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Introduction
«A lack of transparency results in distrust and a deep sense of
insecurity.»
THE DALAI LAMA
This thesis is about the relationship between transparency and cooperation. Here is
how I define the terms for the present purposes. Cooperation is the performance of
an act that is beneficial to others. Transparency is the availability of information
about others’ actions. Fixing a particular group of individuals, the basic question
can be posed as follows: What does the propensity of those individuals to cooperate
with one another has to do with the availability of information they have about each
others’ actions?
In the remainder of this introduction I argue (i) why this question is relevant, (ii)
why the answer to this question is not obvious, (iii) that drawing on the established
paradigm to study cooperation theoretically and experimentally is a useful approach,
(iv) that the respective literature provides valuable insights, (v) but that one critical
aspect has generally received little attention so far. Based on the latter point I am
going to motivate and outline the original contributions contained in this thesis.
Why this question is relevant
Cooperation is fundamental to economic, political, and social life. By working to-
gether as a team, people can achieve things that they cannot achieve by working
alone. However, whenever cooperating is individually costly, shirking pays. In the
marketplace, for example, exchanging products and services honestly is mutually
beneficial but cheating on delivery, quality or payment is tempting. Likewise, all
parties benefiting from a shared resource are better off by using it responsibly and
sustainably, but for each of them there is a temptation for extracting as much as
possible for instant personal gain. Entrusting ones’ democratic decision rights to
representatives or delegates allows for mutual gains from specialization in political
decision-making but abuse of office is tempting. But also conspiring in cartels or
criminal organizations holds mutual benefits for the conspirators, but is vulnerable
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to cheating. Generally, such tensions arise whenever individuals may engage in ac-
tions that result in social benefits that exceed social costs while for the performing
individual private costs exceed private benefits.
How can people work together anyway, and which factors hamper cooperation?
This is one of the most fundamental and important questions science, and in the
social sciences in particular (Kennedy & Norman, 2005; Pennisi, 2005). A long-
standing and influencial thrust in the literature highlights spontaneous social sanc-
tions, reaching from rather explicit to more tacit forms within continuing relation-
ships and communities, as potentially powerful suppressors of opportunism, not only
in distant human history but also in many domains in the contemporary world to
which law and formal contracts do not reach. Documented examples include the
management of shared natural resources (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; Seabright, 1993; Bard-
han, 2000; Kikuchi et al., 2000; Otsuka & Tachibana, 2000), long-distance trade (e.g.
Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif, 1989, 1993, 2006), production teams, cooperatives, and
business networks (e.g. Okun, 1981; Dong & Dow, 1993; Craig & Pencavel, 1995;
Pencavel, 2002; Kawagoe, 2000; Ohno, 2000; Fafchamps, 2000; Platteau & Seki,
2000; Baker et al., 2004), labor relations (e.g. Gintis, 1976; Akerlof, 1982, 1984; Ak-
erlof & Yellen, 1990; Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985; MacLeod & Malcom-
son, 1989, 1998; Kanemoto & MacLeod, 1991), customer relationships (e.g. Okun,
1981; Blinder et al., 1998; Ryssel et al., 2004; Apel et al., 2005) credit unions and as-
sociations (e.g. Hossain, 1988; Banerjee et al., 1994; Besley & Coate, 1995; Fessler,
2002; Armendáriz & Morduch, 2005; Eroglu, 2010), risk-sharing and insurance as-
sociations (e.g. Morduch & Sicular, 2000), open-source software production (e.g.
Benkler, 2002; Osterloh et al., 2008), politics (e.g. Calvert, 1987; Goldstein & Free-
man, 1990), and even residential neighborhoods (e.g. Tilly, 1981; Sampson et al.,
1997; Browning et al., 2005).
Information the involved parties receive about each others behavior is frequently
emphasized as a critical factor moderating the efficacy of such informal governance.
«How can we trust them if we don’t know what they are doing?» Transparency Inter-
national puts it, the world’s major anti-corruption organization (Beddow & Sidwell,
2012, p. 16). It advocates thorough monitoring of representatives, delegates, and of-
ficials by the citizenry as the most forceful instrument to fight corruption, and defines
its function as a facilitator and amplifier. Indeed, this view has gained considerable
momentum in recent years. While there is long tradition of public sector transparency
in the Nordic countries (Manninen, 2006), the 1966 United States Freedom of Infor-
mation Act can be viewed as an ignition of a worldwide spread of similar provisions.1
Even Germany with its long standing tradition of administrative secrecy passed a fed-
eral freedom of information law in September 2005. Supra-nationally, a regulation
(EC 1049/2001) of the European Parliament and the Council grants a right of access
to documents of the three institutions to any Union citizen since 2001. Moreover,
article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1953 provides a right to
freedom of expression, including freedom to receive and impart information. On 11
1See www.right2info.org for a constantly updated list.
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October 2006, 240 years after the first freedom of information legislation was enacted
in Sweden, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights became the first international
tribunal to hold explicitly that access to government information is a fundamental
human right, indeed (Blanton, 2006).
Since around two decades, environmental regulation is undergoing similar trans-
formation. Again beginning in the United States in the 1980s (Sunstein, 1999; Per-
cival et al., 2009), it is culminating in the «third wave» (after command-and-control
and market-based instruments, respectively) of environmental regulation (Tietenberg,
1998; Tietenberg & Wheeler, 2001; Dasgupta et al., 2006b). In the United States, the
setup of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), that publishes toxic emissions from pol-
luting facilities nationwide, was a more practical response, as governmental regula-
tors recognized that conventional regulatory instruments were ill-equipped to handle
the hundreds, and quickly growing number, of pollutants that may have harmful ef-
fects. But the TRI was applauded as being so successful in controlling pollution that it
quickly spread around the world. Most euphorically the idea was taken up in the «de-
veloping world». Lacking sufficient capacities to handle pressing health, safety and
environmental problems through legal liability or governmental regulation, it is often
viewed as the only promising avenue to manage those problems. In collaboration
with the World Bank, many environmental agencies in those countries adapted pub-
lic information programs to the local needs (Dasgupta et al., 2006b). In international
law, this development culminated in the adoption of the Aarhus Convention,2 one of
its three «pillars» devoted to safeguarding access to environmental information, such
that members of the public can get easily informed on what is happening in the en-
vironment around them, in particular to identify potential polluters and monitor what
they are doing. Similar programs to aid community monitoring have also been set up
in the health sector (Dranove, 2002; Björkman & Svensson, 2009, 2010) or the public
education sector (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). Facilitating trust by aiding monitor-
ing and pooling of information about particular traders’ honesty has also a very long
tradition in the marketplace (Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif, 1989, 1993, 2006), and un-
derlays much of consumer protection law (Prosser, 1971; Whitford, 1973), labeling
(Beales, 1994; Golan et al., 2001; Giannakas, 2002; Jin & Leslie, 2003), or feedback
systems in online marketplaces (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002; Resnick et al., 2006;
Jøsang et al., 2007). What all those approaches share is the conviction that mutual
monitoring and sharing of information about particular actors’ conduct is an essential
precondition for effective informal enforcement of cooperation.
Why the answer to this question is not obvious
Two rather different views, which are intimately related to different answers to the
question why people cooperate in the first place, illustrate that the answer to the posed
2It clumsy full name being UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
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question is not obvious anyway. On the one had, one might argue that «without moni-
toring there can be no credible commitment» (Ostrom, 1990, p. 45), without credible
commitment there can be no trust, without trust there can be no cooperation. This
line of reasoning has intuitive appeal, indeed, and it is common. Relatedly, there is an
influential stream in the social sciences, and economics in particular, to explain social
cooperation by extrinsic incentives, rewards and punishments, that induce inherently
selfish individuals to cooperate. In order to apply such rewards and punishments,
the argument can straightforwardly be continued, a minimum requirement is that the
behaviors to be sanctioned are observable. If they are not, incentives that inhibit
cheating are diluted and hence there is no rational reason to trust.
On the other hand, a different explanation of social cooperation emphasizes the
role of moral values and the internalization of social norms, leaving for extrinsic
incentives only a bit part or even a detrimental role. According to this view, cooper-
ativeness is a cultural primitive, by and large short-term invariant and determined by
rather distant social history, not by the incentives current situations create. This view
is more prevalent in sociology (see Durkheim, 1893, for a seminal account), but it has
also been articulated by a number of influential economists, such as Kenneth Arrow
(1971, p. 20), who argued that as an alternative to government enforced contracts
«society may proceed by internalization of these norms [of social
behavior, including ethical and moral codes] to the achievement of the
desired agreement on an unconscious level. There is a whole set of cus-
toms and norms which might be similarly interpreted as agreements to
improve the efficiency of the economic system . . . by providing com-
modities to which the price system is inapplicable.»
Following seminal studies of Putnam (1993b,a), Fukuyama (1995), La Porta et al.
(1997), and Knack & Keefer (1997), a body of empirical studies has accumulated in
the past decade which use some measure of trust, cooperativeness, or «social capital»,
within a population as an independent variable to predict various economic outcomes
(e.g. Zak & Knack, 2001; Guiso et al., 2004, 2008).
A direct consequence of viewing cooperative behavior as a short-term constant
which is not adjusted to specific incentive structures in given situations and domains
is that it should be rather independent from information about others’ behavior. Dore
(1987) and Putnam (1993a), for example, argue that trust and cooperativeness are
culturally transmitted habits formed during centuries of social interaction. Along
the same lines, Fukuyama (1995) asserts that they are the result of shared values
that induce people to generally suppress their private interests to the benefit of the
group. Motivated by the problem of credible commitment, a number of economists
even suggested that humans might have evolved bio-psychological adaptions that
may suppress self-interest (e.g. Schelling, 1978; Hirshlifer, 1978, 1985, 1987; Ak-
erlof, 1983; Frank, 1988).3 One might even reverse the relationship, as monitoring
3Frank (1988), however, does consider that such adaptions might also be conditional. I come back
to this below.
4
and other forms of control may create a milieu of suspicion, undermine civic or moral
duties, or may be perceived as an signal of mistrust that is responded with less not
more cooperation (Titmuss, 1970; Frey & Jegen, 2001).
Relatedly, a body of evidence has accumulated in recent years (see section 2.2)
that shows that people frequently act against their own material self-interest, and the
evidence may be interpreted in a way that tactical considerations may actually of
minor importance. In fact, based on these results economists argued that cooperation
within relationships and communities is to a considerable extent non-strategic (e.g.
Bowles & Gintis, 2002, 2005b). But what, then, does this imply for the relationship
between transparency and cooperation? Do people also cooperate if they have very
little or no information about interaction partners’ past conduct? Do they actually
respond to more of such information with more cooperation? The aim of this thesis
is not to argue that either of these views is incorrect but to take them as a good reason
to investigate the fine-structure of the relationship between the propensity of a given
group of individuals to cooperate with one another and the availability of information
they have about each others’ actions in more detail.
Approach
The real world is extremely complex. It is very difficult to grasp, let alone under-
stand, the rich situations of our everyday life by mere observation because a myriad
of things is going on simultaneously, and they usually interact in complex ways. For
this reason economists build models of the world. The art of modeling is to con-
sider one phenomenon, problem, or supposed relationship at a time, distill its generic
essence and abstract from the richness of the real world in a way that its becomes
comprehensible. Any model is necessarily «wrong» in that it does not replicate the
real world, but this is the very reason to build models in the first place. The same ap-
plies for empirical research, and economic experimentation in particular. Economic
experiments can be viewed as simple models populated by real people. They need to
be simple to be useful. Like models they help us to create and refine hypotheses, and
strengthen or weaken the priors about them, but hypotheses always remain hypothe-
ses that ultimately must be evaluated in the world we actually live in.4 Therefore,
modeling and experimentation are utilities that help to understand the world better,
but are always to be understood as complements not substitutes to other approaches.5
There exists a generic paradigm in the behavioral and social sciences to represent
the problem of cooperation in such a stylized way that it becomes easy to study it
4To view not only the results of theoretical models («thought experiments») but also the results of
experiments as new predictions perhaps help to avoid the misunderstanding that behavioral experiments
provide for readily generalizable «truths».
5There is a sizable economic literature considering the role of transparency for corruption and fiscal
discipline (e.g. Hameed, 2005; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Peisakhin, 2012), environmental management
(e.g. Stephan, 2002; Hamilton, 2005; Dasgupta et al., 2006a), investment decisions (e.g. Drabek &
Payne, 2002; Gelos & Wei, 2005), or monetary policy (see Geraats, 2002, for an overview).
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theoretically and experimentally, as a game. I will introduce this game in section
1.1.1. Within this game, I conceptualize transparency just as the accuracy with which
information about a player’s actions is conferred to the other players. This is, of
course, not the only way to conceptualize the concept, but I hope to convince the
reader that it is an illuminating one. It corresponds closely to the physical definition
(an action is easily observed behind a wall of glass, but not behind a wall of stone)
and also corresponds closely to the common usage of the term in a social context.
The advantage of studying the relationship between transparency thus defined and
cooperation in the established paradigm of cooperation games is that the latter have
been studied extensively, both theoretically and experimentally, and it is therefore
possible to screen the literature with the specific focus of the guiding question: What
does the propensity of individuals in a given group to cooperate with one another has
to do with the availability of information they have about each others’ actions? I will
do this chapters 1 and 2. Although the reviews contain no fundamentally novel ma-
terial, I hope its organization around the specific focus outlined above is nonetheless
a useful contribution to the literature.
Received literature
Theory
In the first chapter I begin with outlining the generic problem of cooperation within
a simple model. Mutual cooperation is beneficial to all, but cheating (assuming
that cooperation is costly) always pays. In a selfish world cooperation therefore al-
ways needs to be enforced. Cooperating must provide for a return benefit (reward or
avoided punishment) that renders cooperation profitable. I will highlight that if such
enforcement needs to be performed by the individuals in the group themselves, then
information about the others’ actions becomes generally critical, since rewards and
punishments are by definition conditioned on past play.
In the remainder of the first chapter, I investigate the qualifications and fine-
structure of this tentative conclusion. Beginning with a setting in which players inter-
act repeatedly and every action is perfectly observed by all other players, I illustrate
that strategies that condition behavior on this information can enforce cooperation
if one of two conditions are met: (i) The players believe that their coplayers might
be precommitted to play the conditionally cooperative strategy as well, or (ii) the
horizon of the interaction is indefinite. If neither condition is satisfied, unconditional
defection is the unique stable outcome, which is another way to say that players do
not care about what the others did before. If one of the conditions apply, then signif-
icant cooperation is possible by the application of conditional strategies that reward
cooperative behavior and punish non-cooperative behavior. Since all cooperation in
these settings hinges on the fact that all actions are perfectly transparent and hence
each player is perfectly informed about her or his coplayers’ history, one might expect
that applying rewards and punishments is more difficult if such information becomes
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limited, and as a result cooperation might be much more difficult to sustain.
I investigate to what extent this intuition is correct in sections 1.3 and 1.4. In
section 1.3 I consider a setting in which the information about the other players’
actions is limited in one special way: it may contain errors but all individuals in the
group receive the same signals. In this case, monitoring is said to be imperfect but
public. The literature has found that the beforementioned result extends to this case,
that is, (almost) any degree of mutual cooperation is possible by means of strategies
that condition rewards and punishments on the information on the coplayer’s behavior
available. For empirical purposes, it is important to observe that the result is also
consistent with actual cooperation being infrequent even when noise is small. A
related result provides a reason to hypothesize that the propensity of individuals in
a group to cooperate with another will at least not decease as information about one
anothers’ actions becomes more accurate.
In section 1.4 I turn to a setting in which the information about the other players’
actions is limited in a more general way: it may not only be inaccurate but different
players may also receive different information about particular players’ actions. In
this case, monitoring is said to be private. If information about past actions is dis-
persed among the players in the group in the form of many small packages of private
information, it becomes generally very difficult to coordinate on stable cooperation.
On the other hand, the settings in which cooperation can be sustained under public
(perfect) monitoring turn out to be much more encompassing, including not only situ-
ations in which the same individuals interact for an indefinite period of time but even
situations in which the same individuals meet hardly more than once. Furthermore,
mechanisms that honestly transmit information about the players’ behavior to other
players, to bring monitoring closer to public, render cooperation more likely. How-
ever, how such information processing should happen in a group of selfish individuals
remains unexplained.
I conclude the first chapter by remarking, that all cooperation in the models re-
viewed is tactical in the sense that individuals only cooperate with one another if it
is in their (long-term) self-interest. A number of questions follow immediately: Do
real people actually perform such tactics? Do real people only cooperate for tactical
reasons? What strategies do they actually play in repeated games? What information
about the coplayers’ actions to they use? How do they respond if such information
becomes limited?
Evidence
In the second chapter I take up those questions and selectively screen the empirical
literature in order to find answers. I will proceed in roughly two steps. As a first step, I
will focus on games with perfect monitoring and investigate when and to what extent
subjects play strategies that are conditioned on information about the coplayers’ past
actions. This will be a useful first step in order to identify situations in which the
degree of information players have about the history of play likely has an impact.
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In section 2.1 I review evidence on behavior in repeated games with perfect mon-
itoring. Results show that a majority of subjects actually cooperates tactically. They
use the available information about the coplayers’ past behavior to condition their
current behavior. However, there is a persistent residuum of cooperation even in
(approximated) one-shot interactions which cannot be accounted for by tactical con-
siderations. In section 2.2 I consider this residuum in more detail, and put special
emphasis on evidence that is informative with respect to the present guiding ques-
tion. A large body of evidence shows clearly that people do not always cooperate
for tactical reasons, but there is also evidence that such cooperation is conditioned on
coplayers’ behavior anyway.
If some subjects are willing to incur a cost to confer a benefit to someone else, are
there also subjects who are willing to incur a cost to impose a cost on someone else?
I review the evidence on this question with a focus on the degree of conditioning on
coplayers’ past behavior, in which case such behavior can serve as a punishment, in
section 2.3. The evidence shows that such spiteful behavior is very common in var-
ious subject pools worldwide. Furthermore, it is frequently used as a punishment of
non-cooperative behavior, even by unaffected third-parties, with strongly disciplin-
ing effects. It follows predictable patterns, despite the fact that pecuniary incentives
seem to play a significantly smaller role than for cooperative behavior. But there are
exceptions and evidence that the degree of conditioning varies.
In sum, the evidence from experiments under perfect monitoring shows that if
information about the other players’ past behavior is readily available, this informa-
tion is generally used in order to play a discriminatory strategy, even in situations
in which material returns from doing so is ruled out. As a result, there are material
incentives to cooperate when the same players meet more than once. This is reflected
in a notably higher frequency of cooperation in repeated games compared to (ap-
proximated) one-shot games. Nonetheless, there is also significant cooperation in the
latter, in particular if costly punishment is available. In one sentence: if informa-
tion about the other players’ past behavior is readily available, cooperation generally
occurs and can be very high if the interaction is repeated.
As a second step, I consider conditions in which this information is actually lim-
ited. While imperfect monitoring is an issue in the theoretical literature for quite
some time, there is only a very small (but growing) experimental literature, which I
review in the final part of the second chapter. Section 2.4 deals with cooperation ex-
periments in which the signals the players receive about their coplayers behavior are
subject to some random disturbance. In cooperation experiments with an indefinite
horizon and imperfect public monitoring, the available evidence shows that there is
cooperation at any level of noise, but always less than maximal. Furthermore, the
frequency of cooperation decreases as noise increases, and cooperation in conditions
with very inaccurate information is not more frequent than under one-shot play. Fi-
nally, subjects seem to resort to more lenient and forgiving variants of conditional
strategies, that wait for a coplayer to defect two or three times before reverting to
punishment mode, and return to cooperation after a punishment phase has occurred.
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These results suggest that one cannot just interpolate results obtained in a perfect
monitoring setting to ones with informational constraints. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the available evidence on imperfect monitoring in cooperation games with
an option to reduce coplayers’ payoffs. It is shown that payoff reductions become
more frequent and cooperation less frequent as monitoring gets more noisy.
Finally, in section 2.5 I consider studies that implement different conceptualiza-
tions of private monitoring. The received evidence is affirmative with respect to the
hypothesis that information transmission, or the publication or disclosure of behav-
ioral records may facilitate cooperation relative to conditions in which monitoring
is private. The frequency of cooperation is generally lowest in private monitoring
conditions, and information transmission in some form or the other increases cooper-
ation. If matching is non-random, disclosure also reduces the clientelization effects
observed under private monitoring. The evidence is more ambiguous with respect
to the question whether random matching games with public monitoring provide for
equally efficient results as repeated interaction among the same individuals. To sum-
marize with respect to our guiding question, the available evidence suggest that the
level of cooperation (and efficiency) is generally increasing in the accuracy and sym-
metry of information players have about each others’ actions.
In sum the insights obtained feed back on the two divergent views about why
people cooperate and what role information about coplayers’ behavior might play.
The evidence shows that both views have merit. People cooperate to a significant
extent tactically, use reciprocity strategically to realize mutual benefits as envisaged
by game theory, and thereby draw strongly on information about coplayers’ past be-
havior. But people also forgo own material gains to cooperate or reduce incomes of
others. A significant fraction of those latter behaviors are conditioned on information
about coplayers’ past play anyway. In a one-sentence summary: there is cooperation
even in situations in which people have minimal or no information about others’ be-
havior, but increasing such information generally facilitates cooperation significantly.
One aspect that is seldomly considered
After having reviewed the existing literature I point to one aspect that is shared by
both theory and experimentation: information structures are generally considered as
an exogenous parameter. In reality, information about others’ behavior is not just
available, non-available, or something in between, but is must be produced, acquired
and transmitted. This implies that transparency, as defined here, is not just there or
absent, it is created by the players themselves, information structures are endogenous.
This fact is vividly illustrated by Milgrom et al. (1990) in their account on the
revival of trade in Europe during the early middle ages. During this time, merchants
evolved their own private code, known as the Lex Mercatoria, that was mutually
enforced, and enforcement relied on shared information about individual members’
conduct. But given that getting informed (monitoring) and information transmission
is generally costly, what incentives did the merchants have to engage in such activi-
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ties? The the vast majority of received theoretical and experimental literature is silent
on this issue because it considers information structures generally as exogenous. It
thereby abstracts from the possibility that players may alter them themselves. In other
words, the standard approach in the theoretical experimental literature is to confront
the players with a given information structure, and investigate how they behave with-
out adjusting the strategy space relative to the case of perfect monitoring. However,
when studying settings in which the players’ information is imperfect it seems in-
tuitive that at least one extension of the strategy set is natural: to acquire better or
additional information!
Doing so might have a number of interesting implications. First, if we allow play-
ers to acquire more accurate information (at a cost), then they might adopt strategies
that produce entirely different cooperative and sanctioning behaviors than the strate-
gies that they adopt under an exogenously given information structure. Second, if
we allow players to acquire more accurate information at a cost, then the player also
has the option to forgo the opportunity. This implies, for example, that there must be
some (potentially intrinsic) incentives «to become adequately informed about how
others had behaved» even though this «might be personally costly» Milgrom et al.
(1990, p. 1). Investigating the nature of those incentives might be an interesting
avenue for research. Milgrom et al. (1990), for instance, argued the there were par-
ticular institutional features in the merchant community that provided incentives to
disclose evidence against violators of the code to the community and to become in-
formed in the first place. They documented that the system was indeed very success-
ful in enforcing honest behavior. This view puts the institutional and technological
environment as a determinant of information acquisition and transmission, and there-
fore the degree of «equilibrium transparency», center stage. This conception is the
motivation for all original contributions in chapters 3 through 7.
Outline of the original contributions
The first four original contributions reported in chapters 3 through 6 are empirical
studies that augment established experimental paradigms to study cooperation and
sanctioning by options to acquire more accurate information (at a cost) about their
coplayers’ previous behavior before acting themselves. In the final chapter 7 I draw
on the above line of reasoning that highlights the technological environment as a
determinant of information acquisition and transmission, and therefore the degree of
«equilibrium transparency», and investigate its relation to measures of generalized
trust using a large sample of micro-level survey data. I now provide a brief outline.
In chapter 3, which is co-authored with Timo Goeschl, we study mutual mon-
itoring and punishment behavior in a simple one-shot cooperation experiment. We
extend upon earlier research that introduced informational imperfections exogenously
by allowing for their endogenous mitigation through costly acquisition of informa-
tion. Specifically, players can decide to resolve imperfect information about coplayer
behavior at the cooperation stage through a perfect, but costly monitoring technol-
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ogy. We study how monitoring and punishment respond to changes in information
costs. The key findings are a follows. First, positive information costs have the
predicted impact of decreasing the supply of punishment. Second, while all sanc-
tioning is discriminate at zero information costs, a distinct share of subjects switches
to «blind» punishment rather than refraining from sanctioning when information is
costly. Third, positive information costs lead to defectors making up a smaller share
of the punished and receiving smaller punishment compared to zero information
costs. Fourth, I find that beliefs and risk aversion contribute to explaining individu-
als’ monitoring and punishment behavior. Fifth, turning to cooperation, single-round
cooperation under positive monitoring costs is maintained because subjects overes-
timate monitoring and punishment, in contrast to the baseline of zero information
costs.
In chapter 4 (also co-authored with Timo Goeschl) we draw on the setup of the
previous chapter and study monitoring and punishment behavior by materially unaf-
fected third parties, and compare it to their second party counterparts. We find the
following. First, positive information costs have the predicted impact of decreasing
the supply of punishment. Second, while virtually all sanctioning is discriminate at
zero information costs, a distinct share of subjects switches to «blind» punishment
rather than refraining from sanctioning when information is costly. Third, condi-
tional on the decision to remain uninformed, it is risk averse subjects that tend to
punish blindly, and more risk tolerant subjects that tend to refrain from punishment.
Fourth, positive information costs lead to defectors making up a smaller share of
the punished and receiving smaller punishment compared to zero information costs.
Fifth, while third party punishment provides for weaker incentives to cooperate than
second party punishment already when monitoring is costless, positive information
costs render this difference even larger.
In chapter 5 (again co-authored with Timo Goeschl) we study finite horizon mod-
ified trust games with endogenous information structures. At the end of each period,
the first mover may acquire information about the second mover’s action in that pe-
riod. We exogenously vary the cost of monitoring, and find that the introduction of
information costs results in less monitoring and an emergence of blind trust as a new
behavior type, where (i) blind trust is the dominant behavior under costly monitoring,
(ii) first mover cooperation is more frequent, and (iii) payoffs are higher if informa-
tion is costly. Furthermore, the average first mover in the costly monitoring condition
did not worse than in the costless monitoring condition, and the average blind trustor
did not worse than the average monitor or defector. We find that this static differ-
ences between conditions stem from differences in the respective dynamic patterns.
The preferred interpretation is a «second-order reputation building» hypothesis, ac-
cording to which some second movers try to strategically exploit the costliness of
monitoring by investing in a sufficiently favorable reputation in the initial periods
in which they are likely to be monitored in order induce blind trust and reap larger
gains from exploitation in later periods. We provide further results that support this
interpretation.
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The setup of the previous chapter is extended upon in chapter 6, in which I inves-
tigate the question whether and how the length of the horizon influences the patterns
of monitoring and blind trust by exogenously varying the length of the horizon of
a given match. I find the following: First, the key results of the previous chapter
are qualitatively replicated for matches with a considerably shorter horizon, but blind
trust remains clearly the exception here. Second, the average first mover’s behavior is
independent from the length of the horizon when monitoring is costless, while blind
trust and overall first mover cooperation is significantly more frequent in long hori-
zon than short horizon matches when monitoring was costly. Third, while in long
horizon matches first mover cooperation is significantly more frequent under costly
than under costless monitoring, this difference vanishes in short horizon matches. In
consequence, efficiency is ceteris paribus higher in long horizon than in short horizon
matches, and ceteris paribus not lower under costly than under costless monitoring.
We underpin these results by an investigation of the behavioral dynamics and a pos-
sible interpretation.
Finally, in chapter 7 I carry the conceptualization to the field. A previous study by
Fisman & Khanna (1999) found a positive relationship between landline connectivity
and survey-measured generalized trust using highly aggregated data and a limited set
of control variables. In chapter 7 I replicate this relationship using (i) individual level
micro-data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), (ii) an improved, more
fine-git, and experimentally validated measure of generalized trust, (iii) and using
alternative estimation methods. I extend on the study by (i) controlling for a much
larger set of variables, (ii) drawing on an experimentally validated measure of beliefs
into others trustworthiness, and (iii) extending the set of considered communication
technologies to include cellular phones, internet (both narrow and broad bandwidth),
and television. I find evidence suggesting that the effect is, as predicted by economic
theory, mediated by beliefs, that it becomes significantly weaker as variables on level
of education and local network inclusion are controlled for, and that there is a sig-
nificantly positive effect of broad bandwidth internet connectivity, and a significantly
negative effect of TV set possession.
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Chapter 1
Transparency & Cooperation: Concep-
tions & Theory
What does the propensity of individuals in a given group to cooperate with one an-
other has to do with the availability of information they have about each others’
actions? The purpose of this chapter is to briefly screen the major theoretical ap-
proaches to cooperation in economics with this guiding question as a specific focus.
In the first section I begin with outlining the generic problem of cooperation
within a simple model. Mutual cooperation is beneficial to all, but cheating (assum-
ing that cooperation is costly) always pays. In a selfish world cooperation therefore
always needs to be enforced. Cooperating must provide for a return benefit (reward
or avoided punishment) that renders cooperation profitable. I will highlight that if
such enforcement needs to be performed by the individuals in the group themselves,
then information about the others’ actions becomes generally critical, since rewards
and punishments are by definition conditioned on past play.
In the remainder of this chapter, I investigate the qualifications and fine-structure
of this tentative conclusion. Beginning with a setting in which players interact re-
peatedly and every action is perfectly observed by all other players, I illustrate that
strategies that condition behavior on this information can enforce cooperation if one
of two conditions are met: (i) The players believe that their coplayers might be pre-
committed to play a conditionally cooperative strategy as well, or (ii) the horizon
of the interaction is indefinite. If neither condition is satisfied, unconditional de-
fection is the unique (sequential) equilibrium outcome of any repeated PD, which
is another way to say that players do not care about what the others did before. If
one of them is satisfied, then significant cooperation is possible by the application of
conditional strategies that reward cooperative behavior and punish non-cooperative
behavior. Since all cooperation in these settings hinges on the fact that all actions
are perfectly transparent and hence each player is perfectly informed about her or his
coplayers’ history, one might expect that applying rewards and punishments is more
difficult if information about the coplayer’s behavior becomes limited, and as a result
cooperation might be much more difficult to sustain.
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I investigate to what extent this intuition is correct in sections 1.3 and 1.4. In sec-
tion 1.3 I consider a setting in which the information about the other players’ actions
is limited in one specific way: it may contain errors but all individuals in the group
receive the same signals. In this case, monitoring is said to be imperfect but public.
The literature has found that the folk theorem extends to this case, that is, (almost)
any degree of mutual cooperation is possible by means of strategies that condition
rewards and punishments on the information about the coplayer’s behavior avail-
able. For empirical purposes, it is important to observe that under imperfect public
monitoring punishment can occur at times on the equilibrium path such that actual
cooperation may be quite low even when noise is small. A related result provides a
reason to hypothesize that the propensity of individuals in a group to cooperate with
another will at least not decease as information about one anothers’ actions becomes
more accurate.
In section 1.4 I turn to a setting in which the information about the other players’
actions is limited in a more general way: it may not only be inaccurate but differ-
ent players may also receive different information about particular players’ actions.
In this case, monitoring is said to be private. If information about past actions is
dispersed among the players in the group in the form of many small packages of pri-
vate information, it becomes generally very difficult to coordinate on a cooperative
equilibrium. On the other hand, the settings in which cooperation can be sustained
under public (perfect) monitoring turn out to be much more encompassing, including
not only situations in which the same individuals interact for an indefinite period of
time but even situations in which the same individuals meet hardly more than once.
Furthermore, mechanisms that honestly transmit information about the players’ be-
havior to other players, to bring monitoring closer to public, render cooperation more
likely. However, how such information processing should happen in a group of selfish
individuals remains unexplained.
In section 1.5 I conclude with two remarks that concern the need for empirical
facts and the exogeneity of information structures.
1.1 The generic problem of cooperation
Etymologically, the term «cooperation» comes from Latin cooperationem, which is
put together from com- («with») and operari («to work»), thus meaning literally «a
working together» (Onions, 1966; Klein, 1971). In this way, cooperation is com-
monly said to occur when two or more individuals engage in joint actions that result
in mutual benefits (see for example the Collins English Dictionary or The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language). Examples include the mutually ben-
eficial exchange of goods and services, contributions to finance or maintain shared
facilities, working together in a team, managing shared natural resources, collusion
among firms, or participating in collective actions such as demonstrations, strikes,
boycotts, coups, or warfare.
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1.1.1 Cooperation
A model that is able to represent cooperation should have three ingredients. First,
cooperation is a social phenomenon, such that at the very minimum two individuals
are needed to capture it. Second, cooperation involves activity. Finally, cooperation
is defined relative to the consequences of this activity.
Strictly speaking, only individuals can «act», such that the primitive of joint or
collective action must be individual action (Dugatkin, 1997). In this sense, the primi-
tive of mutually beneficial cooperation is in the behavioral sciences typically defined
as individual action that is beneficial to other individuals (Hamilton, 1964a,b). To
capture this formally in the simplest way, consider an individual, which I call One
(female articles), that lives in a population N of size n ∈ {Z ∶ n ≥ 2}, and may choose
from a set A1 = {0,α} of mutually exclusive courses of action a1, where a1 = α > 0
represents the performance of some action, and a1 = 0 represents the logical nega-
tion (maintaining the status quo). The performance of the action has consequences
for One (private consequences) and other individuals in the population (social conse-
quences). Specifically, assume that a1 = α implies a cost κ ∈R (which may be nega-
tive in which case it is a benefit) for One, and an external benefit η ∈R (which may be
negative in which case it is a cost) that is somehow shared among the remaining n−1
individuals. Costs and benefits are normalized such that maintaining the status quo,
a1 = 0, entails neither private nor social consequences, κ = η = 0. Costs and benefits
are to be understood in a ceteris paribus fashion, that is, the performance of the act
is the only change in an otherwise constant world.1 For the time being, I adopt the
assumption n = 2 for sake of parsimony, a generalization to n > 2 is straightforward (I
come to this below). I call the second individual Two and use male articles.
I now apply (more or less) standard terminology to classify actions with respect
to their private and social consequences (e.g. West et al., 2007b). Action a1 = α is
called cooperative if and only if η ≥ 0, otherwise the action is called non-cooperative.
One may call α weakly cooperative or socially neutral in case η = 0, and strictly
cooperative if η > 0. A cooperative action is called mutualistic if and only if κ ≤ 0,
otherwise (κ > 0) it is called altruistic.2
1Generally, the appropriate metric on the set of consequences depends on the problem at hand. In
biology benefits and costs are measured in terms of direct genetic or cultural fitness consequences, that
is, relative reproductive success in a constant environment (see Lehmann & Keller, 2006; West et al.,
2007b,a, for recent overviews). Such consequences capture usually very long time frames, which is
natural for evolutionary biologists’ interest in «ultimate» explanations (Tinbergen, 1963). Ecologists,
anthropologists and social scientists, including economists, have a more proximate perspective, that is,
they are interested in the more immediate consequences, such that different metrics are useful (Tinber-
gen, 1963; Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; Nowak, 2006; Jensen et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010). Specifically, it
is standard practice in economic applications to operationalize costs and benefits in terms of pecuniary
consequences or effects on consumption possibilities (broadly construed). See Becker (1976a) for an
account on the relationship between the operationalizations in biology and economics.
2One may call actions for which η < 0 and κ ≤ 0 hold selfish or egoistic, and actions with conse-
quences η < 0 and κ > 0 spiteful. However, there is usually no loss of generality in restricting attention
to α being cooperative, since non-cooperative acts are just the converse of cooperative acts, that is, the
omission of a non-cooperative act can be represented as a cooperative act by just switching labels: we
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The specification can be readily extended to a larger (possibly continuous) action
set A1, that captures the notion of «levels» of a cooperative behavior (e.g. helping
a little, helping a lot) or different behaviors that differ in their cooperativeness in
the sense of having differential external effects.3 Again, this complication does not
produce important additional insights, so for the time being I stick to the more parsi-
monious dichotomous case.
With this simple generic representation of what it means to «cooperate», it is
easy to conceptualize the notion of engaging in «joint action for mutual benefit»:
If both individuals can perform a cooperative action for which η > κ holds, then
working together, exchanging cooperative acts reciprocally, is mutually beneficial.
Both players realize a net benefit of η −κ > 0 such that each of them is better off,
even if κ > 0, by working together compared to each of them working alone. In other
words, mutual cooperation yields a strict Pareto improvement over mutual defect.
This is the kind of self-interested cooperation Adam Smith (1776, p. 19, emphasis
added) described when he famously wrote that
«man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is
in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more
likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show
them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires
of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to
do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you
want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we
obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which
we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to
their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their
advantages.»
It is apparent that such generic exchange of cooperation models not only exchanges
of services in the narrow sense, but virtually all situations in which One and Two can
work together to achieve something that is not possible to achieve by working alone.
In this case η is an individual’s contribution to the common project and κ is the
personal opportunity cost of contributing. It models also the avoidance or resolution
of costly conflict or the sustainable conservation of shared resources: in this case κ
is the personal opportunity cost and η the other’s benefit of restraint.
can label the performance of the non-cooperative act by a1 = 0, and the abstention from it by a1 = α .
It is easy to see that this just reverses the inequalities in the above definitions. There can be cases,
however, in which the distinction is useful (see for example section 2.3). It should also be noted that
those definitions neither refer to motivations nor have any normative connotations (see Sober & Wilson,
1998, for an comprehensive discussion).
3Our simple dichotomous case is nested in this general model with η (a1) ∶ A1 → R and κ (a1) ∶
A1 → R representing the social and private consequences, respectively, as a function of a1, requiring
η (0) = 0 and κ (0) = 0, and defining with some abuse of notation η (α) ∶= η and κ (α) ∶= κ .
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Henceforth, one might be led to conclude that if there are mutual gains feasible
as above, a «win-win-situation», then exploiting them is a «rational» thing to do, just
like grabbing cash on the table. Thus, «rational selfishness», in the sense of cooperat-
ing when it personally pays off, appears to be enough for widespread cooperation to
occur. Indeed, this is what Adam Smith (1776, p. 488f, emphasis added) concluded
later in his seminal work:
«[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of
the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By
preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain,
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to
promote an end which was no part of his intention . . . By pursuing his
own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually
than when he really intends to promote it.»
This idea became the basis for the Walrasian model, the dominant model in economic
theory until quite recently, which culminated in the welfare theorems of Kenneth
Arrow and Gerard Debreu (Arrow & Debreu, 1954; Debreu, 1959; Arrow & Hahn,
1971). In essence, they are an almost trivial consequence of the assumption that if
there are mutual gains, as in the above stylized situation involving One and Two, they
are realized.
1.1.2 The problem of opportunism
While Smith’s view highlights one aspect of self-interest, it neglects another critical
part: whenever κ > 0, then independently from Two’s behavior One is always better
off by refusing to cooperate. To see this, consider the payoff consequences of One’s
behavioral alternatives in the two possible contingencies. In case Two cooperates,
One gets η − κ by cooperating and η by the non-cooperative move, whereas the
latter is always greater by assumption κ > 0. If Two does not cooperate, One gets −κ
by cooperating and zero by the non-cooperative move, again the latter being always
greater by assumption κ > 0. Thus, independently from Two’s behavior, cooperation
does never pay.
Under the traditional behavioral assumptions employed in economics (see Mas-
Colell et al., 1995; Bowles, 2004; Kirchgässner, 2008, for detailed expositions),
which imply that a course of action is performed if and only if it pays off in material
terms relative to the other alternatives, it follows that whenever κ > 0 One will refuse
to cooperate independently from Two’s behavior, that is, non-cooperation is said to
be a strictly dominant strategy.4 The same is true for Two, such that both players will
4The behavioral assumptions imply that the case κ ≤ 0 is not very interesting, since such cooperative
acts will be performed by immediate self-interest already; the external benefits are windfall gains.
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refuse to cooperate and the mutual gains will not be exploited. This generic problem
is well known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD).5 It readily extends to any arbitrary
number of players: suppose there is a finite number n of players, each having the
two behavioral alternatives as before, but now the external benefit η generated by
one player’s cooperation is equally shared among the remaining n−1 players. This
is well known as the public good game. It is easy to show that under the mentioned
behavioral assumptions defection still is a strictly dominant strategy for all players.
This was highlighted by Samuelson (1954). In all these situations, everyone would
be better off if everyone could cooperate, however, everyone defects, «ruefully but
rationally, confirming one another’s melancholy expectations» (Putnam, 1993b).
Thus, the «invisible hand» and the Prisoner’s Dilemma predict outcomes that
could hardly be any farther apart: While the former predicts that aggregate wealth
of a population will be maximized if each individual pursues her or his own profit,
the latter reverses this statement. This puzzled economists (and other social scien-
tists alike) since the PD was devised by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in the
early 1950s (Flood, 1952). The stark difference stems from differing assumptions
about the possibilities for the players to commit to, or bind themselves to a particular
course of action (see Bowles, 2004, for an overview). The central assumption under-
lying the Walrasian model is that perfect commitment is possible at no cost. This is
often termed «complete contracting», and it eliminates any possibility for cheating
on agreements by assumption.
The PD turns the perfect commitment assumption on its head in the sense that
no binding commitments are possible at all.6 Whenever complete contracting is in-
feasible, contributing to some potentially mutually beneficial endeavor exposes in-
dividuals to possible exploitation by others acting opportunistically. The temptation
for opportunistic behavior is the personal gain accruing over and above the mutually
cooperative payoff by «taking a free ride» on the others’ cooperation, which in our
simple model is equal to η −(η −κ) = κ .
1.1.3 Reward and punishment
The problem could obviously be «solved» by just «taxing» or «subsidizing» away the
gain from opportunism, that is, provide appropriate counter-incentives by a respective
reward and/or punishment scheme that renders cheating unattractive and cooperation
a selfish best response. That is, if we assume that there is some central enforcement
automaton that monitors the players’ behavior and imposes a punishment p ≥ κ on
In particular, such acts are performed independently from anyone else’s behavior. Keeping with the
literature on cooperation, I will restrict attention to the interesting case η > κ > 0. Even if we want to
assume that the players are not entirely selfish, there is still always a temptation to defect, which renders
the problem still (or even more) interesting. I come to this below.
5In economics this problem has many names, among others social dilemma, problem of cooperation,
free-riding problem, problem of opportunism, tragedy of the commons, problem of collective action, or
moral hazard.
6A corollary is that in a selfish world pre-play communication, promises or agreements are com-
pletely irrelevant because they are not credible. I come to this below.
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any defection, or a reward of r ≥ κ on any cooperative act, or some combination of
both, then the players are deterred from cheating. To see this, observe that One’s
payoff from cooperating, given that Two cooperates as well, is η −κ + r, and the
payoff from defecting is η − p, such that cooperation is a best response if and only if
η −κ + r ≥ η − p⇔ r+ p ≥ κ
The same condition results contingent on Two defecting. Thus, if all actions by all
players are subject to an incentive scheme for which this condition holds, then mutual
cooperation instead of mutual defect becomes the unique equilibrium in dominant
strategies (the idea goes back to Pigou, 1932).
1.1.4 Conclusion
Recall that I defined transparency as the availability of information about the other
individuals’ actions. Does it matter in the settings reviewed above? That is, does the
propensity of individuals in a given group (here One and Two) to cooperate with one
another has to do with the availability of information they have about each others’ ac-
tions? The answer is «no». In the Walrasian world with perfect and costless commit-
ment, the players can costlessly bind themselves to the mutual cooperation outcome,
so once committed there is no reason to monitor the coplayers behavior. Likewise, if
no precommitment is feasible but there is an enforcement automaton which is perfect
in the sense that it can monitor all players actions and imposes sufficient rewards and
punishments diligently, both players have a strictly dominant strategy which is by
definition independent from the coplayer’s behavior. The same is true if the enforce-
ment automaton is imperfect or absent, this time defection being the strictly dominant
strategy. Generally, information about the other individuals’ action is apparently only
relevant if a player wants to condition own behavior on the behavior of the other play-
ers. We might expect this to be the case if the rewards and punishments mentioned
above need to come at least partially (this includes their contribution to centralized
enforcement, for example by reporting, complaining, verifying or litigating, which
all is costly) from the players themselves. I turn to this case in the next section.
1.2 Mutual enforcement
Assume that One and Two play the PD, and Two is informed about One’s action
before choosing his own.7 Observe that this setting involves an opportunity for Two
to reward One for cooperative and punish her for non-cooperative behavior. Reward
comes just in the form of reciprocation and punishment in the form of withholding it,
7That the sequence of moves in a game models the information structure and not the actual temporal
structure of actions is easily illustrated: Suppose that One and Two play the PD, and that Two chooses
temporally before One. Suppose further, however, that One is not informed about Two’s action at the
point of her own choice. It is easy to see, then, that One’s situation is no different from one in which
she chooses temporally before Two.
19
that is, to cooperate conditionally on One’s cooperation. If we assume that Two plays
this strategy, and this is known to One, then One faces the incentive scheme r+ p =η .
Thus, since defecting (relative to cooperating) still generates a gain κ but now also
carries an opportunity cost of η , then by assumption η > κ cooperation becomes a
strict best response to her. It is easy to check that these strategies are mutual best
responses, that is, the strategy profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium point. Thus,
one might argue that conditional cooperation, or (direct) reciprocity, enforces mutual
cooperation even if there is no external enforcer at all.
However, this equilibrium violates a basic notion of dynamic consistency. To see
this, observe that under the mentioned behavioral assumption of selfishness the con-
ditionally cooperative strategy «cooperate if One cooperates, defect if One defects»
involves a promise that is not sequentially consistent, that is, once One actually coop-
erated, it is no more in Two’s interest to adhere to the promise of reciprocating. This
is just because κ > 0. If One perfectly knows about Two’s interests, it is not plausible
to assume that she will believe such non-credible promises (and threats), and for this
reason game theorists generally reject equilibria that rely on non-sequentially con-
sistent strategies and call possibly remaining ones sequential equilibria (or subgame
perfect equilibria in games with complete information, see van Damme, 1983). The
notion of sequential equilibrium requires that Two’s strategy must specify an action
contingent on all of One’s possible actions that are still in his interest to perform
once he is informed about One’s actual action.8 In other words, it does not allow for
threats and promises off the equilibrium path that are not credible. It is easy to check
that mutual defecting is the unique sequential equilibrium of the sequential PD. Thus,
in equilibrium, Two still defects unconditionally, which is another way to say that he
does not care about information about what One did before.
1.2.1 The shadow of the future
Intuitively, one might expect that the problem outlined above might disappear if the
interaction does not end after Two’s action but there are many future opportunities
to respond on one anothers’ actions, that is, there is a long shadow of the future.
The basic idea is probably best captured by the common German idiom «man trifft
sich immer zweimal im Leben» («you always meet twice», in English commonly
known as «be nice to people on your way up because you will meet them on your
way down»). The essence is that cooperation might be turned into a long-term best
response if cooperation is exchanged conditionally («I’ll scratch your back if you’ll
scratch mine») and there is a long enough horizon of future interaction. The prospect
for repeat business might work this way just as the prospect of being shunned can be
a strong motivator to be honest and generous to friends, neighbors, and colleagues.
8Generally, it requires that the action taken by any player at any point in the game must be part of
an optimal strategy from that point onward, given her or his beliefs about previous play to this point
(which must, to the extent possible, be consistent with Bayesian updating on the hypothesis that the
equilibrium strategies have been used to date) and given that future play will unfold according to the
equilibrium strategies.
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To begin with, the dynamic consistency problem explained above does not disap-
pear if there is a commonly known definite end point of the interaction. To see this,
suppose that there is just another stage after One and Two played the (simultaneous
or sequential) PD in which One may reward Two’s cooperation with a benefit η at
a personal cost κ . It is easy to show that One’s strategy «cooperate and reward Two
only for cooperation» together with Two’s strategy «cooperate if One cooperates»
constitutes a Nash equilibrium. But again, One’s promise is not credible, and hence
this is not a sequential equilibrium. The unique sequential equilibrium is mutual de-
fect with no reward given. What if One may punish Two’s non-cooperation with a
benefit −η (still at cost κ) instead of rewarding cooperation with benefit η? Appar-
ently, nothing changes to the previous setting, since the threat of punishment is not
credible.
One may continue to add another stage in which Two has the option to reward or
punish One, but the above reasoning actually extends to any arbitrary finite duration
of the interaction. Thus, a shadow of the future per se is not enough for changing
anything: by backwards induction universal defect remains the unique sequential
equilibrium if the common future has a (commonly known) definite end point (this
stunning result has been vividly illustrated by Selten, 1978). Thus, we can extend
the above conclusion in that after any history the player at move does not care about
information what the other player did before.
1.2.2 Finite horizons, belief perturbations and imitation
Selten (1978) argued that the backwards induction prediction is in a way descriptively
implausible, as one should expect the players to cooperate at least for some time
when there is still a long time remaining in a finitely repeated game. He advocated
a bounded rationality approach, but far more influential was the approach of Kreps
& Wilson (1982); Milgrom & Roberts (1982); Kreps et al. (1982) that retained the
standard behavioral assumptions and showed that cooperation over a large fraction
of a finitely repeated game’s duration is indeed possible if there is a (potentially only
small) degree of incomplete information, that is, uncertainty about how the coplayers
might behave.
Kreps et al. (1982) perturbed a finite horizon PD supergame with a little incom-
plete information. Specifically, they assumed that players hold a prior ε ∈ ]0,1[, close
to zero, that their matched coplayer is precommitted to a strategy called tit-for-tat
(TFT) : «cooperate in the initial period and then copy what the coplayer did in the
previous period» (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). That is, TFT is an in-kind reciprocal
strategy that rewards cooperation with cooperation, and retaliates against defection
with one period of defection. Precommitted means that this type of player sticks to
the strategy no matter how the game unfolds, and particularly also in the terminal
period. Kreps et al. (1982) show that in any sequential equilibrium of this perturbed
supergame, each conventional (i.e. rational and selfish) player imitates the committed
type throughout most of the time, except some last few periods before termination.
That is, despite ε being arbitrarily small, rational and selfish players can end up in a
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situation of self-confirming beliefs that the coplayer will play TFT: each player plays
TFT in response to the expectation that the coplayer plays TFT, and this expectation
is always confirmed in equilibrium. Generally, Kreps et al. (1982) show that in any
sequential equilibrium of a finitely repeated PD there exists an upper bound on the
number of stages where one player or the other defects, and this bound depends only
on ε but is independent of the duration of the game (i.e. the number of repetitions).
The intuition is that a standard rational-selfish player may have an incentive to
cooperate in the first period in the hope of «passing by» as a committed type and
reap the gains from cooperation in subsequent periods, until it pays to cheat when
the terminal period approaches. Thus, cooperation in initial periods can be thought
of as an investment in maintaining a cooperative reputation, its return coming in the
form of the coplayer’s cooperation in later periods. «In common usage, reputation
is a characteristic or attribute ascribed to one person (firm, industry, etc.) by another
. . . Operationally this is usually represented as a prediction about likely future be-
haviour» (Wilson, 1985, p. 27), which is «inferred from . . . past actions» (Camerer
& Weigelt, 1988, p. 1). This is exactly what happens along the equilibrium path:
One, being uncertain about Two’s type, updates her prediction about Two’s likely
behavior based on Two’s observed actions as the game unfolds. The prediction is
Two’s reputation in the eyes of One. As long as Two cooperates, One’s belief in Two
cooperating in the next period as well, i.e. Two’s «good» reputation, is maintained;
as soon as Two defects, One’s belief degenerates, that is, Two’s reputation turns im-
mediately «bad». Thus cooperating in the initial periods along the equilibrium path
is often called «reputation building» (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988), but I have put this
term into quotation marks because no reputation is actually built, but merely main-
tained. If the players share a belief that their coplayer could be a committed type, all
players prefer to imitate this type (at least until the terminal period approaches), such
that the «equilibrium reputation» they are playing is constructively maintained along
the equilibrium path. But cooperation in the initial periods of the supergame can cer-
tainly be interpreted as an investment in reputation maintenance, because it entails
immediate opportunity costs (κ) in return for a compensating payoff stream in the
future. Apparently, for such an investment, and therefore sticking to the imitation
equilibrium strategy, to be worthwhile, the (remaining) duration of the game needs to
be long enough for the prospective return to cover the cost of the investment asset (a
good reputation). Furthermore, since the value of a good reputation is decreasing in
the (remaining) duration of a finitely repeated game, so is the incentive to cooperate.
In any case, since reputations are inferred from the coplayer’s past actions, adequate
information about those actions are essential for this process to work.
A striking feature of the model is that the committed types need not actually ex-
ist, they only need exist in the heads of the conventional players. Even if all players
are rational and selfish, the mere belief in the existence of committed or «crazy»
types is sufficient to sustain the imitation equilibria. Kreps et al. (1982) assume that
all players are rational and selfish, but this is not common knowledge. Thus, one
interpretation of this prior belief is that it is just a result of «fuzzy minds» or super-
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stition. However, for being empirically useful the model must pose some restrictions
on observable behavior, and if any behavior can be «explained» by assuming an ap-
propriate belief in a particular type, then the theory is vacuous. In fact, Fudenberg &
Maskin (1986) show that the set of permissible types is virtually unrestricted. Thus, a
second interpretation is that the assumption of committed types may be substantive,
that is, the prior is justified by the actual existence of precommitted types. In any
case the reason for the players’ belief is an empirical question (I will come back to
this in the following chapter). Theorists preferred the «save» route by rejecting any
precommitment power or beliefs in such power, and it turns out that the only way in
which cooperation can be shown to be part of an equilibrium strategy in this setting is
to eliminate the definite termination point, that is, to assume that there is uncertainty
about the exact time after which the players disband. I will illustrate how this works
by means of a very simple example here.
1.2.3 Indefinite horizons and trigger strategies
Assume that One and Two play the (simultaneous-move) PD repeatedly for an indef-
inite duration, that is, after each round of play the interaction will continue for one
more period with probability σ ∈ ]0,1[ ⊂R. We denote the action profile (a1t ,a2t) in
period t by at , and call the sequence (a0, . . . ,at) the repeated game’s history through
time t. Player i’s payoff in period t, after actions at have been performed, is rep-
resented by wi (at). At the end of each period, all players are perfectly informed
about the other players action performed in that period. That is, we consider a world
in which at each point in time every player perfectly knows exactly what the other
player has done so far. Assume that player i’s preferences are represented by the
expected payoff from the entire interaction, which is given by
wi =wi (a0)+σwi (a1)+σ2wi (a1) . . . = ∞∑
t=0σ twi (at)
Denoting the expected duration of the interaction by d, it holds that
d = 1+σ +σ2+ . . .
and multiplying both sides with σ we obtain σd = σ +σ2+σ3 . . ., such that
d = 1+σ +σ2+ . . .´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
σd
⇔ d = 1+σd⇔ d = 1
1−σ
We can use this to write the expected per-period average payoff as
w¯i = (1−σ) ∞∑
t=0σ twi (at)
which can be meaningfully compared to the payoffs of the stage game.
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As a first step, assume the players have only the two completely unconditional
strategies available: always cooperate (ALC) or always defect (ALD). In case the
coplayer plays ALD, it is a strict best response for player i to play ALD as well. To
see this, observe that i realizes an expected average payoff of zero by playing ALD,
and an expected average payoff of −κ < 0 by playing ALC. Likewise, in case the
coplayer plays ALC, i realizes an expected average payoff of η −κ by playing ALC,
and an expected average payoff of η < η −κ by playing ALD, such that it is strict
best response for player i to play ALD. In other words, ALD is strictly dominant over
ALC.
But now suppose that instead of the unconditional ALC, players have the fol-
lowing conditionally cooperative strategy available called grim trigger (GRIM): be-
gin with cooperating initially, keep cooperating if the coplayer reciprocated in the
previous period, and punish defection with perpetual defection. Thus, GRIM re-
wards reciprocation and threatens to punish cheating with permanent shunning. If
the coplayer plays GRIM, ALD yields a payoff of η in the initial period and zero
thereafter for player i, whereas GRIM yields η −κ forever. Thus, GRIM is a strict
best response to GRIM if and only if
η −κ
1−σ > η⇔ σ > κη (1.1)
Thus, if this condition holds, GRIM is a best response to itself and both players
playing GRIM therefore a Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium both players per-
manently cooperate, deterred from cheating by the coplayer’s threat to retaliate in
the future. Note, however, that both players playing ALD remains an equilibrium
as well: if the coplayer plays ALD, playing GRIM yields player i a payoff of −κ ,
whereas ALD yields a zero payoff, such that ALD is still a best response to itself.
Without further assumptions we cannot say which equilibrium will be played.9
It is straightforward to include impatience or myopia into the model by assuming
that players discount future payoffs by a common discount factor δ ∈ ]0,1[ ⊂R, such
that player i’s expected payoff becomes
wi = ∞∑
t=0σ tδ twi (at)
and condition 1.1 adjusts to
σδ > κ
η
(1.2)
Note that the players’ patience and the probability of continuation are substitutes in
fulfilling the above condition.
9Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) provided an evolutionary argument for equilibrium selection: kin al-
truism might have helped reciprocity to get started. In closely related and stable family bands, recipro-
cators can invade an all defector population, and once reciprocators became prevalent, their advantage
no longer requires relatedness.
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GRIM is the most unforgiving punishment strategy one can imagine, but much
more forgiving strategies work as well. Consider, for example, the most forgiving
retaliatory strategy possible, the beforementioned strategy tit-for-tat (TFT). The ex-
ercise to show that TFT is a best response to itself is identical to the one above: if the
coplayer plays TFT, responding with TFT yields payoff η −κ permanently for player
i, while ALD yields η in the initial period and zero afterwards, such that universal
TFT is a Nash equilibrium if and only if condition 1.2 holds. Again, this equilibrium
is fully cooperative, but permanent mutual defect remains an equilibrium as well.
A lot of other trigger strategies have been explicitly proposed and shown to be
able to enforce cooperation.10 In fact, the number of possible trigger strategies is un-
limited, but all lead to the same simple rule: condition 1.2. Generally, Fudenberg &
Maskin (1986) showed that trigger strategies (of whatever specific form) can sustain
any average payoff vector (w¯1,w¯2) that Pareto dominates (0,0), up to the full coop-
eration outcome (η −κ,η −κ), in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame,
provided σδ is sufficiently close to unity.11 In other words, under those conditions
any degree of cooperation can be obtained as an equilibrium outcome, including en-
during full cooperation. This result is known as the folk theorem, because the authors
noted that they have written down what already has been folklore for years among
game theorists.
Such trigger strategy equilibria can also be interpreted as embodying a notion of
reputation (Vega-Redondo, 2003): after any history in the game, each player forms
her or his expectations about the coplayers’ future behavior (their reputations from
the perspective of the player considered, see above) based on the latters’ behavioral
record. For example, in the grim trigger strategy equilibria outlined above, a player’s
reputation can be interpreted as being «good» as long as (s)he sticks to the cooper-
ative equilibrium path, but immediately shifts to «bad» after just one deviation. In
this sense, a trigger strategy can be interpreted as a behavioral rule that prescribes to
cooperate with coplayers with a «good» reputation, and to defect on players with a
«bad» reputation. This interpretation helps to draw the following two connections.
First, it provides for an alternative view on the stark differences between finitely and
10In a famous agent-based computer simulation tournament (Axelrod, 1984), TFT turned out to be
the most successful in the set of competing strategies. For the present purposes it should be noted that
this tournament was implemented with perfect monitoring, that is, arbitrary conditioning on past play
was feasible.
11Note that I have only illustrated a Nash equilibrium argument above. In principle, such an equi-
librium may involve non-credible threats and promises, that is, it may not be in the interest of a player
to carry out the punishment phase once an instance of cheating occurred. However, it is easy to extend
the demonstration to subgame perfectness by verifying that there is no single period where one of the
players can make a profitable deviation from the equilibrium strategies (the «one-stage deviation prin-
ciple»). Fudenberg & Maskin (1986) did this. The original result is also much more general in other
respects: it holds for any finite number of players and any kind of stage game payoff function. The idea
is that once one player deviates, all the other players impose the punishment payoff on the defector. It
asserts that any average payoff vector that is an element of the feasible and individually rational payoff
set, in the PD the convex hull of the four stage game payoff vectors bounded by zero, can be sustained
by an equilibrium in the repeated cooperation game, provided σδ is sufficiently close to unity.
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indefinitely repeated games and the imitation equilibria considered above. At any
point in time in a repeated game, and given that Two plays grim trigger or TFT,
the value to One of maintaining a «good reputation» by cooperating (maintaining a
«clean» record) is equal to the expected present value of a stream of mutual cooper-
ation payoffs η −κ accruing over the (expected) remaining duration of the game. As
shown above, in an indefinitely repeated game with continuation probability σ , this
expected duration is equal to 11−σ in any given period, that is, it is constant over time.
It follows that the value of maintaining a good reputation is also constant over time,
namely equal to η−κ1−σ , and if this value is no smaller than the investment required
to maintain a good reputation, which is equal to the immediate gain from cheating
η , then investing in the maintenance of a good reputation by cooperating is a best
response in any period. This is just another way to describe the conditions 1.1 or 1.2.
In principle, the same applies to the finite horizon case. However, under complete
information it is not credible for Two to actually stick to the trigger strategy but the
only credible strategy is universal defect (by backwards induction), such that main-
taining a good reputation by cooperating is worthless to One in any period. Thus,
since the required investment is by assumption greater than zero, but maintaining a
good reputation pays off with zero returns, One will never invest. This is just another
way to describe the unique sequential equilibrium in a finitely repeated PD. If there
is, however, some small probability that Two might be committed to a trigger strat-
egy, then we know that the value of a good reputation can be sufficiently valuable
such that cooperation is profitable for some fraction of the finite duration of the game
(see section 1.2.2).
Second, since the players condition their behavior on the other’s reputation, which
is in turn inferred from the other’s past actions, or more precisely from the available
information about the other’s past actions, a sufficient amount of such information
seems essential for reputation building. This interpretation will be useful in the re-
maining sections.
1.2.4 Conclusion
Summing up, in a perfectly transparent world in which every action is perfectly ob-
served by all other players, strategies that condition behavior on this information can
enforce cooperation if one of two conditions are met: (i) The players believe that
their coplayers might be precommitted to play a conditionally cooperative strategy,
or (ii) the horizon of the interaction is indefinite. If neither condition is satisfied, un-
conditional defection is the unique (sequential) equilibrium outcome of any repeated
PD, which is another way to say that players do not care about what the others did
before. If (i) is satisfied, then cooperation over a large fraction of a finitely repeated
PD is possible (even among entirely selfish players) by an equilibrium process of
«reputation maintenance» in which players base their predictions of their coplayers’
future play on information about their past play, and therefore have an incentive to
imitate a behavioral record of a «precommitted type».
If (ii) is satisfied, the folk theorem shows that (even entirely selfish) players may
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sustain any degree of mutual cooperation by means of strategies that reward coopera-
tive behavior with reciprocity and punish non-cooperative behavior by (some periods
of) shunning.12 It formalizes the intuition of tactical cooperation, «I scratch you back
if you scratch mine», in personal relationships. One may expect such tactical cooper-
ation to be more likely the higher the gains from cooperation for a given σδ , and for
given κ and η , more likely the «larger» the shadow of the future, that is, the closer
σδ is to unity.
With respect to our guiding question (What does the propensity of individuals in
a given group to cooperate with one another has to do with the availability of informa-
tion they have about each others’ actions?), it can be concluded that all cooperation
in these setting hinges on the fact that all actions are perfectly transparent and hence
each player is perfectly informed about her or his coplayers’ history. Players use
this information to condition their own behavior.13 This conditioning provides for
incentives to cooperate along the equilibrium path.
Those results do not readily extend to setting in which information about the
coplayer’s behavior is limited. Intuitively one might expect that applying rewards and
punishments is more difficult if information about the coplayer’s behavior becomes
limited. As a result, there might be phases of retaliation based on false accusations,
incentives to cooperate might be diluted, and hence cooperation much more difficult
to sustain. Whether this is correct is the subject of the following section.14
1.3 Imperfect public monitoring
Monitoring is called perfect if each action taken by each player is observed by all
other players automatically, immediately and without error, which implies that at
any point in time t all players perfectly know the entire history of the interaction(a0, . . . ,at). This is the case I considered in the previous section. It is stunning that
a simple strategy such as TFT is able to enforce cooperation among purely selfish
individuals in this setting. However, the sensitivity of the strategy to precise mon-
itoring has soon be highlighted after its «invention» (Selten & Hammerstein, 1984;
Fudenberg & Maskin, 1990):15 TFT cannot correct errors, such that one wrong sig-
nal (or accidental defection) leads to a long (possibly infinite) sequence of retaliation.
A number of modified strategies that tolerate some «defect» signals have been pro-
posed (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1990; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992, 1993). In particular,
more forgiving strategies may perform better than harsh ones under noisy monitoring,
because the latter are too quick in punishment of apparent defections such that coop-
erative equilibria resting on such strategies become extremely fragile (Bendor et al.,
12This result can be viewed as both a success and a failure. I come back to this in the concluding
section 1.5.
13To be precise, this is the case in all equilibria but one: the universal defect equilibrium.
14Following the literature, I will focus on the indefinite horizon case in what follows.
15The argument works not only with monitoring imperfections but with any kind of error in percep-
tion or performance.
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1991). Thus, since more tolerant strategies can avoid such escalations, but necessarily
invite exploitation, there seems to be a trade-off under imperfect monitoring (Axelrod
& Dion, 1988). However, Bendor (1993) found counterexamples in which imperfect
monitoring can actually facilitate cooperation in a population of harsh strategies, and
concludes that «the idea that inferential uncertainty always harms nice strategies and
always impairs the evolution of cooperation must be sharply qualified.» Indeed, later
work in game theory has shown that monitoring imperfections per se need not to be
a serious problem, as long as all players get the same noisy signal.
Like many other ideas that were later generalized in game theory, this case was
motivated by an application in industrial organization. In a seminal contribution,
Stigler (1964) suggested that tacit industrial collusion may be difficult to sustain
when price cuts can be made in secret, because there may be erroneous punishment
phases («price wars») if there is uncertainty whether cheating has actually occurred.
Porter (1983a) and Green & Porter (1984) took up this idea and considered a Cournot
duopoly in which quantity choices are private information and demand is uncertain.
Specifically, in each period, firms first choose output levels secretly, and then a ran-
dom demand shock is realized and the market price determined. The shock is unob-
served by all players (they share a common belief, though) but the market price is
commonly observed. Monitoring is public in this case because all players observe
the same signal, the market price, but it is imperfect because (due to demand shocks)
the firms’ actions can only be deduced with error.16 In sum, the market price pro-
vides a public but imperfect signal about the players’ actions. Green & Porter (1984)
showed that in such situations firms still can maintain some collusion using statisti-
cal inferences on unobserved actions and punish potential deviations by aggressive
output choices.17 Key is the publicly observed signal which is correlated with the un-
observed actions, in this case the market price (see also Green & Porter, 1984; Abreu
et al., 1986).18
Abreu et al. (1990) provided an early generalization of this idea of imperfect
public monitoring in a standard generic repeated game framework.19 They allowed
monitoring to be imperfect, in the sense of an exogenous probability of error, but
retained the assumption that (possibly erroneous) signals are observed publicly by
all players. Specifically, a player in the game cannot observe other players’ actions
16Without demand stochasticity monitoring would be quasi-perfect because the rival’s action could
be perfectly inferred from the price. Through a random demand shock, such inference becomes noisy
because a low price may be caused either by low demand or by a rival’s cheat.
17Specifically, the equilibrium trigger strategies put forth are as follows: Firms produce at the jointly
monopolistic level as long as the realized price is above a certain threshold, but revert to the one-
shot Cournot quantity for a fixed number of periods when it falls below the threshold. Due to the
random component in demand, false accusations and periodic price wars, i.e. punishment, occurs on
the equilibrium path. The latter is an efficiency loss compared to trigger strategy equilibria under perfect
monitoring where punishment never occurs on the equilibrium path.
18There is a body of empirical work following the Green-Porter model, most of it based on data from
the 1880’s Joint Executive Committee (JEC) railroad cartel (Porter, 1983b, 1985; Lee & Porter, 1984;
Cosslett & Lee, 1985; Ellison, 1994b; Vasconcelos, 2004).
19I follow Kandori (2002).
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directly but after performing her or his action each player i observes a signal sit ∈ Si.
Monitoring is called public if the signal generated by one player’s action is identical
for all players, that is, s1t = s2t (generally s1t = . . . = sit = . . . = snt). Thus, denoting
the signal vector (s1t ,s2t) ∶= st , the sequence {s0, . . . ,st} is the public history of the
supergame through time t. In this setup, the perfect monitoring case considered above
is obtained by assuming sit = at for all i and t. Observe that perfect monitoring (st = at
for all t) implies public monitoring, but not the reverse, since monitoring may be
public but imperfect (st ≠ at for some, possibly all, t). Assuming that st is realized
conditional on the current action profile at , the probability of a particular signal vector
st being pi (st ∣at ), and letting wi (ait ,sit) represent player i’s realized payoff in case
(s)he performs action ait and receives signal sit , each player i’s expected stage game
payoff is given by20
wˆi (at) =∑
s∈S wi (ait ,sit)pi (st ∣at )
Defining the expected payoff over the entire interaction as before using this new stage
game payoff function, Fudenberg et al. (1994) extended their earlier folk theorem to
this case (see Fudenberg & Yamamoto, 2011, for generalizations), by showing that
essentially the same region of payoffs (i.e. in the repeated PD any strictly positive
average payoff vector up to the full cooperation payoff) can be sustained in a su-
pergame equilibrium with the additional qualification that the signal space S has suf-
ficient cardinality, that is, there are sufficiently many signals possible.21 In addition,
the qualifier «essentially» means that the full cooperation payoff can be approximated
as closely as desired (but never reached entirely). In other words, monitoring imper-
fections indeed result always in an efficiency loss, since punishment can occur on the
equilibrium path, which can be made arbitrarily small, however.
With respect to our guiding question (What does the propensity of individuals
in a given group to cooperate with one another has to do with the availability of
information they have about each others’ actions?) it follows that the basic conclusion
from the previous section carries over to a world in which the players cannot observe
directly what the other player has done so far but receive some noisy signal from a
commonly known conditional distribution which is the same for all players. Then
again entirely selfish players may sustain (almost) any degree of mutual cooperation
by means of strategies that condition rewards and punishments on the information
about the coplayer’s behavior available, provided condition 1.2 holds. However, as
the original folk theorem for the case of perfect monitoring, it does only claim that
(almost) all degrees of mutual cooperation are possible, it does not provide a sharp
prediction on the level of cooperation one might expect to actually observe under a
given level of monitoring inaccuracy. Specifically, the approach taken is that one fixes
20This specification assures that the realized payoff does not convey any information on top of what
is already contained in ait and sit . Note that one can, without loss of generality, redefine the signal as
sˆit = (sit ,wi). See Kandori (2002).
21Specifically, for the PD the folk theorem of Fudenberg et al. (1994) implies that for a generic signal
distribution pi (st ∣at ) the same set of payoffs can be approximately sustained under the usual conditions
and if the S has a cardinality of at least three elements.
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a desired level of cooperation and then shows that for any group size and for any error
rate, there exists a σδ sufficiently close to unity that this level of cooperation can be
realized. Conversely, starting with a given σδ , the attainable payoffs may be quite
low even when the group size and the signal error is small, let alone the general open
question of how the players might coordinate on a particular supergame equilibrium.
But for empirical purposes it would be nice to have at least a hypothesis about
what might actually happen if monitoring gets more or less noisy. A result by Kan-
dori (1992b) is useful here. Drawing on the framework of Abreu et al. (1990), he
formalized the idea that «improved» monitoring helps the players to enforce coop-
eration. As an illustration in the above example, suppose the demand becomes less
stochastic so that low prices are a better signal of cheats. Can the firms achieve a more
collusive outcome, perhaps with less punishment (price wars) along the equilibrium
path? Indeed, Kandori (1992b) shows that the pure-strategy sequential equilibrium
payoff set never becomes smaller and often expands (in the sense of set inclusion)
if the quality of the signal improves (in Blackwell’s sense). The intuition is simple:
If cheating is detected more accurately, punishment becomes more directed, that is,
there are less losses due to erroneous punishments and stronger incentives to coop-
erate ex ante. Therefore, we can summarize as follows: In repeated games with an
indefinite horizon and imperfect public monitoring, the available information about
the other player’s action is used to play conditional strategies, and it can be hypoth-
esized that cooperation will be more frequent if more information (in the sense of
more accurate signals) becomes available.
1.4 Private monitoring
In the previous section, signals were allowed to be noisy, but every player still re-
ceived the same (noisy) signal. Therefore, at each point in the game all players have
the same information about the history of play. One may imagine this as a scenario
in which the players are located in a class room and the public signal is written on the
blackboard after each round. In this scenario, each player (i) knows what signals the
coplayers received, and that (ii) signals were drawn always from the same commonly
known distribution. Using statistical inferences, the players can, in principle, mitigate
efficiency losses due to omitted and misdirected punishments to a large extent.
But what if different players receive different signals, that is, if sit ≠ s jt for i ≠ j
and for some, possibly all, t (this includes the case where some players receive no
signal at all, i.e. their signal is «infinitely noisy» and hence uninformative)? In this
case monitoring is called private. To continue along the above collusion example,
and following Kandori (2002), imagine a situation that is identical to the one above,
except there is no single market price but secret price cuts can be offered to customers
individually. The firms still cannot observe the coplayers secret offers, but this time
there is also no publicly observed signal from which every player can form a identical
belief; all a firm can do is to extract information from her own sales only.
It is apparent that in this case each player is neither sure about the actions per-
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formed by the other players, nor about the signals the other players received. In
other words, each player has different information about the history of play, and no
player knows what information her or his coplayers have. For instance, suppose One
and Two play the PD and One receives information that Two defected, whereas this
signal might be wrong. If One believes this information and chooses to punish Two,
then Two does not know whether One defected «on the cooperative equilibrium path»
because she received a defect signal or whether she left the «cooperative equilibrium
path». It is apparent that reasoning of this kind becomes extremely complex as the
game unfolds both for the players and the analyst.22 The literature in this field is
consequently very limited.
I will illustrate this case by means of a setting that might intuitively come into
mind when thinking of situations in which «individuals can hardly observe what the
others are doing»: A large group (community or population) of individuals that meet
in smaller groups in each period, and everything that happens within this subgroups is
private information to them, unobserved by the other individuals in the larger group.
This scenario is apparently very common in practice.23 I will come back briefly to
the (small) general literature on private monitoring at the end of this section.
1.4.1 Public and private monitoring in matching games
The scenario I just outlined has been formalized by means of matching games (Rosen-
thal, 1979), repeated games in which in each period the players in a larger group are
matched together into subgroups to play a game such as the PD. It turns out that the
number of players and the matching scheme is completely unimportant, that is, it does
not matter whether the same individuals interact frequently or just once, provided that
monitoring is not private (see Milgrom et al., 1990, and below).
But for the moment, observe that depending on the perspective, matching games
may be viewed as both a generalization and a special case of the setting considered in
the previous sections. When considering the matching game as a whole, it is a special
case. When considering the game the subgroups are playing, it is a generalization, as
the setting considered above, in which the same players play a game repeatedly, can
be captured in the matching game setting. One way is to assume that in any period
the same subgroups are matched. Then in each period and each subgroup the same
players meet repeatedly as in the setting above. Another way is to assume that any
pair (I assume the subgroups are pairs for sake of continuity) of players is matched in
one out of τ periods, where τ depends on the size of the larger group. We may choose
τ very large, such that the setting represents the practically important case in which
any individual may interact frequently with a large number of other individuals, but
22The technical challenges are that (i) such games lack the convenient recursive structure that games
with public monitoring have (see Abreu et al., 1990), such the method of recursive dynamic program-
ming cannot be applied, and that (ii) the players, and therefore the analyst, must conduct very complex
statistical inference about the coplayers’ private histories (Kandori, 2002).
23A further reason why I consider this case in more detail is that it is very useful to interpret particular
experimental designs with respect to their information structure. I will come back to this in chapter 2.
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infrequently with any single one.
If we assume that players can recognize each other, and keep account of the out-
comes of past interactions with particular coplayers, then the folk theorem results
from the above setting can be straightforwardly extended to this case.24 To illus-
trate, assume that monitoring is perfect within each match (but private in the larger
group, as players only observe what happens in their own matches), and keep the
fixed continuation probability σ . Then after any match the probability that the same
two players will meet once again is equal to σ τ , since the same pair of players only
meets every τ periods. Furthermore, the present value at time t of a payoff realized
in the next meeting, wi (at+τ), is now δ τwi (at+τ). Then, an argument parallel to that
of above shows that cooperating is a strict best response if and only if
η −κ
1−(σδ)τ > η
or equivalently (σδ)τ > κ
η
(1.3)
Note that this condition is identical to condition 1.2 except that σδ on the left hand
side is now multiplied with itself τ times, such that condition 1.3 is more restrictive
than 1.2 for any τ > 1. Thus, the larger τ , that is, the less frequent the interaction
between the same individuals, the more restrictive the above condition, and for suffi-
ciently large τ , it does not pay to cooperate (note that one-shot games can be approx-
imated by letting τ converge to infinity), such that direct retaliation fails to enforce
cooperation.
However, it can be shown that if one drops the assumption that players are not in-
formed about what happens outside their own matches, that is, if monitoring is public
(in fact, perfect) then full cooperation can be sustained by indirect enforcement, that
is, by a trigger strategy sequential equilibrium in which not the cheated player her-
or himself but third parties gang up upon the defector to wipe away any gain from
cheating (Milgrom et al., 1990; Kandori, 1992a; Ellison, 1994a; Okuno-Fujiwara &
Postlewaite, 1995). In such equilibria, everybody cooperates by the justified expec-
tation «give and you shall receive, cheat and you will be expelled».25 But even more:
the restrictions on σδ are no more stringent than under direct retaliation, that is,
perfect monitoring can perfectly substitute for repeated interaction among the same
individuals. Thus, the restriction of the traditional folk theorem that the same players
need to interact repeatedly turns out to be not critical but the symmetry of information
about the players’ behavior takes center stage.
24If the game is finite, it is apparent that the backwards induction argument also holds in this case:
independent from the information a player has about the history of play (in particular the current
coplayer’s behavioral record), it is a dominant strategy to defect in the terminal period, and by back-
wards induction also in all other periods.
25This is closely related to the biological literature on indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987, see
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005 for an overview).
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The result was proved by Milgrom et al. (1990) and Kandori (1992a), showing
that under perfect (public) monitoring any payoff vector that is for some σδ sup-
ported by a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game with the same two players
is also supported by a sequential equilibrium in the matching game with arbitrary
matching group size and matching rule for the same σδ . The proof is so short that I
can quote it here in Kandori’s own words:26
«The players in the matching game start by playing the equilibrium path
of the two-player game. If the type-i player deviates (i = 1,2), all type-
i’s are punished by all of the other type, using the same punishment
strategies as in the two-player game. The same principle applies to any
further deviations, and simultaneous deviations are ignored. Then, it is
clear that the incentives of each player are identical with those in the
two-player game because each player encounters the same sequence of
action profiles as in the two-player repeated game, only the opponents
being changed over time. Hence the prescribed strategies are in fact a
perfect equilibrium.»
I find this result remarkable because it implies that it is the publicness of monitoring
not the size of the population or the matching protocol that matters. Under public
monitoring it is entirely unimportant who punishes a defector, that is, indirect en-
forcement in matching games works just as well as direct personal retaliation in a
repeated game with a fixed set of players. In this sense, «even if no pair of traders
come together frequently . . . then transferable reputations for honesty can serve as an
adequate bond for honest behavior if members of the trading community can be kept
informed about each other’s past behavior» (Milgrom et al., 1990, p. 3, emphasis
in the original), that is, «observability in the community is a substitute for having a
long-term frequent relationship with fixed partners» (Kandori, 1992a, p. 68).
From this result one might be led to conclude that we should always expect more
(or at least no less) cooperation in settings where monitoring is public compared to
settings where it is private. There is a caveat to this intuition as Kandori (1992a) and
Ellison (1994a) showed. I will briefly outline the idea.
1.4.2 Contagious equilibria
Consider a matching game with private monitoring. Specifically, to rule out the pos-
sibility for direct retaliation, assume that players cannot recognize each other, which
approximates a situation in which each pair meets at most once (we might say that the
individuals in each match are perfect strangers). Furthermore, each player observes
only the history of actions in her or his own matches and information transmission or
pooling among players is ruled out. Thus, the matching game is a game with private
monitoring, since in each stage, each player’s action is (perfectly or imperfectly) ob-
served only by a subset of all other players, namely those with which the player is
26Kandori (1992a) proved also a version in which only defectors are punished.
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matched in the current period. In other words, each player is only informed about a
tiny part of the overall history: her or his personal experience.
Under these adverse conditions it appears that repetition of the stage game Nash
equilibrium (i.e. zero cooperation) is the only possible outcome. But Kandori (1992a)
and Ellison (1994a) showed that this need not to be the case. There is a possibility, for
σδ sufficiently close to unity, to sustain full cooperation in the population supported
by a sequential equilibrium that may be called «contagious equilibrium». Here is the
intuition how it works. Suppose players adopt a generalized grim trigger strategy
that prescribes to cooperate as long as one defection is observed in the population,
after which the strategy prescribes to defect perpetually. Since every player observes
only the outcome of his or her own matches, a defection can only be detected by
the coplayer that is currently matched to the defector. Thus, the defector cannot be
immediately punished because the subsequent coplayers are not informed about the
defection and hence cooperate. However, assuming that all players stick to the trig-
ger strategy, the coplayer of the defector will defect in the subsequent periods, and
all affected coplayers will defect in the periods after that as well, and so on. Thus,
any defection «rebounds» on the defector through a contagious process of defection
spreading through the population. Thus, although delayed, defections will be pun-
ished in much the same way as above, and if σδ is sufficiently close to unity, is does
not pay to defect. However, this does not establish a sequential equilibrium yet, be-
cause it must also be in the interest of every player to actually start off the contagious
punishment phase (which was simply assumed above). That is, after observing a de-
fection, it must be a best response to defect as well, that is, continuing to cooperate
should not be beneficial. This turns out to be the case, because the original defector
will continue to defect (the trigger strategy requires to defect in response to detected
defections, including one’s own) and hence for the defector’s coplayer continuing
to cooperate the next period delays the contagion but cannot stop it. Thus, a player
whose coplayer defected will continue to cooperate only if sufficiently impatient or
the probability of termination is sufficiently high. It again follows that this is ruled
out if σδ is sufficiently close to unity.
It should be noted that the deterrence of cheats in a contagious equilibrium is
stronger than under direct retaliation (embedded in the matching game), since in the
latter a defector is punished only by the player (s)he cheated upon (which occurs only
every τ periods in the above random matching example), while under the contagious
equilibrium a defector forgoes also some of the future payoffs with other players
(Kandori, 1992a). That is, if for a player condition 1.3 holds with equality under
direct retaliation, such that the player is indifferent between cooperate and defect,
(s)he strictly prefers to cooperate under the contagious equilibrium. Thus, there are
situations in which cooperation is sustained by the contagious equilibrium, but not
by direct retaliation.
However, the deterrence of cheats in a contagious equilibrium is weaker than in
the indirect (community) enforcement case under perfect (public) monitoring, be-
cause punishment comes immediately in the latter but delayed in the former. The
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delay is the greater the larger the population, such that the conditions for a coopera-
tive contagious equilibrium are quite restrictive. In fact, Kandori (1992a) shows that
for a large enough population there is no way of sustaining cooperation by a conta-
gious equilibrium, because it takes a long time for the contagion to rebound on the
defector. Thus, there exist cases in which cooperation can be sustained under perfect
(public) monitoring but not under the private monitoring.
To summarize, the idea of a «contagious equilibrium» may be viewed in a way
that each player does not trust specific coplayers but the «community as a whole»,
whereas a single defection lets this trust collapse in the whole population. Each in-
dividual that is cheated starts cheating all of her or his future coplayers. Apparently,
cooperation sustained by such an equilibrium is extremely fragile. With a small de-
gree of monitoring imperfection within matches (or «trembling hands»), a single error
in one match lets cooperation collapse within the entire population. Thus, even Kan-
dori (1992a) considers them as not very realistic. It can therefore be concluded that
we should expect more (or at least no less) cooperation in settings where monitoring
is public compared to settings where it is private, with the qualification that (unlikely)
instances exist in which this is not the case.
1.4.3 Information transmission and publication
We may also take the contagious equilibrium as a benchmark to investigate cases
between the boundary cases of entirely public and entirely private monitoring. To be-
gin with, note that the weaker deterrence of cheats in a contagious equilibrium under
private monitoring compared to the public monitoring case stems from the fact that
punishment comes immediately in the latter but delayed in the former. This points
toward the conclusion that mitigating the «privateness» (or increasing the «public-
ness») of monitoring increases deterrence in a contagious equilibrium. To see this,
suppose that players still cannot identify each other but that more than one (the cur-
rent coplayer), possibly all other players observe a defection in a given match. Then
the contagion is accelerated, the faster the more players are informed, such that the
critical σδ above which full cooperation can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium
can only decrease relative to the fully private monitoring case. In extreme, if all play-
ers get to know that a defection has occurred somewhere in the population, then the
punishment phase begins in the very next period after the defection, such that con-
tagious punishment has equal force than in the perfect monitoring case considered
above. Thus, information transmission increases deterrence.
However, the fragility of the equilibrium remains, and in a sense information
transmission may be viewed to even worsen things along these lines, since a single
signaling error lets cooperation collapse immediately, while it takes some time under
private monitoring. Thus, to get rid of those implausibly fragile contagion equilib-
ria one must necessarily relax the anonymity assumption, that is, players need not
only to detect whether a defection has occurred in the group but also who defected.
In this case, the set of possible trigger strategies is significantly expanded because
punishments can then be targeted on defectors while keeping to cooperate with other
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cooperators.
Indeed, if one assumes the existence of some information transmission mecha-
nism, then one can show that an appropriate adaption of a trigger strategy that pre-
scribes to cooperate with a coplayer having a «good» reputation and defect towards
with a coplayer having a «bad» reputation is a best response to itself. Generally,
suppose that a «label» is attached to each player and the label carries all «neces-
sary» information on a players past behavior (the setup follows Okuno-Fujiwara &
Postlewaite, 1995). In each match, the two players observe each other’s label and
then play the stage game. After the game, the labels are updated as a function of the
original labels and the actions performed. In principle, such labels can carry arbitrary
amounts of information, including each players complete history. If such information
transmission mechanism exists, then there can be an additional (it adds to the incen-
tives arising through direct reciprocity) incentive to cooperate in order to cultivate a
cooperative reputation, to «keep one’s record clean».
The aim of much of the literature is to identify a class of very simple labels, that
is, labels that transmit a minimal amount of information about the behavioral record,
perhaps only a one dimensional statistic, and still suffice to sustain a cooperative
equilibrium. There are two prominent specifications of such labels (see Nowak &
Sigmund, 2005, for an overview), elaborated in evolutionary models, that have been
shown to be able to support indirect reciprocity as an evolutionary stable strategy
(and hence a perfect or even proper equilibrium, see Weibull, 1996 for the correspon-
dence). The first is due to Sugden (1986), and is called standing. According to this
mechanism, an individual who cooperated in the previous period is in good stand-
ing, and the only way an individual can fall into bad standing is by defecting on a
coplayer who is in good standing. Note that an individual can always defect when
her or his coplayer is in bad standing without losing her or his good standing status.
In this more general setting the TFT strategy is replaced by the following standing
strategy: cooperate if and only if your current coplayer is in good standing.27 De-
spite it seeming simplicity, the standing model is still informationally demanding. It
requires that each individual knows the current standing of each other individual in
the group, the identity of each other individual’s current coplayer, and whether each
individual cooperated or defected against her or his current coplayer. Since reputa-
tion (standing in this case) hinges on monitoring, errors in determining the standing
of individuals may be frequent if monitoring is imperfect. Particularly serious are er-
rors in second-order information, that is, about the standing or behavior of the current
coplayer’s previous period coplayer. Then it becomes difficult to judge whether the
current coplayer’s defection in the previous period was warranted or not. This will
occur with high frequency if information is partially private rather than public (not
everyone has the same information).
The informational requirements of the second commonly studied mechanism,
image scoring proposed by Nowak & Sigmund (1998), are somewhat milder in that
27If errors are possible, the strategy can be extended such that after accidental defections, it prescribes
to cooperate unconditionally in the next period in order to restore the status as a player in good standing.
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players need not know the reputation of cooperators’ coplayers. Nowak and Sigmund
show that the strategy of cooperating with others who have cooperated in the past,
independent of the reputation of the cooperator’s partner, is stable against invasion
by defectors, and weakly stable against invasion by unconditional cooperators once
defectors are eliminated from the population. Takahashi (2010) provides a general
result by showing that cooperation can be sustained in a matching game if players are
informed about their current coplayers’ past play only.
What virtually all approaches in this stream of literature share is the assumption
that there exists a mechanism or institution that processes the respective information
honestly, without explaining its specific workings or where it comes from. This, of
course, assumes parts of central problem away. In reality, information about others’
behavior is not just available, non-available, or something in between, but is must
be produced, acquired and transmitted. «Perhaps the most important question which
is unanswered», concluded (Kandori, 1992a, p. 77) «concerns the way in which the
information transmission . . . is implemented.» But how this should occur in a pop-
ulation of selfish individuals has not been (and probably cannot be) shown (Bowles
& Gintis, 2011). What does incentivize players to share information they have and
deter them from spreading lies if it is in their interest? What does incentivize players
to get informed in the first place? Those questions underlie all original contributions
in chapters 3 through 7 and I will come back to this repeatedly below.
1.4.4 Conclusion
As mentioned above, obtaining general results for the case of private monitoring is
technically challenging. There is a small but growing literature that tries to extend
the folk theorem to this case (Fudenberg & Levine, 1991; Sekiguchi, 1997; Bhaskar
& Obara, 2002; Piccione, 2002; Ely & Välimäki, 2002; Matsushima, 2004; Hörner
& Olszewski, 2006, 2009; Yamamoto, 2007; Kandori, 2011). Fortunately, for the
present purposes they provide not much further insights than the above illustrations.
Three related facts from this stream of literature can be summarized. First, the con-
structed equilibria are extremely fragile, since they generally rely on strictly mixed
strategies, which appears to render coordination on a particular equilibrium extremely
difficult. Second, the equilibria are engineered in a way that players are indifferent
between acting on the information they receive about the other players’ behavior and
ignoring it, such that the slightest perturbation destroys this indifference and players
behave the same way whatever signal they receive (Gintis, 2009). Third, the above
results require restrictive conditions on the monitoring technology. In particular, al-
most all of them are based on «close-to-public» monitoring, that is arbitrarily small
disturbances from public monitoring, whose actual order of magnitude is typically
not specified or discussed (Gintis, 2009). But this just reinforces our earlier hypoth-
esis: if a folk theorem can only be proved under approximately public monitoring,
then anything that brings monitoring closer to public, to reduce the asymmetry in the
distribution of information about the history of play, can be expected to be conductive
to cooperation.
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With respect to our guiding question (What does the propensity of individuals
in a given group to cooperate with one another has to do with the availability of in-
formation they have about each others’ actions?) we can henceforth conclude the
following. The propensity of individuals in a given group to cooperate with one
another is constrained, besides mere inaccuracy, in particular by the privateness of
monitoring. If information about past actions is dispersed among the players in the
group in the form of many small packages of private information, it becomes gen-
erally very difficult to coordinate on a cooperative equilibrium. On the other hand,
the settings in which cooperation can be sustained under public (perfect) monitoring
turned out to be much more encompassing, including not only situations in which
the same individuals interact for an indefinite period of time but even situations in
which the same individuals meet hardly more than once. Furthermore, mechanisms
that honestly transmit information about the players’ behavior to other players, to
bring monitoring closer to public, render cooperation more likely. However, how
such information processing should happen in a group of selfish individuals remains
unexplained.
1.5 Conclusion
What does the propensity of individuals in a given group to cooperate with one an-
other has to do with the availability of information they have about each others’ ac-
tions? After having briefly reviewed the major theoretical approaches to cooperation
in economics, the following can be wrapped up with respect to this guiding question.
In section 1.1 have started with outlining the generic problem of cooperation
in a simple model. Mutual cooperation is beneficial to all, but cheating (assuming
that cooperation is costly) always pays. In a selfish world cooperation therefore al-
ways needs to be enforced. Cooperating must provide for a return benefit (reward or
avoided punishment) that renders cooperation profitable. I highlighted that if such
enforcement needs to be performed by the individuals themselves, then information
about the others’ actions becomes generally critical, since rewards and punishments
are by definition conditioned on past play.
In the remainder of this chapter, I investigated the qualifications and fine-structure
of this tentative conclusion. Beginning with a setting in which players interact re-
peatedly and every action is perfectly observed by all other players, it was shown
that strategies that condition behavior on this information can enforce cooperation
if one of two conditions are met: (i) The players believe that their coplayers might
be precommitted to play a conditionally cooperative strategy, or (ii) the horizon of
the interaction is indefinite. If neither condition is satisfied, unconditional defec-
tion is the unique (sequential) equilibrium outcome of any repeated PD, which is
another way to say that players do not care about what the others did before. If
one of them is satisfied, then significant cooperation is possible by the application of
conditional strategies that reward cooperative behavior and punish non-cooperative
behavior. Since all cooperation in these settings hinges on the fact that all actions
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are perfectly transparent and hence each player is perfectly informed about her or his
coplayers’ history, one might expect that applying rewards and punishments is more
difficult if information about the coplayer’s behavior becomes limited, and as a result
cooperation might be much more difficult to sustain.
I investigated to what extent this intuition is correct in sections 1.3 and 1.4. In
section 1.3 I considered a setting in which the information about the other players’
actions is limited in one specific way: it may contain errors but all individuals in
the group receive the same signals. In this case, monitoring is said to be imperfect
but public. The literature has found that the folk theorem extends to this case, that
is, (almost) any degree of mutual cooperation is possible by means of strategies that
condition rewards and punishments on the information on the coplayer’s behavior
available. The result does not allow for predictions about which cooperation level
can be actually expected for a given degree of information accuracy, or how the de-
gree of cooperation may change if information becomes more (or less) accurate. For
empirical purposes, it is important to observe that under imperfect public monitoring
punishment can occur at times on the equilibrium path such that actual cooperation
may be quite low even when noise is small. A related result provides a reason to
hypothesize that the propensity of individuals in a group to cooperate with another
will at least not decease as information about one anothers’ actions becomes more
accurate.
In section 1.4 I turned to a setting in which the information about the other play-
ers’ actions is limited in a more general way: it may not only be inaccurate but
different players may also receive different information about particular players’ ac-
tions. In this case, monitoring is said to be private. If information about past actions
is dispersed among the players in the group in the form of many small packages of
private information, it becomes generally very difficult to coordinate on a cooperative
equilibrium. On the other hand, the settings in which cooperation can be sustained
under public (perfect) monitoring turned out to be much more encompassing, includ-
ing not only situations in which the same individuals interact for an indefinite period
of time but even situations in which the same individuals meet hardly more than once.
Furthermore, mechanisms that honestly transmit information about the players’ be-
havior to other players, to bring monitoring closer to public, render cooperation more
likely. However, how such information processing should happen in a group of selfish
individuals remains unexplained (I come back to this in the second remark below).
I conclude with two remarks. First, all cooperation in the models reviewed in this
chapter is tactical in the sense that individuals only cooperate with one another if it is
in their (long-term) self-interest. Two related questions follow immediately: (i) Do
real people actually perform such tactics? (ii) Do real people only cooperate for tac-
tical reasons? Concerning (i), the repeated game models provide for little restrictions
on the set of attainable outcomes. The folk theorem shows that virtually «anything
goes», which can be interpreted as both a success and a failure. On the one hand, it
tells us that (provided the conditions are satisfied) equilibria with significant cooper-
ation along the equilibrium path exist, that is, it is not impossible for entirely selfish
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players to coordinate on a fully cooperative outcome. In principle, this is good news.
However, in terms of explanatory/predictive power, the fact that «anything goes» can
also be interpreted as the theorem’s central weakness: since the model is compatible
with a myriad of very diverse outcomes, it does not pose much testable restrictions on
empirical data, such that its empirical usefulness can be questioned (Vega-Redondo,
2003). The theorem does not suggest how the equilibria whose existence it demon-
strates can actually be accessed and sustained, and in particular it does not predict
which one(s) from the continuum of equilibria is more likely to be observed than
another. The question of how people can ever coordinate on one of the equilibria is
one of the central open questions in game theory. In addition, and concerning (ii),
the traditional behavioral assumptions, in particular universal selfishness, have be-
come under criticism. In any case, what is needed is rigorous evidence about how
real people actually behave in the generic circumstances outlined in this chapter. Do
they really cooperate tactically only, that is, only if there is a prospect for a material
return? What strategies do they actually play in repeated games? What information
about the coplayers’ actions to they use? How do they respond if such information
becomes limited? In chapter 2 I selectively review the body of received experimental
evidence in order to finds answers on these questions.
The second remark concerns how information structures are typically modeled:
as an exogenous parameter. In the previous section I already mentioned that this
is exemplified, inter alia, by assumptions about honest information acquisition and
transmission. In reality, information generally, and information about others’ behav-
ior in particular, is not just available, non-available, or something in between, but is
must be produced, acquired and transmitted. This implies that transparency, as de-
fined here, is not just there or absent, it is created by the players themselves. But how
this should occur in a population of selfish individuals has not been (and probably
cannot be) shown (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). What does incentivize players to share
information they have and deter them from spreading lies if it is in their interest?
What does incentivize players to get informed in the first place?
This problem is vividly illustrated by Milgrom et al. (1990) in their account on the
revival of trade in Europe during the early middle ages. During this time, merchants
evolved their own private code, known as the Lex Mercatoria, that was decentrally
enforced by mechanisms similar to the ones outlined in section 1.4.3. Importantly,
enforcement in the merchant community relied on shared information about individ-
ual members’ conduct. But given that getting informed (monitoring) and information
transmission is generally costly, what incentives did the merchants have to engage
in such activities? The received theoretical literature is largely silent on this issue
because it considers information structures generally as exogenous (in turns out that
the situation is not much different in the experimental literature, which I will re-
view in the next chapter). It thereby abstracts from the possibility that players may
alter it themselves. In other words, the standard approach in the theoretical liter-
ature reviewed above is to confront the players with a given information structure,
and investigate how they behave without adjusting the strategy space relative to the
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case of perfect monitoring. However, when studying settings in which the players
information is imperfect it seems intuitive that at least one extension of the strategy
set is natural: to acquire better or additional information! Doing so might have a
number of interesting implications. For example, there must be some incentives «to
become adequately informed about how others had behaved» even though this «might
be personally costly» Milgrom et al. (1990, p. 1). Investigating the nature of those
incentives might be an interesting avenue for research. Milgrom et al. (1990), for
instance, argued the system of judges used to enforce commercial law before the rise
of the state provided incentives to disclose evidence against violators of the code to
the community and to become informed in the first place. They documented that the
system was indeed very successful in enforcing honest behavior. This view puts the
institutional and technological environment as a determinant of information acquisi-
tion and transmission, and therefore the degree of «equilibrium transparency», center
stage. This conception is the motivation for all original contributions in chapters 3
through 7 and I will come back to it at the end of the following chapter.
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Chapter 2
Transparency & Cooperation: Empiri-
cal Insights
«Logically, the conclusions follow from the assumptions. But empirically,
scientifically, the assumptions follow from the conclusions!»
ROBERT AUMANN (in van Damme, 1998, p. 206)
In this chapter, I take up the questions raised at the end of the previous chapter and
selectively screen the empirical literature in order to find answers: Do real people
actually perform such tactics as envisaged in the theoretical models? Do real people
only cooperate for tactical reasons? What strategies do they actually play in repeated
games? What information about the coplayers’ actions to they use? How do they
respond if such information becomes limited? In other words, I review the empirical
literature in order to investigate what strategies real people actually play in the generic
situations described in the previous chapter. I proceed in roughly two steps.
As a first step, I focus on games with perfect monitoring and investigate when
and to what extent subjects play strategies that are conditioned on information about
the coplayers’ past actions. This is a useful first step in order to identify situations
in which the amount of information players have about the history of play likely
have decisive consequences. In section 2.1 I review evidence of behavior in repeated
games with perfect monitoring. Results show that a majority of subjects actually co-
operates tactically. They use the available information about the coplayers’ past be-
havior to condition their current behavior. However, there is a persistent residuum of
cooperation even in (approximated) one-shot interactions which cannot be accounted
for by tactical considerations. In section 2.2 I consider this residuum in more detail,
and put special emphasis on evidence that is informative with respect to our guiding
question. A large body of evidence shows clearly that people do not always cooperate
for tactical reasons, but there is also evidence that such cooperation is conditioned on
coplayers’ behavior anyway.
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If some subjects are willing to incur a cost to confer a benefit to someone else,
are there also subjects who are willing to incur a cost to impose a cost on someone
else? I review the evidence on this question with a focus on the degree of condi-
tioning on coplayers’ past behavior, in which case it can serve as a punishment, in
section 2.3. The evidence shows that such spiteful behavior is very common in var-
ious subject pools worldwide. Furthermore, it is frequently used as a punishment of
non-cooperative behavior, even by unaffected third-parties, with strongly disciplin-
ing effects. It follows predictable patterns, despite the fact that pecuniary incentives
seem to play a significantly smaller role than for cooperative behavior. But there
are exceptions and evidence that the degree of conditioning varies, individually and
spacially.
In sum, the evidence from experiments under perfect monitoring shows that if in-
formation about the other players’ past behavior is readily available, this information
is used in order to play a discriminatory strategy, even in situations in which material
returns from doing so are ruled out. As a result, there are pecuniary incentives to co-
operate, which is reflected in the notably higher frequency of cooperation in repeated
games compared to (approximated) one-shot games. But there is also significant co-
operation in the latter, in particular if costly punishment is available. In one sentence:
if information about the other players’ past behavior is readily available, cooperation
generally occurs and can be very high if the interaction is repeated.
Although the study of perfect monitoring settings is a useful first step, it is not
sufficient to draw definite conclusions about conditions in which information about
coplayers’ actions is actually limited. This is because players might adapt to the sit-
uation by adopting entirely different strategies, such that we cannot just interpolate
behavioral tendencies from a perfect monitoring to an imperfect monitoring setting.
A hint in this direction comes from the evolutionary literature touched in the previ-
ous chapter, which suggests that more forgiving strategies may perform better than
harsh trigger strategies in environments in which monitoring is noisy. Computer
simulations with evolving finite automata playing PD population games confirm that
informational frictions can lead to significant differences among the evolving strate-
gies (e.g. Bendor et al., 1991; Bendor, 1993; Miller, 1996). Hypotheses in the similar
direction has been advanced in cultural anthropology (Boyd & Richerson, 1988a,
1995): in situations in which monitoring is noisy or costly, rules-of-thumb or beliefs
about the «right» action (eventually with moral imperative) may be adaptive. As a
second step, I will therefore review experiments that actually limit the players infor-
mation about past play in different ways. Research in this area is quite limited to
date, and all four experimental studies reported upon in the second part of the thesis
contribute to this literature. So what happens if such information is limited?
While imperfect monitoring is an issue in the theoretical literature for quite some
time (sections 1.3 and 1.4 in the previous chapter), there is only a very small (but
growing) experimental literature, which I review in sections 2.4 and 2.5. Section 2.4
is devoted to cooperation experiments in which the signals the players receive about
their coplayers’ behavior are subject to some random disturbance (corresponding to
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the setting outlined in section 1.3). In PD experiments with an indefinite horizon and
imperfect public monitoring, the available evidence shows that there is cooperation
at any level of noise, but always less than maximal. Furthermore, that the frequency
of cooperation decreases as noise increases, and cooperation in conditions with very
inaccurate information are not higher than under one-shot play. This supports the
hypothesis derived in section 1.3, and poses empirical restrictions on the predictions
of the folk theorem under imperfect public monitoring. Furthermore, subjects seem
to resort to more lenient and forgiving variants of the classical TFT and grim trigger
strategies, that wait for a coplayer to defect two or three times before reverting to
punishment mode, and return to cooperation after a punishment phase has occurred.
These results support the above claim that merely interpolating results obtained in
a perfect monitoring setting to ones with informational constraints is problematic.
This conclusion is reinforced by the available evidence on imperfect monitoring in
cooperation games with an option to reduce coplayers’ payoffs. It is shown that
payoff reductions become more frequent and cooperation less frequent as monitoring
gets more noisy.
Finally, in section 2.5 I consider studies that implement conceptualizations of pri-
vate monitoring. The received evidence is affirmative with respect to the hypothesis
that information transmission, or the publication or disclosure of behavioral records,
may facilitate cooperation relative to conditions in which monitoring is private. The
frequency of cooperation is generally lowest in private monitoring conditions and in-
formation transmission in some form or the other increases cooperation. If matching
is non-random, disclosure also reduces clientelization effects observed under private
monitoring. The evidence is more ambiguous with respect to the question whether
random matching games with public monitoring provide for equally efficient results
as repeated interaction among the same individuals, as suggested by the theorem of
Kandori (1992a) reviewed in section 1.4.1. To summarize with respect to our guid-
ing question, the available evidence suggests that the level of cooperation (and effi-
ciency) is generally increasing in the accuracy and symmetry of information players
have about each others’ actions.
Wrapping up, the insights obtained feed back on the two divergent views (ex-
pressed in the general introduction) about why people cooperate, and what role in-
formation about coplayers’ behavior might play accordingly. The evidence shows
that both views have merit. People cooperate to a significant extent tactically, use
reciprocity strategically to realize mutual benefits as envisaged by game theory, and
thereby draw strongly on information about coplayers’ past behavior. But people
also forgo own material gains to cooperate or reduce incomes of others. A significant
fraction of those latter behaviors are conditioned on information about coplayers’
past play anyway. Thus, there is cooperation even in situations in which people have
minimal or no information about others’ behavior, but increasing such information
generally facilitates cooperation significantly. However, returning to an issue raised
at the end of the previous chapter: what if players have the opportunity to later the
information structure they are confronted with themselves?
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Before I begin, one remark is to be made. «Science is the knowledge of conse-
quences, and dependence of one fact upon another», puts it Thomas Hobbes over four
centuries ago (Hobbes, 1651, ch. 5). Thus, the challenge of any empirical science
is (i) precise and valid measurement, and (ii) identification of causality. Both are a
peculiar strength of the experimental method. Experiments are strong in precision
and validity of measurement because the researcher controls (or even completely
designs) the data generating process, and observes and records the data by her- or
himself. The researcher therefore knows exactly how the data set to be analyzed
has been constructed.1 Well designed experiments also allow for causal inferences
with a minimal set of identifying assumptions, as focal factors can be truly exoge-
nously varied, and the impact of confounding variables can be minimized by means
of direct control (observables) and randomization (unobservables). In sum, it approx-
imates the ideal causal inference model in which one parameter is varied at a time
while holding all other influences constant as far as possible (Rubin, 1974, 2008).
I therefore focus strongly on experimental research, because a reasonable degree of
measurement precision as well as control of incentives and information conditions
is critical for obtaining empirically sound results in the domain under consideration
here. The standard approach in experimental economics combines the general meth-
ods of behavioral experiments with pecuniary incentivation, anonymity (except if its
relaxation is a focus of the study), and strict control of information flows. How-
ever, the experimental approach has also been subject to criticism in economics, that
has, however, less to do with the experimental method itself but more with gener-
alizations drawn from experimental results. I address the concerns by considering
evidence from field experiments as far as available. With respect to the settings con-
sidered in this chapter, the key behavioral patterns are generally observed in both the
lab and the field alike. Nevertheless, generalizations are always to be made with due
care (see e.g. Schram, 2005; Guala & Mittone, 2005, for discussions of the issue).
2.1 Mutual enforcement under perfect monitoring
I begin by taking up two fundamental questions with which I concluded chapter 1:
(i) Do real people actually perform such tactics as envisaged in the conventional ap-
proaches to cooperation in economics? (ii) Do real people only cooperate for tactical
reasons? In this section I will focus on (i) and only touch (ii). In the following section
2.2 I consider (ii) in greater detail.
Experimental research on cooperation has been conducted for quite some time.
The (experimental) simultaneous-move PD is presumably one of the most extensively
1This is not the case for existing data sets, such as surveys or official records. The researcher is
typically not present when surveys are completed, but this task is delegated to interviewers or the re-
spondents themselves (however, in section 2.2 and chapter 7 I will touch on how survey and experiments
can be fruitfully combined). This problem may also apply to experiments whenever the subjects are not
directly observed, such as in experiments conducted over the internet or some natural field experiments.
Likewise, official records are typically created by many different people, sometimes under changing
definitions and guidelines, and usually for different purposes than the researcher’s question at hand.
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studied experimental games, and there is a huge literature stemming predominantly
from social psychologists in the 1960s and early 1970s (see Rapoport & Chammah,
1965; Rapoport, 1974; Colman, 1982, 1999; Roth, 1995, for overviews).2 There is
also a vast early literature on public good games from the 1980s (see Dawes, 1980;
Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Ledyard, 1995, for overviews). I will focus on a selection of
more recent experiments, because they are more tailored to speak to the theories
reviewed in the previous chapter, and include appropriate control conditions (see
below).
2.1.1 Tactical cooperation under indefinite horizons is prevalent
The basic prediction taken from the theoretical approaches in the previous chapter
is that we should expect (conditional) cooperation especially in indefinitely repeated
games with perfect monitoring, because there are tactical reasons to do so and in-
formation about the coplayers behavior is readily available. However, it was also
highlighted that the multiplicity of equilibria is a central weakness of the folk theo-
rem, since virtually any outcome between zero and full cooperation can be sustained
in an equilibrium. So a useful first step would be to see whether the trigger strategy
equilibria indeed exert some attraction to human players, and if «yes», which ones.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there is only a very small experimental litera-
ture on this issue. An early body of studies provided rather mixed results. While
Roth & Murnighan (1978) found in a repeated PD experiment with random termina-
tion that the frequency of cooperation decreases with the termination probability (and
more cooperation under parameter constellations in which cooperation is an equilib-
rium in pecuniary payoffs), those results were not replicated in a similar experiment
by Murnighan & Roth (1983).3 In addition, Roth (1995) pointed to methodological
problems in both studies, most importantly that subjects played with the experimenter
and not with each other, and that a questionable payoff procedure was used. Simi-
lar methodological problems render it difficult to interpret the results of Feinberg &
Husted (1993), who find a small increase in cooperation as the discount factor (im-
plemented by a reduction of payoffs after each round) was decreased. Palfrey &
Rosenthal (1994) also find only a very small difference between a one-shot condition
and a condition with termination probability 0.1 in a public good experiment, which
was, however, unnecessarily complicated.
A few recent papers with strongly improved designs have taken up the issue again.
Dal Bó & Fréchette (2011) conducted a repeated PD experiment (266 undergraduates
from New York University) in which they varied the termination probability (0.25 and
0.5) and the gains from mutual cooperation (low, intermediate, high). Subjects played
2The first PD experiments were (probably) conducted by Flood (1952, 1958) at the RAND Corpo-
ration. Some economists were quick in proposing a behavioral approach to the PD, that is, to refine
the behavioral assumptions based on experimental research (e.g. Lave, 1962), but this approach gained
momentum in economics only about three decades later.
3In both studies, cooperation rates were still far from the maximum, even under a relatively low
termination probability.
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a large number of matches (between 22 and 77) with randomly changing coplayers.
The main predictions can be directly derived from condition 1.2 in the previous chap-
ter: the frequency of cooperation should be decreasing in the termination probability
and increasing in the gains from cooperation.
Specifically, the parameter values were chosen such that, assuming subjects max-
imize their payoffs, there were some conditions in which cooperation is a subgame-
perfect and risk dominant equilibrium (low probability, high gains), some conditions
in which cooperation is a subgame-perfect but not risk dominant equilibrium (low to
high probability, intermediate gains), and some conditions in which cooperation was
no equilibrium at all (high probability, low gains).4 The results are threefold: First,
in the conditions in which cooperation is not supported by an equilibrium, actual fre-
quencies of cooperation decreased with experience from modest to very low levels
(around 5 to 10 percent). Second, in the conditions in which cooperation is sup-
ported by an equilibrium, cooperation sometimes increases, sometimes decreases,
and sometimes remains rather stable over the long haul, but the frequency of coop-
eration is on average clearly higher than in the previous conditions (around 40 to
50 percent). Third, the frequency of cooperation is typically (not always though)
markedly increasing with experience in conditions in which it is supported by a risk
dominant equilibrium; in the conditions with favorable parameters (low probability,
high gains) cooperation rates converge to very high (sometimes full) levels. In fact,
average cooperation rates converge to around 60 to 70 percent in the conditions in
which cooperation is supported by a risk dominant SPE, and around 20 percent in
the conditions in which cooperation is supported by a SPE that is not risk dominant.
Thus, at the minimum, one may conclude that subjects respond markedly to the in-
centives of the situation, cooperating more the lower the termination probability and
the higher the gains from mutual cooperation. These effects a present with little ex-
perience already, often in the first match, but become much stronger with increasing
experience. However, the results also show that even experienced subjects can have
difficulties in sustaining mutual cooperation in situations in which full cooperation
is an equilibrium. In sum, the evidence obtained provides for empirical restrictions
on the set of outcomes that the folk theorem predicts as attainable; overall, being an
equilibrium action seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustained
cooperation over the long haul.
But the above findings do not necessarily support the hypothesis that human play-
ers actually play the kind of trigger strategies as assumed in the theory of indefinitely
repeated games. In particular, the fact that people respond to the termination prob-
ability and the size of the gains from mutual cooperation is also consistent with the
kind of strategic imitation that also predicts cooperation in finite horizon games (sec-
tion 1.2.2), or at least partially with some kind of intrinsic motivation to cooperate,
such as maximizing the joint surplus (see section 2.2 below). Systematic errors seem
rather unlikely for cooperation that remains after many trials (I come back to this
4An equilibrium is considered risk dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction of all equilibria
(Harsanyi & Selten, 1988).
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below). To differentiate between those possibilities, it is necessary to include appro-
priate control conditions into the experiment.
What would be a reasonable control condition? First, a finite horizon condition
would clearly rule out the any folk-theorem-type of cooperation. Second, a condi-
tion in which subjects play (at least approximately) one-shot matches rules out all
repeated game incentives, that is, any remaining cooperation cannot be tactical. The
priors subjects bring to the lab may induce some cooperation in initial trials, but
it appears unlikely that beliefs alone can account for any residual cooperation after
subjects have gained sufficient experience.
Dal Bó (2005) did this in a comprehensive repeated PD experiment (390 under-
graduate students from the University of California) that included both indefinite and
finite horizon experiments with respective one-shot control conditions. The indefinite
horizon experiment (198 subjects) was similar to the one reviewed above, involving
two treatment conditions with termination probabilities 0.25 and 0.5, respectively,
and a control condition with termination probability 1 (i.e. one-shot). Note that these
termination probabilities imply expected horizons of one, two, and four periods, re-
spectively (the actually realized lengths were with averages of 1.91 and 3.73 periods,
respectively, slightly below the expectations). Dal Bó (2005) used this fact to im-
plement a finite horizon experiment (192 subjects) that could be suitably compared
to the indefinite horizon experiment: Here the two treatment conditions had definite
durations of two and four periods, respectively, and the control condition was just
one-shot. In both experiments, every subject played all three conditions, whereas the
researcher counterbalanced partly by reversing the sequence. In each of the three
conditions, each subject played between 5 and 10 matches, depending on the session,
thus between 15 and 30 matches in total.
Again, the main prediction for the indefinite horizon case can be directly derived
from condition 1.2 in the previous chapter: the frequency of cooperation should be
decreasing in the termination probability.5 Consistent with the experiment reviewed
above, this turned out to be the case: Averaging over all matches (excluding the initial
three to allow for learning) and rounds, cooperation occurred in around 9 percent in
the one-shot condition, 27 percent in the condition with termination probability 0.5,
and 37 percent in the condition with termination probability 0.25 (pairwise significant
differences).6
5In order to resemble the scenario usually assumed in theory, Dal Bó (2005) also introduced a public
randomization device in the form of a screen that displayed a random number between 1 and 1,000 every
ten seconds. It turned out that subjects did not pay any attention to the device, even after being told that
they may use it to choose one of their actions.
6Dal Bó (2005) also replicated the effect of a change in payoffs by implementing two payoff function
conditions in a way that under termination probability 0.5 the unique equilibrium outcome in pecuniary
payoffs was mutual cooperation in one and mutual defection in the other. Again, it turned out that
behavior was quite sensitive to this subtle change in payoffs: cooperation occurred significantly more
often under the payoff function under which it was predicted (18.8 versus 3.2 percent), and defection
occurred more often, albeit not significantly so, under the payoff function under which it was predicted
(28.6 versus 25.5 percent).
A significantly higher frequency of cooperation (55 percent) in a repeated PD with termination prob-
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2.1.2 Tactical cooperation under finite horizons is prevalent as well
The main prediction for the finite horizon condition can be directly derived from the
reasoning in section 1.2.2: Under the assumption of some incomplete information
about coplayers’ types, the length of the horizon is a key determinant of the value
of maintaining a cooperative reputation, such that the imitation equilibrium model
predicts a non-increasing rate of cooperation in the initial periods of a match, and
a sharp decline as the terminal period approaches. Furthermore, the frequency of
cooperation in the first period should be increasing in the length of the (remaining)
horizon. Again, dropping all observations from a player’s first three matches to allow
for learning (but see below), Dal Bó (2005) finds within-match dynamics that are
quite consistent with the prediction: Cooperation in the first round is increasing in the
remaining match horizon, and decreasing over time in the two treatment conditions.
The average cooperation rate in the first period was 10.3 percent in the one-shot
treatment, 13.3 percent in the two-period match treatment, and 34.6 in the four-period
match treatment. In the second period, cooperation diminished to 6.9 percent in the
two-period, and 21.6 percent in the four-period treatment. In the latter, cooperation
decreased further in the third and fourth period, respectively to 19 and 10.6 percent.
Thus, the dynamic patterns are quite consistent with the imitation model, but there
is also non-negligible cooperation in terminal periods (including the one-shot control
condition).
There is, however, some conflicting evidence on long-term learning in finite hori-
zon games. In the experiment by Dal Bó (2005), cooperation rates tended to deteri-
orate somewhat over the long haul.7 In the one-shot treatment, average cooperation
rates started at 26.6 percent in the first match, deteriorated successively to 12 percent
in the fifth match, and settled between 6 and 10 percent afterwards. Likewise, in the
four-period match treatment, average cooperation rates started at somewhat higher
31.6 percent in the first match, and declined successively, albeit somewhat less than
in the one-shot treatment (25.1 percent in the fifth match, settling between 15 and
23.8 percent afterwards). Interesting is the two-period match treatment: Here, co-
operation rates were most stable over the long haul, but are generally lower than in
the one-shot treatment, starting at 19.8 percent in the first match and settling between
around 6 and 12 percent.
In a classic repeated PD experiment (28 students from the University of Wiscon-
sin) conducted by Andreoni & Miller (1993), in which subjects also played a rela-
ability 0.1 compared to a random rematching condition (6 percent) has also been found by Duffy &
Ochs (2009).
7The same trend was found in a trust game experiment by Engle-Warnick & Slonim (2004), to be
reviewed in more detail below. In the first supergame of their experiment, first movers cooperated in 82
percent of the time, and 81 percent of first mover cooperation was reciprocated. In the final supergame,
first mover cooperation declined to 53 percent of the time, while 90 percent of their cooperation was
reciprocated. Interestingly, the average payoff per period decreased steadily for both players as they
gained experience over the long haul, for first movers from about 62 cents average over the first ten
matches to about 52 cents in the last ten, for second movers from about 47 to 42 cents. See also the
experiment of Anderhub et al. (2002) to be reviewed below.
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Figure 2.1: Cooperation in a finite horizon PD experiment.
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tively large number of matches, the long-term trend points in the other direction (see
lower left panel of figure 2.1). In the treatment condition (the «partners condition»)
each of the 14 subjects played 20 ten-period matches with a fixed coplayer in each
match, respectively, and a random rematch occurred between matches. The control
condition (the «stranger condition») was identical except that players were randomly
re-matched in each of the 200 periods.8 Interestingly (see the lower-left panel of fig-
ure 2.1), the full effect in the partner condition did require a few matches to unfold.
In fact, in the initial two matches cooperation rates are actually lower in the partner
than in the stranger condition, but strongly increase afterwards and remain high for
most of the time in the former but not in the latter. More evidence is needed to resolve
the exact reasons for the conflicting evidence, because the experiments differ along
too many dimension to compare them in a meaningful way. Likely candidates are
the number of players in a session (very few in Andreoni’s and Miller’s experiment)
or the length of the matches (very short in the other experiments). But also the sam-
pling population might play a role. The evidence reviewed in the next subsection is
informative on this issue as well.
Anyway, that (i) the frequency of cooperation is generally higher in «partners»
than in «strangers» conditions, and (ii) the distinct within-match dynamics in the for-
mer are very robust results (see also below). They have also been documented in
public good games. While there is some conflicting evidence in early experiments
of this kind (Andreoni, 1988, 1990; Croson, 1996, see Andreoni & Croson, 2008 for
an overview),9 the literature following one of the most rigorous studies (Keser & van
Winden, 2000) converged to the following two stylized facts that mirror the above
evidence for dyadic games: (i) cooperation in a «partners» condition is higher than
in a «strangers» or «perfect strangers» condition, (ii) there is a drop of cooperation
if the terminal period approaches in «partners» conditions, and (iii) cooperation in
«strangers» conditions (and the terminal period of «partners» conditions) is signifi-
cantly above zero.
2.1.3 What strategies are actually played?
Returning to the experiment by Dal Bó (2005), it remains to compare the finite and
indefinite horizon outcomes. Dal Bó (2005) expects cooperation in the first round to
be no less in the indefinite than in the finite horizon condition for any given (expected)
remaining duration of a match.10 This turned out to be clearly the case. While the
8The design has one weakness, though: in the control condition the probability of meeting the same
subject again in the future was not negligible given the moderate number of subjects in a session and the
large number of matches. However, Cooper et al. (1996) replicated the experiment with a much more
sophisticated matching scheme in the control condition, which assured that no pair interacted more than
once, but obtained virtually identical results.
9See also Weimann, 1994; Palfrey & Prisbrey, 1997, Burlando & Hey, 1997; Brandts et al., 2004
for indications that the sampling population plays a role.
10Note that this comparison is meaningful because in the first period the expected remaining horizon
in the indefinite horizon condition is exactly equal to the certain remaining horizon in the finite horizon
condition. There is no general theoretical result on such a comparison, so the hypothesis is intuitively
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first-round cooperation rates between the two control (one-shot) conditions do not
differ significantly (9.2 percent in the condition with zero continuation probability,
10.3 percent in the one-period match condition), they are clearly higher in the indef-
inite horizon condition, 30.9 versus 13.3 percent and 46.2 versus 34.6 percent in the
(expected) two- and four period horizon conditions, respectively. In the subsequent
periods, cooperation remained significantly higher in the indefinite horizon condi-
tions; the differences actually increased, as cooperation rates deteriorated much less
in the indefinite than in the finite horizon treatments.11
The results suggest that all three of the possible forces mentioned above must be
operative. The fact that there is a modest but clearly positive and stable frequency
of cooperation even in one-shot games suggest that not all observed cooperation in
repeated games can be attributed to the strategic incentives reviewed in the previ-
ous chapter.12 Putting this aside, the patterns in finitely repeated games are by and
large consistent with strategic imitation (but see the final paragraph below). Finally,
the differences between the finitely and indefinitely repeated games of the same (ex-
pected) duration suggests that there are indeed different things going on in the latter
than in the former.
But what exactly? We still do not know what kind of strategies the players are
actually playing. There is indeed very little evidence on this issue, but two recent
studies by Engle-Warnick & Slonim (2004, 2006b) make an honest effort to infer
repeated game strategies from observed actions in finitely and indefinitely repeated
trust games. Engle-Warnick & Slonim (2004) conducted a trust game experiment
(146 students from the University of Pittsburgh) with two conditions: an indefinite
horizon condition with termination probability 0.2, i.e. an expected duration of five
periods (the actually realized duration was 5.2 on average), and a finite horizon con-
dition with definite duration of five periods. Each subjects played 50 matches (which
was not told to them, however, only that they will play «many» matches), pairs were
randomly re-matched between matches, and subjects kept their roles as first or second
movers, respectively, for the entire experiment.
Similar as in the experiments reviewed above, the frequency of cooperation and
pecuniary efficiency did not differ significantly between conditions in early matches,
derived.
11Normann & Wallace (2012) found also more frequent cooperation before a repeated PD was ter-
minated with low probability compared to high probability and certain termination, although the differ-
ences are small and insignificant. This might be explained by the fact that subjects played only a single
match, whereas the above experiments suggest that learning is important. Furthermore, a somewhat
peculiar feature of the design is that subjects played 22 rounds for sure in any condition, before the
treatments kicked in. An interesting novel feature, however, is a fourth condition in which the hori-
zon was completely unknown (ambiguous) to the subjects. No significant difference to the random
termination treatments was found.
12Note, however, that the control conditions in the experiments by Dal Bó & Fréchette (2011) and
Dal Bó (2005) do not rule out any strategic incentives beyond doubt, because there is a non-negligible
probability that the same pair of subjects meet in more than one match due to the large number of
repetitions relative to a modest number of players in a session. Though, a large number of experiments
that rigorously rule out this possibility do not find any different results (see section 2.2).
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but diverged as subjects gained experience, with first movers cooperating signifi-
cantly more often in the indefinite than in the finite horizon condition (contingent
second mover cooperation rates did not differ significantly). The researchers at-
tempted to infer strategies from observed behavior by fitting the data to finite au-
tomata (Engle-Warnick & Slonim, 2006a, go into much greater detail). In the indef-
inite horizon condition, only one first mover strategy was inferred, and this strategy
was always a best response for one of the inferred second mover strategies: grim
trigger. For second movers, between two and four strategies were inferred for each
interval of ten matches. «Always cooperate» and the four-period counter («cooperate
three rounds, then defect once») were inferred across all matches, the other strategies
were inferred only sporadically. Apparently, one second mover strategy («always co-
operate») is always a best response to the inferred first mover strategy (grim trigger).
In the finite horizon condition, clearly more strategies were inferred, and dynami-
cally, strategies disappear and emerge, at least for first movers, significantly more
often than in the indefinite horizon condition. Between four and two first mover
strategies were inferred, including various counter strategies («cooperate x rounds,
then defect once»), «always defect», «always cooperate», or grim trigger. The set of
inferred strategies becomes smaller over time, with only «always defect» and grim
trigger surviving, only the former being a best response to the inferred second mover
strategies.13 For second movers, various counter strategies come and go (four and
three period counters survive), «always defect» emerges towards the end, and again
«always cooperate» was inferred across all matches.
The interesting novel insights that Engle-Warnick & Slonim (2004) provide are
twofold. First, the strategy inference provides evidence that subjects use distinct
strategies in the two conditions from the beginning already, an insight that would not
have been obtained by comparing aggregate performance alone (because there were
no significant differences in the beginning). Second, the fact that subjects seem to
settle on a very small set of strategies in the indefinite horizon but not the finite hori-
zon condition, in which heterogeneity persists, suggest a reason why the frequency
of cooperation begins to diverge over time. Furthermore, the fact that the only second
mover strategy that was inferred across all matches, in both conditions, and even af-
ter many trials was «always cooperate» suggests that there is a hard core of subjects
which are somehow intrinsically motivated to cooperate. Interesting would be an in-
dividual level inference in order to get an idea about how frequent (in relative terms)
the different strategies actually are.
Dal Bó & Fréchette (2012) did this with a different approach to infer strategies
involving the «strategy method» (Selten, 1967). The basic design was similar to the
the studies of Dal Bó (2005) and Dal Bó & Fréchette (2011) reviewed above, built
around a sequence of indefinitely repeated PDs with different termination probabilies
and gains from mutual cooperation conditions (they had 246 undergraduates from
New York University). After playing the games in the usual fashion for around 20
13Note that behavior predicted by the strategic imitation model may be observationally identical to
grim trigger.
54
minutes, subjects were asked to design complete strategies that will play in their
place. They find that the most popular strategies were «always defect», TFT and grim
trigger. However, the prevalence of the strategies depend markedly on the termination
probability and the gains from mutual cooperation: in treatments less conductive to
cooperation (likely termination, low gains) «always defect» is the by far most popular
strategy (between 46 and 58 percent). As those conditions become more conductive,
«always defect» becomes significantly less frequent (only 9 to 14 percent under most
conductive conditions), and trigger strategies become dominant (between 48 and 69
percent). Interestingly, grim trigger is more prevalent in treatments with high gains,
while TFT is more prevalent in treatments with a low termination probability. Thus,
the strategies players adopt appear to depend significantly on the parameters of the
game. This result may help to resolve the conflicting evidence on the use of trigger
strategies in earlier studies (Sell & Wilson, 1991; Feinberg & Husted, 1993). I will
come back to this important insight in section 2.4.
Summing up so far, what goes on in indefinitely repeated games appears rela-
tively simple: trigger strategies are the dominant way to play the game. On the other
hand, what happens in finitely repeated games remains more mysterious. The over-
all patterns appear to be quite consistent with the strategic imitation model, but at
a closer look there are also some oddities. This conclusion is reinforced by an ex-
periment that was particularly well tailored at testing the strategic imitation model.
Anderhub et al. (2002) conducted a trust game experiment (36 not further specified
subjects) in which they also varied the length of the horizon, but added as a special
feature that players could explicitly randomize over their actions, that is, a subject
had to specify the probabilities (in percent) for her or his two actions to be carried
out. Each participant played a sequence of six matches with a different coplayer each,
where the horizon of the matches comprised, always in this order, three, six, two, ten,
three, and six periods, respectively. Roles were randomly assigned and remained
fixed for the entire sequence. Consistent with the experiment by Dal Bó (2005), they
found that changing the length of the horizon had little effect on the standard qualita-
tive within-match dynamics of frequent cooperation in the non-terminal periods and
a strong termination effect, but that cooperation in the first period of a longer match
tends to be more frequent than in the first period of a shorter match. The explicit
randomization option was hardly used. The most interesting analysis performed by
Anderhub et al. (2002) was the investigation of the more fine-grit predictions of the
strategic imitation model. Two clear predictions are that (i) second movers should
never cooperate in the terminal round, and that (ii) once a second mover defected
in a non-terminal round, the coplayer should immediately turn to defection for the
rest of the match. It was found that the majority of second movers indeed defected
in at least some of the six terminal rounds, but there was also a small minority that
did never exploit a cooperating first mover in the terminal period of a match. There
were also some second movers who sometimes rewarded and sometimes exploited
in the terminal period of a match. Concerning the second prediction, roughly a third
of those first movers that were exploited in a non-terminal round never cooperated
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again, whereas the remaining two thirds forgave. This confirms the conclusion that
strategic cooperation plays a role, but cannot account for all observed cooperation.14
There is, however, a qualification. Since the first and fifth, and the second and sixth
supergame, respectively, had the same length Anderhub et al. (2002) could also check
for the role of experience. Indeed, learning shifted behavior clearly towards the the-
oretical benchmark. From first to the fifth and the second to the sixth supergames,
respectively, the share of monotone strategies increased significantly with the result
that first and second mover cooperation increased in the non-terminal periods and
decreased in the terminal period.
2.1.4 Conclusion
In this section I have investigated two fundamental questions with which I concluded
chapter 1: (i) Do real people actually perform such tactics as envisaged in the conven-
tional approaches to cooperation in economics? (ii) Do real people only cooperate
for tactical reasons? In this section I focused on (i) and touched (ii). The following
conclusions with respect to those questions can be drawn from the evidence reviewed
in this section. First, a majority of subjects actually cooperates tactically. In in-
definitely repeated cooperation games, the evidence shows that cooperation is more
likely to prevail if it is a supergame equilibrium (in particular if it is risk dominant)
than when it is not. As predicted by the folk theorem, subjects respond to changes in
the termination probability and the size of the gains from mutual cooperation. Most
importantly with respect our guiding question (What does the propensity of individ-
uals in a given group to cooperate with one another has to do with the availability of
information they have about each others’ actions?), subjects use the available infor-
mation about the coplayers’ past behavior to condition their current behavior. The
evidence suggests that the most commonly employed strategies are the two trigger
strategies considered in section 1.2.3: TFT and GRIM.
The evidence shows that there is generally also significant cooperation in finitely
repeated cooperation games. The average within-match dynamics are consistent with
the strategic imitation model considered in section 1.2.2: significant cooperation over
some fraction of the duration, with cooperation in the first period being increasing
in the remaining duration, and a sharp decline as the terminal period approaches.
However, while most people seem clearly to condition their behavior on past play,
the individual level fine-structure of behavior is often inconsistent with the strategic
imitation model, and subjects seem to have more difficulties to settle on a particular
14The limited consistency with this theory is confirmed by individual level analysis. A key aspect
of the equilibrium strategies is that the probability of cooperation should be, for both players, at least
non-increasing over time. While the fraction of such monotone strategies is relatively high in matches
with shorter horizons, it is less so with longer horizons, and only 28 percent of the first movers and 33
percent of the second movers played monotonically in all six supergames. Thus, while the theory of
reputation equilibria appears to have some merit, it is clearly only part of the story. This conclusion is
further reinforced by the regularly increasing patterns of cooperation in non-terminal periods found in
other experiments (see below), which are also inconsistent with the theory.
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strategy.
In sum, tailored at our guiding question this means that if information about the
other players’ past behavior is readily available, this information is used in order to
play a discriminatory strategy. As a result, there are material incentives to cooperate
which is reflected in the notably higher frequency of cooperation in repeated games
that in (approximated) one-shot games. However, and this brings me to question
(ii), there is some persistent residual of cooperation even in (approximated) one-shot
interactions which cannot be accounted for by tactical considerations. Andreoni &
Miller (1993) show that behavior in their stranger condition is consistent with an
incomplete information Nash equilibrium in which individuals share a common prior
on the probability of experiencing cooperation of around 0.2, which is similar to the
«homegrown» subjective prior of 0.17 estimated by Camerer & Weigelt (1988) in a
similar experiment. But where should such a prior come from, and more importantly,
why should it persist over many trials if not justified? I will now turn to experiments
that address those peculiarities more directly.
2.2 Non-tactical cooperation
One key conclusion from the experiments reviewed above is that tactical (conditional)
cooperation plays an important role, but that there is also a residuum of observed
cooperation that must have different reasons: either the respective subjects make
errors or do not understand the strategic incentives of the experimental game, or they
are motivated not only by their pecuniary payoffs.
To start with, the «residuum» is not a peculiarity. The findings that (some) people
(sometimes) cooperate even if pecuniary returns from doing so are ruled out have now
been replicated in a vast number of studies using a variety of different experimental
games, protocols or sampling populations, and in the laboratory as well as in the field
(see Fehr & Schmidt, 2003, 2006; Henrich et al., 2001, 2004, 2005; Gintis et al.,
2005; Meier, 2007; Kagel & Roth, 2011, for overviews). There is even substantial
cooperation in strict one-shot cooperation games without any kind of repetition (e.g.
Marwell & Ames, 1979; Gächter et al., 2004; Walker & Halloran, 2004; Dufwenberg
et al., 2011; Cubitt et al., 2011). In this section I will put special emphasis on evidence
that is informative with respect to our guiding question. Namely, to what extent is
even such non-tactical cooperation conditioned on coplayers’ actions?
2.2.1 Non-tactical cooperation is predictable
The notion that humans are not always motivated by their immediate self-interest
alone is of course an old hat in sociology and social psychology (see general intro-
duction). But economists have traditionally been wary to overhasty adjust assump-
tions on preferences, for good reason, since a theory quickly becomes vacuous if any
behavior can be «explained» by positing respective preferences. Furthermore, the
common observation that many people want to be helpful, generous, philanthropic
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and generally a good person does not refute the selfishness assumption, because those
desires may just be a «mental program» that actually implements a long-term selfish
strategy.
But also economists have pointed to many apparent forms of cooperation under
conditions that make it hard to believe that they rely on (enlightened) self-interest
alone (Bohnet & Frey, 1997). A large fraction of people sacrifice time and resources
to vote or participate otherwise in political or other collective actions, despite their
own contribution having a negligible impact on the overall outcome (Olson, 1965;
Mueller, 2003; Shabman & Stephenson, 1994). Likewise, often people take care
of shared resources and comply with environmental standards (Russell et al., 1986;
Harrington, 1988) or pay their taxes honestly (Andreoni et al., 1998) even if the likeli-
hood of sanctions is extremely low. Apparently, people also voluntarily contribute to
finance local amenities, donate to charities or tolerate large scale income redistribu-
tion (Roberts, 1984). This is backed by more general claims that throughout human
history, relationships and communities were frequently disbanded by warfare, famine
and other catastrophes, such that folk theorem arguments (recall the condition 1.2 in
section 1.2) run into severe difficulties in plausibly accounting for the degree of co-
operation that has frequently been observed precisely in the midth of such adverse
conditions (e.g. Knauft, 1991; Gintis, 2000; Fehr & Henrich, 2003). «Physicists also
do not argue that we can explain sunset and sundown by assuming that the Sun or-
bits around the Earth although this incorrect assumption can provide a superficially
plausible explanation for these phenomena» argues Fehr et al. (2009, p. 363). But
rigorous empirical research is needed before adjusting behavioral assumptions. And
the controlled experiments is again indispensable here, because in the field virtually
«all human interaction involves a seamless transition from past involvements to fu-
ture anticipations» (Seabright, 2010, p. 66), such that too many uncontrolled factors,
on which adequate data is often lacking, simultaneously affect the outcomes which
renders it extremely difficult, if not impossible to rigorously distinguish between ex-
trinsically motivated («enforced») and intrinsically motivated cooperation.
The major competing hypothesis that have been put forward to explain appar-
ently non-tactical cooperation is that not preferences diverge from the traditional be-
havioral model but decision-making and performance, that is, subjects are just not as
rational in forming beliefs and performing their actions as assumed by game theory,
that they are more guided by intuition and rules of thumb and do not backward in-
duct. However, in principle game theory does not require that players select strategies
consciously (e.g. Gintis, 2009), that is, even intuition may be sufficiently adapted to a
situation at hand to produce behavior that is «rational» in the usually defined sense of
consistency. The argument therefore boils down to the hypothesis that subjects apply
intuitions from the real world «maladaptively» in the laboratory experiment initially,
i.e. that they make errors, and that they need some time to learn the incentives of the
game (e.g. Selten & Stoecker, 1986; Binmore, 1998; Anderson et al., 1998).
Clearly, people differ in their powers of comprehension and reasoning, and some
people might require a longer period of practice than others. But doubt on the «error
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hypothesis» as a major explanation is cast already by experiments in which subjects
play a significant number of matches (reviewed above). In those experiments a small
but robust residual of cooperation persists even with significant experience. Engle-
Warnick & Slonim (2004), for example, inferred the «always cooperate» strategy
even in the last ten trials, after 40 trials have already been played. Furthermore,
cooperation typically starts high in new trials after deteriorating in the previous one,
even with significant experience. For example, in the experiment by Andreoni (1990)
reviewed above, the frequency of cooperation rebounds, after dropping to very low
levels at the end of a ten period match, back to about equally high levels in the first
period of a new match. This «restart effect» has also been found by Andreoni (1988)
in a public good game in which there was a previously unannounced second sequence
of stage games (see also Croson, 1996; Cookson, 2000).
Another fact that supports the hypothesis that there is something systematic be-
hind non-tactical cooperation is the observation that (most) subjects respond clearly
and quite consistently to changes in the inventive structure created by the experimen-
tal design. For example, the comparisons in the previous section show that when
incentives for strategic reputation building are removed there are behavioral adjust-
ments in the very first period already. Likewise, the end-game-effect in finitely re-
peated games is pronounced even in the first match or if only a single match is played.
This suggests that, at least a majority of subjects are able and do analyze the simple
situations created in the laboratory before they start playing, and plan their strategy
accordingly.
By means of an extensive giving game experiment in which they vary the cost (κ)
and the external benefit (η) of cooperation, Andreoni & Miller (2002) show that sub-
jects systematically respond to changes in those parameters. A majority of subjects
even behave consistent with the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP), a
basic consistency requirement that assures that behavior can be represented by a well-
behaved utility function. Note that the giving game is a one-shot unidirectional game
in which only one of the two players (the donor) has the option of performing a co-
operative action from which the other player (the recipient) benefits, just as described
in section 1.1. Thus, cooperation never pays off, such that this design rules out any
pecuniary motivation to cooperate. Relatedly, a number of one-shot (or controlled
rematching) public good experiments find that cooperation is generally increasing
in the external benefit η , which is equally shared among the other group members
in this case (Isaac & Walker, 1988; Brandts & Schram, 2001; Goeree et al., 2002;
Zelmer, 2003; Carpenter, 2007b).15 Relatedly, if the marginal per capita return of the
public good is held constant, that is, η is increased with the number of coplayers such
that ηn−1 remains constant, then cooperation is generally independent from the size of
the group (Marwell & Ames, 1979; Isaac & Walker, 1988; Isaac et al., 1994; Zelmer,
2003; Carpenter, 2007b; Cárdenas & Jaramillo, 2010).
There are also studies that systematically test the «error hypothesis» against the
«non-pecuniary motivation» hypothesis. In a public good experiment, Andreoni
15See also Anderson et al. (1998) for a theoretical approach.
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(1995) found confusion to be a dominant reason for cooperation in the very first
round, but it declined strongly after just a few rounds to about 10 to 20 percent of
cooperative moves. The fraction of cooperative moves coming from subjects which
understand the free-riding incentive quite well but choose to cooperate nevertheless
follows the opposite pattern. Several experiments with different designs strengthen
the evidence that errors play some role, it particular in the very first period, but
relatively swiftly become a minor issue (e.g. Palfrey & Prisbrey, 1997; Houser &
Kurzban, 2002; Brandts & Schram, 2001; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 2001; Charness
& Haruvy, 2002). The evidence in favor the «non-pecuniary motivation» hypothesis,
on the other hand, has become very strong (see Fehr & Schmidt, 2003, 2006; Henrich
et al., 2001, 2004, 2005; Gintis et al., 2005; Meier, 2007; Kagel & Roth, 2011, for
overviews), whereas much research on the fine-structure of those motivations is still
to be done.16
2.2.2 Non-tactical cooperation is partly conditional
Even if one rejects the «error hypothesis» as a major explanation, there are alternative
hypotheses concerning individual motivations.17 A classic hypothesis is that people
might have altruistic preferences in the sense that they experience subjective utility
from knowing about someone else receiving a benefit (Becker, 1974). Another hy-
pothesis is that people experience subjective utility, a «warm inner glow», just from
the act of contributing to the common good (Andreoni, 1990). Or people may just
be principled by their moral values or social norms that generally suppresses selfish
behavior (see the introduction). In sum, there might be intrinsic motivations to co-
operate that are independent from the behavior of others, and therefore independent
from information about those behaviors.
But the idea that intrinsically motivated behavior may be conditional on others’
behavior has long been hypothesized in biology and anthropology (e.g. Darwin, 1871;
Williams, 1966; Trivers, 1971; Sahlins, 1972), sociology (e.g. Gouldner, 1960; Blau,
1962), social psychology (e.g. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), and even by a number
of influential economists (e.g. Friedman, 1962; Buchanan, 1967; Cornes & Sandler,
1984; Frank, 1988). Indeed, Milton Friedman (1962, p. 191) mentioned vividly half
16The question of how humans might have evolved pro-social dispositions that suppress selfish be-
havior in particular circumstances to the benefit of others is a vibrant area of research in biology and
anthropology (e.g. Sober & Wilson, 1998; Boehm, 1999; Hammerstein, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 2005;
Kappeler & van Schaik, 2006; Henrich & Henrich, 2007). However, such ultimate questions are only
of peripheral importance to economists with their more proximate perspective.
17Such non-pecuniary motivations are commonly called social preferences (or other-regarding pref-
erences), and are typically conceptualized by a preference order over payoff distributions in the relevant
reference group in the sense that individuals who exhibit social preferences behave as if they value the
payoff of relevant reference players positively or negatively (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005). Generally, the
relevant reference agents are always relative to the situation under consideration, that is, a person may
have different reference agents in different domains. In the laboratory, however, the researcher is able
to have some control along these lines: the common assumption in experimental economics is that the
relevant reference players are those matched into the same group (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006).
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a century ago that
«we might all of us be willing to contribute to the relief of poverty, pro-
vided everyone else did. We might not be willing to contribute the same
amount without such assurance.»
With respect to our guiding question, this can be put alternatively as follows: people
respond to information about other people’s (non-)cooperative behavior. The evi-
dence reviewed in the previous section shows clearly that this is true when doing so
carries a prospect of a material return. But does this extend to settings in which such
material returns are very unlikely?
A way to investigate this question is to observe second mover behavior in one-
shot sequential games (Camerer & Fehr, 2004). The advantages are two-fold: First,
because such games end after the second mover’s action, pecuniary motivation can
be ruled out as a reason for her or his behavior. Second, since the second mover
follows the first mover’s action (i.e. is informed about this action before her or his
own move), one can study how the former’s behavior depends on the latter’s. First
mover behavior can still be tactical, but is interesting insofar as it may reflect an
anticipation of the second mover’s non-tactical cooperation (which may be viewed as
even stronger evidence on the existence of instrinsic cooperative motivations).
In a seminal study, Berg et al. (1995) conducted a strictly one-shot investment
game experiment (64 undergraduates from the University of Minnesota).18 They used
a sophisticated double-blind protocol in order to mitigate subjects’ concerns about
being observed as far as possible. Out of the 32 first movers, five sent their complete
endowment, nine sent between 6 and 8 Dollars, six sent half of their endowment.
Only two out of 32 sent nothing, two sent one Dollar. Thus, first movers cooperated
to a considerable extent: almost 94 percent cooperated (sent positive amounts), 63
percent sent at least half of their endowment. Among the second movers, the majority
(24 out of 30, or 80 percent) cooperated in return. Most first movers were at least
compensated, such that the exchange was mutually beneficial to both players. But
some first movers were exploited, their coplayer returning little or nothing at all.
Although the behavior of the second movers in the trust or investment game is
frequently termed «reciprocity» from the outset, it is important to observe that their
cooperation may be, at least partially unconditional.19 Thus, identifying whether and
to what extent second mover cooperation in the trust or investment game is condi-
tional is actually not that easy, because a (within-subject) counter-factual is missing
18The investment game is an extension of the trust game in which subjects can send also intermediate
amounts between the two extremes. The first mover’s transfer is usually doubled or tripled, the second
mover’s transfer is not modified.
19Berg et al. (1995) anticipated this caveat and tried to avoid transfers based on distributional consid-
erations by endowing both players with 10 Dollars each. There are, however, some plausible motives
inducing unconditional cooperation that were not ruled out by this feature. For example, if a first mover
cares about the joint surplus of both players, then the fact that the amount sent is tripled provides a
strong incentive to cooperate, independently from the second mover’s return. The same is true for the
second mover in the gift-exchange game since there the return transfers are multiplied.
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by design: one can only observe the actual path of play, but to identify conditioning,
one needs also to know what the second mover would have done in case the first
mover had behaved differently.
One way to address this problem is to just ask second movers about the reasons
of their behavior. Bolle (1998) conducted a slightly modified trust game (first mover
binary decision, second mover multiple) experiment (95 first year economics students
in Frankfurt/Oder, Germany). Each first mover had to indicate both what the second
mover will return, and what he or she should return, and each second mover could
justify her or his behavior free of form. Bolle (1998) obtained similar results as Berg
et al. (1995). Not surprisingly, the distribution of normatively expected return trans-
fers is concentrated at much higher levels than actual ones. The majority expected
(normatively) an equal split of the surplus. The vast majority of second movers felt
obliged to at least compensate the first mover, whereas a minority of those perceived
it as just to maximize their income under this restriction, while the rest expressed
it just to reward the first mover’s willingness to take the risk of being exploited by
returning somewhat more than the compensating amount. However, all stayed well
below the equal split of surplus with their judgment. Some of the second movers
provided an equity justification, namely an equal share of the joint payoff to be fair.
The most common justification among the second movers who returned very little
was that they did not felt bound by any rule, commitment or promise to return any-
thing. In sum, those more-than-compensating return transfers that were justified as a
«reward» point toward a conditional motivation, whereas the statements suggest that
distributional concerns are important as well.
Cox (2004) attempted to decompose behavior in the one-shot investment game
more rigorously (188 students from the University of Arizona). There was one condi-
tion with the standard investment game, and two conditions in which subjects played
a giving game, respectively. The giving games were structurally identical to the situ-
ations of the first and second mover in the investment game, respectively, but with the
actual move of the coplayer eliminated.20 Cox (2004) argues that the differences of
the average amounts sent and returned between the actual investment game and the
two giving games should identify tactical cooperation, conditional on the belief of
a compensating return («trust») in case of first movers, and cooperation conditional
on the first mover’s action in case of second movers («reciprocity»). Note that this
argument is not unproblematic, because the comparison is (i) between-subjects and
(ii) across quite different games which may be, despite being structurally identical to
the investment game, not perceived as the same kind of situation. Anyway, assuming
that this design is successful in disentangling unconditional and conditional cooper-
ation, Cox (2004) finds that both partially account for cooperation in the investment
game. On average, the first movers sent 5.97 Dollars in the investment game and 3.63
20The first was identical to the first mover’s situation in the investment game except that the second
mover did not have an opportunity to return anything. The second was identical the second mover’s
situation, whereas the endowments were adjusted by the average amounts set in the investment game in
order to render the two games comparable.
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Dollars in the respective giving game, suggesting that about 40 percent of the first
movers’ cooperation is tactical and the remaining 60 percent is unconditional. Like-
wise, the second movers returned on average 4.94 Dollars in the investment game and
sent 2.06 Dollars in the respective giving game, suggesting that roughly 60 percent
of the second movers’ cooperation is conditional on first movers’ behavior and the
remaining 40 percent unconditional. The larger fraction of unconditional cooperation
among the first movers is consistent with a surplus maximization motive (Charness
& Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), because the amounts sent are tripled.
Ashraf et al. (2006) address one shortcoming of the previous approach by em-
ploying a within-subject design. In addition, they used the strategy method where
the second movers had to decide on a contingent action for every possible amount
sent by the first movers. The three-games design was very similar to Cox’s, but they
did not adjust endowments in the giving game that resembled the second mover’s
situation in the investment game. They are somewhat more cautious in relating the
results from the three games by forgoing to interpret the differences quantitatively but
instead focusing on correlations. Ashraf et al. (2006) argue that if tactical coopera-
tion is the dominant component (relative to unconditional cooperation) of first mover
cooperation in the investment game, then the latter should be stronger correlated with
the expected return than with their own transfer in the giving game. Likewise, if
conditional cooperation is the dominant component (relative to unconditional coop-
eration) of second mover cooperation in the investment game, then the latter should
be stronger correlated with the amount received than with their own transfer in the
giving game. Their results are affirmative in the first case, and somewhat less in
the second, but conditional second mover cooperation, according to their measure,
is clearly present. Furthermore, they conducted the same experiment in three dif-
ferent countries, the USA (112 students from universities in Boston), Russia (118
students from universities in Moscow), and South Africa (129 students from univer-
sities in Cape Town), and found little differences between the locations. Using also
a within-subjects design, Chaudhuri & Gangadharan (2007) finds similar results and
more clear indications of conditional cooperation in second movers.
Further evidence comes from experiments using the gift-exchange game in which
researchers aim to measure conditional cooperation in second movers by within-
period correlations between first and second mover cooperation (e.g. Fehr & Falk,
1999; Falk et al., 1999; Fehr & Gächter, 2000b; Gächter & Falk, 2002). The follow-
ing patterns that have been replicated many times: First, a notable fraction of second
movers cooperate above the minimum in response to above-the-minimum coopera-
tion by their respective first movers. In addition, the two’s cooperation levels are
positively correlated. Second, there is also a notable fraction of second movers that
cooperate above the minimum consistently, independent from the level of their first
mover’s cooperation. Third, on average first movers cooperate above the minimum,
that is, they are «rent leavers» (Bohnet & Frey, 1997). Fourth, while the average
level of second mover cooperation (and total surpluses in turn) is typically signifi-
cantly above the minimum, it is still far from the maximum.
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The gift exchange game is probably the most studied experimental game so far,
and there is a vast number of studies that vary design elements in one-shot or ran-
dom matching laboratory gift-exchange game experiments to check the robustness of
non-tactical conditional cooperation. Such elements comprise inter alia stake sizes
(Rigdon, 2002; Fehr et al., 2002b),21 the extent of experimenter-subject interaction
(Rigdon, 2002), instructions, framing and presentation (Charness et al., 2004; En-
gelmann & Ortmann, 2009), whether the equilibrium in material payoffs is a corner
or interior point (Pereira et al., 2006; Engelmann & Ortmann, 2009), the matching
mechanism (Engelmann & Ortmann, 2009), whether second mover’s get information
about transfers received by other second movers (Maximiano et al., 2007; Charness
& Kuhn, 2007; Abeler et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2010; Siang et al., 2011), or whether
second movers’ cooperation is a pecuniary transfer or real effort (Brüggen & Stro-
bel, 2007). Some manipulations have a notable effect on the strength of conditional
behavior, in some cases it gets quite weak (i.e. information about the coplayer’s
previous behavior is close to being ignored), but the qualitative conclusion that it is
common turned out to be quite robust with respect to variations in the laboratory im-
plementation. There are also a number of studies that embedded the gift-exchange
game in a competitive experimental market (Fehr et al., 1993; Kirchler et al., 1996;
Fehr et al., 1997, 1998a,b; Fehr & Falk, 1999; Hannan et al., 2002; Brandts & Char-
ness, 2004; Brown et al., 2004, 2008). They generally find little differences to the
standard experiments, that is, there is still a positive correlation between first and
second mover cooperation even under strong competition, both on the demand and
the supply side.
However, while all of those approaches are rather indirect (and not entirely un-
problematic, in particular the experiments using multiple games) in measuring the ex-
tent of conditional cooperation, a very direct and simple way is the familiar sequential
PD. Clark & Sefton (2001) conducted an experiment using this game (120 students
from the University of Manchester, and 120 students from Penn State University), in
which any subject played ten periods under a round robin rematching scheme, ap-
proximating one-shot play. They found that first movers cooperated between 32 and
58 percent, and second movers between 15 and 23 percent. The interesting question,
however, are the frequencies of second mover cooperation conditional on the first
mover actions: if the first mover defected, only between 3 and 6 percent of the sec-
ond movers responded with cooperation, while between 35 and 39 percent of them
21Similar manipulations have been done with the trust game. Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005) find
no differences in second mover behavior for different, even considerable (transfers equivalent to 1.683
USD) stake sizes. Most other studies that examined the effects of stake size on behavior in experiments
have analyzed the ultimatum game (see the following section). In all studies, first movers’ behavior is
independent of the stake size (with the exception of Fu et al., 2007, who found that transfer decrease
with stakes), but the respondents tend to accept smaller (relative to the endowment) offers with high
stakes compared to conditions with low stakes (Hoffman et al., 1996; Slonim & Roth, 1998; Cameron,
1999; Munier & Zaharia, 2002; Fu et al., 2007). No significant effects are found in the dictator game
(Forsythe et al., 1994; Cherry et al., 2002; Carpenter et al., 2005; List & Cherry, 2008). Cooperation in
the centipede game is reduced significantly with lower stakes (Parco et al., 2002).
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cooperated in response to the first mover cooperating. This experiment illustrates that
simplest designs can produce the clearest insights.
Several additional facts underpin their robustness. First, the average degree of
conditioning is virtually constant over the ten periods, even slightly increasing. Sec-
ond, the researchers also implemented a condition with all payoffs doubled, and a
condition in which only the temptation payoff (defect in response to cooperation)
was doubled, and found that in both conditioning was weaker but not eliminated.
Finally, the results are approximately the same in both locations. A weakness of the
experiment is that Clark & Sefton (2001) only observed actual paths of play, such that
their comparison is between-subjects. It would be interesting to have second movers’
complete strategies elicited in a sequential PD by means of the strategy method. I am
not aware of such an experiment.
2.2.3 Non-tactical and tactical cooperation interact
The reviewed evidence in section 2.1 shows that the average patterns of behavior in
finitely repeated games fit the imitation model outlined in section 1.2.2 quite well,
but the fine-structure of behavior not exactly. In particular, many subjects appear to
adopt less harsh strategies. For instance, in the experiment by Anderhub et al. (2002)
reviewed above a large fraction of first movers granted coplayers that defected early
in the game «another chance». Might this have to do with the non-tactical, backward-
looking conditional cooperation discussed above?
Cochard et al. (2004) conducted an experiment (72 students sampled from dif-
ferent not further specified universities in France) using the investment game. In
the main condition, the game was repeated seven-fold with random rematching in be-
tween.22 Again, the researchers found the standard dynamic patters: After significant
cooperation in the initial periods, it collapsed in the terminal period. While there was
no second mover who returned zero in the first five periods, 31 and 56 percent did
so in the penultimate and ultimate period, respectively. However, 56 and 11 percent
of the second movers, respectively, still returned more than two thirds of their bud-
22They also implemented a control condition which was a strict one-shot version of the investment
game. Comparing average cooperation rates across treatment conditions, cooperation was notably
higher in the partners condition than in the one-shot condition. The average first mover transfer was
7.5 tokens in the partners condition and 5.0 in the one-shot condition. Second movers who received
a positive transfer returned on average 56.1 percent in the partners condition and 38.2 in the one-shot
condition. In sum, the average joint payoff was about 17 percent higher in the partners condition (35.0)
than in the stranger condition (30.0). Interestingly, the additional surplus accrued almost exclusively
to the first movers: second movers earned on average the same in both conditions (19.7 tokens in the
partners and 19.3 in the one-shot condition), while first movers earned about 43 percent more in the
partners condition (15.2 tokens in the partners and 10.7 in the one-shot condition). It should be noted
that their comparison is not a particularly clean one since more than one factor is changed across treat-
ments. Specifically, the repeated game offers the opportunity to learn while the one-shot game does not.
Relatedly, they had to change the conversion rate between Francs and tokens in order to keep overall
earnings approximately equal, but this may change the incentives in the individual stage game. A more
fortunate design would have been, in may opinion, the inclusion of a seven period game with stranger
or total stranger rematching protocol.
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get in the last two periods. The latter is clearly inconsistent with tactical reputation
building. Using panel data estimation methods, Cochard et al. (2004) tried to isolate
the extent of non-tactical conditioning in both first and second movers. Concerning
the second movers, they defined (non-tactical) conditional cooperation as positive
within-period correlation between first and second mover cooperation. Likewise,
(non-tactical) conditional cooperation in first movers was defined as positive across-
period correlation between first and second mover cooperation. They find both types
of correlation.
Gächter & Falk (2002) did a similar exercise using data from a gift-exchange
game experiment (116 students sampled from various educational facilities in Vi-
enna). They compared a «partners» condition to a «(perfect) strangers» condition.23
They found that first mover transfers were quite similar in both conditions, but second
mover cooperation was, on average, significantly higher in the partners condition, but
with the familiar drop to approximately the same level as in the perfect stranger con-
dition in the ultimate period. Pooling the data, the correlation between first mover
and second mover cooperation is stronger in the partners compared to the perfect
strangers condition, that is, reciprocal behavior is more pronounced in the former,
but also not entirely absent in the latter. This kind of reciprocity cannot be accounted
by strategic reputation building, because a second mover in the stranger condition
will certainly never play with the same coplayer again.
Gächter & Falk (2002) use their data to classify the second movers in the perfect
stranger condition into two types: A subject is classified as a «strong reciprocator» if
her or his return cooperation is highly significantly correlated with the first mover’s
cooperation. A subject is classified as selfish if (s)he defects (chooses the minimum
cooperation level) in at least six of the ten periods. According to these criteria, 53.3
percent of the second movers in the perfect stranger condition were strong reciproca-
tors, and 20 percent were selfish.
In the partners condition, the share of second movers with a highly significant
correlation between own and their coplayer’s cooperation was notably higher at 67.8
percent. However, since in the partners condition there are strategic reasons to behave
reciprocally, this share includes both strong reciprocators and the imitators. To sepa-
rate them, Gächter & Falk (2002) supplement the previous «strong reciprocity» crite-
rion by requiring a return cooperation of strictly above the minimum in the terminal
period. Analogously, a subject is an «imitator» if the latter qualification is violated,
that is, if (s)he defects in the final period. Finally, a subject is classified as «myopi-
cally selfish» if her or his return cooperation fails to be significantly correlated with
the first mover’s cooperation and if (s)he defects in the terminal period. According
to these criteria, 48 percent turn out to be «strong reciprocators», 20 percent «imi-
tators», and 21.4 percent «myopically selfish» types. Thus, putting the former two
types together, 68 percent of second movers in the partners condition conditioned
23Kirchler et al. (1996) conducted the same experiment before, but (1) their presentation of results
was somewhat sparsely, and (2) they changed the exchange rate between tokens and money among
conditions (lower in the partners condition), which may confound the results.
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their cooperation on the information about their coplayers’ behavior. This likely
accounts for the higher average cooperation rates compared to the perfect stranger
condition.24
Gächter & Falk (2002) also point to an important difference in the patterns of
finitely repeated games with a simultaneous-move stage game and those with a se-
quential stage game. In their experiment less first movers can be classified as recip-
rocal («strong» or «imitator»), in the sense of responding to their coplayer’s previous
period action, than second movers. Under the assumption of successful randomiza-
tion, it is implausible to expect there to be more conditional cooperators among the
second movers than among the first movers, such that there must be a different expla-
nation. Gächter & Falk (2002) speculate that conditioning across periods may be less
obvious to subjects in supergames with a sequential stage game than in supergames
with a simultaneous stage game; in the former within-period reciprocity may be focal.
I am not aware of a study that investigates this conjecture rigorously, but it may be
useful to consider this point in interpreting results from existing studies and perhaps
in designing new experiments.
In sum, the results reviewed in this section displace a significant part of the mys-
tery of what goes on in finitely repeated cooperation games. A significant fraction
of subjects seems to resort to a non-tactical form of conditional cooperation which
rewards cooperation with cooperation in return even in the terminal period. The ex-
istence of those types, in turn, provides for an empirical justification of the imitators’
belief in «committed types», that entered the theoretical model (section 1.2.2) as an
unexplained assumption.
2.2.4 Conditional cooperation in public good games
I take a specific look at public good games because it is not at all clear how condition-
ing of cooperation on coplayers’ behavior should extend to this game. To see this,
suppose a player in a three-player public good game is confronted with one coplayer
cooperating and the other coplayer defecting. How should a conditional coopera-
tor behave in this situation? On the one hand, a conditionally cooperative strategy
prescribes to return the cooperation of the other cooperator, on the other hand it pre-
scribes to defect on the defector.
Furthermore, simultaneous-move games are generally not ideally suited to study
conditional cooperation, and non-tactical conditioning in particular, because (i) sub-
jects need to respond to a belief about their coplayers’ action, such that they have
a pecuniary reason to cooperate with players whom they believe are also cooper-
24Gächter & Falk (2002) conducted also some trials in which another sequence of ten periods was
conducted with the same subjects to check for learning effects. All results turn out to be robust with
respect to experience. In fact, the reciprocal patterns become even more pronounced in the second
sequence.
In a smart modification of a finite horizon public good experiment, Sonnemans et al. (1999) replaced
one group member by another after a prespecified number of periods. They also found evidence of both
tactical (forward looking) and non-tactical (backward looking) behavior.
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ating, and (ii) unconditional cooperation may «pollute» behavior in a difficult-to-
disentangle way.
Although it was not their primary aim to test for conditional cooperation, Keser &
van Winden (2000) and Brandts & Schram (2001) both identified behavioral patterns
in their public good experiments that strongly pointed towards its existence. In the
experiment by Brandts & Schram (2001), subjects reported a complete contribution
function contingent on various marginal rates of transformation between a public
and a private good. Their results show that subjects’ behavior cannot be explained
exclusively as the result of errors, but that they exhibited quite consistently one of two
behavioral types: (i) selfish payoff maximizers and (ii) intrinsically cooperative types,
where some features of the data indicated the latter’s cooperation may be conditional
on the coplayers behavior. They suggested that the interaction between these two
types may be important in accounting for the behavioral dynamics, namely initially
high and successively declining contributions.
Extending this conjecture, Fehr et al. (2002a) suggested that the pattern results
from non-tactical conditional cooperation («strong reciprocity»), together with some
selfish bias or presence of selfish coplayers in the group (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003,
2004a).25 To illustrate, assume that there are free riders and conditional cooperators
in a population and players are randomly drawn in each period to play a sequence of
public good games. Free riders never contribute anything and conditional cooperators
contribute conditional on their belief about the other group members’ contributions.
Monitoring is private in the sense that subjects are informed only about the contri-
butions in their current group, but perfectly so. For free riders this information is
irrelevant because they will not adjust their behavior upon receiving it. Conditional
cooperators, however, may respond to this this information in the next period if it
conflicts with their prior belief about the cooperativeness of the other players in the
population. This effects may be exaggerated by the fact that the average conditional
cooperator does not fully match the others’ average contribution (Fischbacher et al.,
2001).
Croson (2007), Neugebauer et al. (2009), Fischbacher & Gächter (2010), and
Dufwenberg et al. (2011) elicited each subject’s beliefs about other group members’
contributions, and found a marked and statistically significant correlation between
those beliefs and own contributions. Fischbacher & Gächter (2010) add an individ-
ual level analysis and find some heterogeneity in the sense that some subjects exhibit
a positive correlation between beliefs and contributions, whereas other subjects do
not cooperate even if rather optimistic about the coplayers’ contributions. Clearly,
there are at least three problems with this interpretation. First, beliefs are endoge-
nous and are therefore difficult to control by the experimenter. Second, a free rider
who believes that others contribute zero and actually contributes nothing him- or her-
self is observationally equivalent to a pessimistic conditional cooperator who only
contributes a little because he or she believes others will free ride. Third, beliefs may
reflect a «false consensus effect», that is, people may project their own motivation
25See Ambrus & Pathak (2011) for a formalization.
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unto others (e.g. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Orbell & Dawes, 1993).
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher & Gächter (2010) circumvent these
problems by using an adaption of the «strategy method» (Selten, 1967) in order to
elicit a conditional contribution function for each subject: for each (integer) aver-
age contribution of the other group members, a subject had to specify a contribution,
where the contingency with the true average was actually implemented.26 Further-
more, the game was played strictly one-shot. The researchers classified their subjects
according to their contribution function into two main classes: they labeled a subject
as a free rider if and only if (s)he contributed nothing in all contingencies, and a con-
ditional cooperator if the contribution function is (weakly) increasing in the others’
average contribution. Note that this involves a specification of the above-mentioned
problem of how to extend the concept of conditional cooperation to the public good
game. Fischbacher et al. (2001) found 50 percent of the subjects to be conditional
cooperators and 30 percent to be fee riders. Likewise, Fischbacher & Gächter (2010)
found 55 percent conditional cooperators and 23 percent fee riders. The rest shows
either more complicated patters (about one out of ten subjects had a «hump shaped»
contribution function) or could not be classified. Many other studies with related de-
signs find similar heterogeneity, and all find that the vast majority can be classified as
either free riders or conditional cooperators, with the latter constituting the majority
(e.g. Burlando & Guala, 2005; Page et al., 2005; Bardsley & Moffatt, 2007; Ones &
Putterman, 2007; Muller et al., 2008).
Interestingly, Fischbacher & Gächter (2010) also explicitly tested the theory out-
lined above. In the experiment, any subject participated in both a strict one-shot pub-
lic good game with contribution function elicitation as in Fischbacher et al. (2001),
and a ten period repeated public good game with random rematching in which sub-
jects’ beliefs about the coplayers’ average contribution were elicited. As predicted,
contributions in the repeated game declined over time from around 40 percent to
around 10 percent on average. The researchers then combined each subject’s contin-
gent contribution function and elicited beliefs to predict her or his contributions in the
repeated game, and compared those predictions to the actual contributions. They find
that the predicted contributions match the actual contributions quite closely, although
the former are generally slightly below the latter (whereas this gap vanishes towards
the end). Thus, this experiment supports the above theory, and in particular highlights
the important role of beliefs (and therefore information) about other’s cooperation.27
26One might object to this method that it involves some experimenter demand effect in the sense
that if somebody is given the opportunity to condition one’s contribution on others’ contributions, (s)he
will tend to actually do so. This would overstate the prevalence of conditional cooperation. However,
building on the design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), Kocher (2008) tested for such demand effects
by running one experiment that just reversed the order of how the contingencies were presented, and
another experiment that introduced a deliberate choice between an unconditional contribution and a
conditional contribution. The results show that the existing findings on conditional cooperation are
very robust to the implemented changes even on a quantitative basis of comparison.
27A corollary is that any factor that alters these beliefs will influence cooperation. Gächter et al.
(2012) conducted a public good experiment in which one group member was designated as the «leader»,
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2.2.5 Conditional cooperation extends to the field
At least in the laboratory, conditional cooperation seems to be a qualitatively robust
phenomenon. But does this extend to the field, in particular with different subjects
pools than students? To start with, the phenomenon is replicable and appears to be
even stronger in the field. A number of experiments retain the standard laboratory
design but recruit non-standard subjects, such as soldiers (Fehr et al., 1998a), sports-
card traders (List, 2006), MBA’s (Hannan et al., 2002), or CEOs (Fehr & List, 2004).
They confirm the results obtained with student subjects, with non-students tending
to behave even more pro-socially and conditionally so. The same results have been
obtained by Falk et al. (2010) who did find no evidence that a representative sample
from the Zurich citizen behave different in the investment game than a student sam-
ple from the University of Zurich (rather the opposite). They also find no evidence
for a self-selection bias (more pro-social students are not overrepresented due to self-
selection into the experiments) in student samples. Further one-shot trust game exper-
iments performed in various locations worldwide (e.g. Willinger et al., 2003; Ashraf
et al., 2006; Greig & Bohnet, 2008; Bohnet et al., 2008) produced results which at
times differ quantitatively but not qualitatively.
Here I focus on particularly strong evidence that is provided by implementations
of the experimental games used in the laboratory in large representative surveys. This
approach allows to replicate the lab experiments with a large, heterogeneous sample
of people and for linking large amounts of socio-demographic data to experimentally
elicited behavior. Fehr et al. (2002c, 2003) integrated the investment game into the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).28 They had a sub-sample of 429 subjects
that did not differ significantly in observables from the general 2003 wave of the
SOEP comprising about 25 thousand individuals. The second movers’ responses
were elicited with the strategy method and first movers’ beliefs were elicited by non-
incentivized direct question. On average, the results replicate familiar patterns from
the laboratory: Out the first movers, only 17 percent transferred nothing, 60 percent
transferred between 2 and 5 Euros, and 11 percent transferred the full endowment
of 10 Euros. Furthermore, first-movers’ transfers were strongly positively correlated
with elicited beliefs about return transfers.
But again, our primary focus is on second mover behavior. Most importantly, the
transfer of the average second mover is increasing in the amount they received, that
is, conditioned on information about their coplayer’s behavior. Relating behavior to
socio-demographics, young second movers (below the age of 35) give significantly
that had to make a contribution decision first. The other players were informed about this decision and
then made their decisions simultaneously. The researchers also elicited the followers’ beliefs about the
other followers’ contributions, both before and after being informed about the leader’s action, which
allowed them to determine how the leader’s contribution influences the beliefs about other followers’
contributions. They find that the leader’s contribution positively influences the followers’ beliefs about
other followers’ contributions significantly. Furthermore, the followers’ actual contributions match their
beliefs quite closely.
28The SOEP is a large representative household panel. The experiment had the same protocol as the
investment game in the laboratory and subjects were paid by cheque sent a few days later.
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less whereas old second over (above 65) give significantly more than the intermedi-
ate age group (35 to 55). Second movers without German citizenship, who are un-
employed or recently separated from their (marriage) partner return less than the re-
spective reference group, those with good health tend to return more. Such variables
as gender, income situation, expressed worries about the own economic situation, or
education status were unrelated to behavior in both first and second movers.
The study was significantly extended to a much larger sample and various accom-
panying experiments aimed at investigating the sensitivity of the design (the strategy
method vs. direct response method, removal of the equal split option, high stakes),
and is reported in Naef & Schupp (2009a). Most interestingly, Naef & Schupp
(2009a) used the full sample in order to compare behavior of students and non-
students. They found no significant difference between them as second movers.29
Bellemare & Kröger (2007) conducted a similar trust game experiment with a sam-
ple that was representative for the Netherlands, and also found that students trans-
ferred less than a representative population sample.30 In a trust game experiment
conducted with 18 to 84 year old participants recruited from an online panel, Gar-
barino & Slonim (2009) find socio-economic and demographic information to explain
little of first and second mover behavior. Gächter et al. (2004) also found no relation-
ship between socio-economic background and behavior in a one-shot public good
experiment. Thöni et al. (2012) find the usual patterns in a public good experiment
with a sample representative for the Danish population. More research is certainly
warranted, but the current evidence points towards the conclusion that cooperative
behavior and its conditioning on coplayers’ actions does not differ overwhelmingly
along socio-demographic differences.
Still, the above studies keep the highly structured, critics might say «artificial»,
experimental games from the laboratory and people generally know that they partic-
ipate in an experiment. Can conditional cooperation also be demonstrated in natural
environments, and even if subjects are not aware of their participation in an exper-
iment? Existing evidence points towards the answer «yes, but...». Gneezy & List
(2006) conducted a field experiment in a labor relation setting involving two distinct
tasks: data entry for a university library and door-to-door fund-raising for a research
29As a first mover, students transfer on average significantly more (61 percent of the endowment) than
non-students (50 percent of the endowment). This difference upholds even when controlling (statisti-
cally) for age, income, and the level of education, which are key characteristics along which students
and non-students typically differ. Furthermore, since Naef & Schupp (2009a) found students to be less
risk averse than non-students, risk preferences may be conjectured to be the primary cause of the differ-
ences in transfers, but the differences remain highly significant after controlling for a measure of risk
tolerance.
30In related large-scale experiments, Carpenter et al. (2008) found with a sample representative for a
community in Vermont (USA) that students transferred significantly less than non-students in a dictator
game. In a representative ultimatum game experiment in Taiwan, no difference was found between
students and non-students (Fu et al., 2007). Harrison et al. (2002) found that in Denmark, students have
a six percentage point higher discount rate than non-students. In a similar study in Denmark, students
were found to be more risk-averse than non-students (Harrison et al., 2007). Concerning the latter
result, note the conflict to Naef & Schupp (2009a).
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center. Consistent with laboratory gift-exchange games worker performance in the
first few hours on the job is considerably higher in a «gift treatment» than in a «non-
gift treatment». After the initial few hours, however, no difference in outcomes is
observed, and overall the gift treatment yielded inferior aggregate outcomes for the
employer: with the same budget the employer would have logged more data for the
library and raised more money for the research center by using the market-clearing
wage rather than by trying to induce greater performance with a gift of higher wages.
Kube et al. (2006, 2011b) extended the design to allow also for negative reciprocity,
and found that the gift (wage increase) does not work well in the long run (if at all)
as well, whereas a wage reduction (the negative reciprocity treatment) had a signifi-
cant and lasting negative impact on performance. Thus, there appears to be a marked
asymmetry of «positive» (reciprocating cooperative behavior in-kind) and «negative»
reciprocity (reciprocating non-cooperative behavior in-kind).
In a similar field experiment designed to measure worker responses in a tree-
planting firm to a monetary gift from their employer (Bellemare & Shearer, 2009),
firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day
as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity. A comparison of
planter productivity on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous
and subsequent days of planting on the same block showed that the gift had a sig-
nificant and positive effect on daily planter productivity, controlling for planter-fixed
effects, weather conditions and other random daily shocks. Kube et al. (2011a) finds
in a similar labor context that non-monetary gifts have a much stronger impact than
monetary gifts of equivalent value. They also observe that when workers are offered
the choice, they prefer receiving money but reciprocate as if they received a non-
monetary gift. Furthermore, monetary gifts can effectively trigger reciprocity if the
employer invests more time and effort into the gift’s presentation. This suggests that
the employer’s intention and not only the consequences are important in triggering
reciprocity (see also section 2.3.6).
Falk (2007) reports evidence from a field experiment in collaboration with a char-
itable organization, that sent roughly 10,000 solicitation letters to potential donors.
One-third of the letters contained no gift, one-third contained a small gift, and one-
third contained a large gift. In support of the hypothesis, the relative frequency of
donations increased by 17 percent if a small gift was included and by 75 percent for a
large gift compared to the no gift condition. Also in a charity context, Frey & Meier
(2004) exploited the fact at the University of Zurich each students has, upon regis-
tering for the new semester, the opportunity to donate, in addition to the tuition fee,
to one of two charity funds, one helping needy students with subsidized loans (CHF
7 donation), and the other generally supporting foreign students (CHF 5 donation).
Students in the treatment conditions received information about about the donation
behavior of the other students, in one condition that 64 percent of the other students
donated, in the other condition that 46 percent made a donation in the past (those fre-
quencies were actual frequencies from past but different semesters). Students in the
control condition received no information. Frey & Meier (2004) found (i) positive
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and significant correlation between students’ expectations (which were also elicited)
and own donations, and (ii) that students who were informed that 64 percent donated
in the past are more likely to donate than those who received the information that
only 46 percent donated.31
In a similar natural field experiment, Heldt (2008) asked tourists using a cross-
country skiing slope for a donation to help for keeping the slope well-prepared. He
also manipulated the information people got, and found that those who were told that
70 percent of the other tourists donated contributed significantly more than those who
received no further information. In a natural field experiment by Martin & Randal
(2008), visitors to an art gallery in New Zealand were given the opportunity to leave
a donation to the museum in a transparent box. In one condition there was already
some money in the box, in another condition the box was empty. They found that
people donate significantly more in the former than in the latter condition.
Shang & Croson (2009) conducted a natural field experiment around a fund-
raising tour for a public radio station. In the three treatment conditions subjects
were told that they had just another member who contributed either USD 75, 180, or
300. In the control condition no such information was given. The researchers found
that callers who were confronted with a previous pledge of USD 300 donated signifi-
cantly more than people in the control condition. Callers in the other two information
conditions also contributed more than the control group, but those differences were
not statistically significant.
Alpizar et al. (2008) conducted a natural field experiment at a national park in
Costa Rica in which visitors were asked for donations for the park’s maintenance.
They found that (i) contributions made in public in front of the solicitor were a quar-
ter higher than contributions made in private, (ii) giving subjects a small gift before
requesting a contribution or (iii) telling subjects that the typical contribution of oth-
ers is USD 2 (a small contribution, instead of telling nothing) both increases the
likelihood of a positive contribution but decreases the size of the average contribution
compared with providing no reference information, whereas (iv) providing a high
reference level (USD 10) increases both the likelihood and the average size of the
donation.
There are also studies that connect laboratory and field experiments. Benz &
Meier (2008) replicated the natural field experiment described above (Frey & Meier,
2004) in a laboratory, which involved exactly the same donation decision to the same
funds as in the field experiment. As a control condition, they also conducted a sec-
ond experiment, which involved the same donation decision but to another charity
unrelated to the university. They find that behavior in the two lab experiments are
significantly correlated with behavior in the field experiment, approximately to the
31Within the same experiment, Meier (2005) explores the role of framing effects and found that
their influence is limited. People behave in a conditionally cooperative way if informed either about
the number of contributors or about the equivalent number of non-contributors. The positive correlation
between group behavior and individual behavior is, however, weaker when the focus is on the defectors.
He also finds gender differences in social comparison.
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same degree. This holds up in more refined statistical analysis. Along the same lines,
Carpenter & Seki (2011) conducted a finitely repeated public goods experiment (with
and without opportunities to express disapproval) with Japanese fishermen in the lab-
oratory, and related their behavior in the experiment to collected data on their daily
fishing activities. The researchers used the data from the lab to statistically derive
five measures of social preferences for each fisherman: his level of unconditional
cooperativeness; his conditional cooperativeness; the propensity to disapprove; the
fisherman’s response to received social disapproval; and finally, the level of the un-
conditional response to disapproval. The results show that fishing productivity is
significantly related to the experimentally derived measures of social preferences.
Finally, there are also some informative studies that use survey data or other ex-
isting data sets. Using survey data from 30 West and East European countries, Frey
& Torgler (2007) found marked negative correlation between perceived tax evasion
and tax morale. Using survey data from the European Values Survey (EVS), Tor-
gler et al. (2009) found a similar (small but significant) positive relation between
perceived environmental cooperation (reduced public littering) and voluntary envi-
ronmental morale. Using retrospective survey data on charitable giving (the Giving
the Netherlands Panel Study 2005), Wiepking & Heijnen (2011) find that in the case
of door-to-door donations, social information affects perceived social norms for giv-
ing and, through this perception, influences the level of actual donations. They also
found that people in different income categories donate roughly the same amounts in
separate instances (they use the same social information), and as a result people in
lower income households donate a higher percentage of their income to charitable or-
ganizations. Ferrary (2003) finds gift exchange being the principle rule of exchange
in the social networks that underlie the industrial networks of Silicon Valley.
In sum, the evidence from field experiments support the evidence from the labo-
ratory qualitatively in that conditioning on other’s cooperation is common, while the
order of magnitude may differ.
2.2.6 Conclusion
In this section I considered one fundamental question with which I concluded chapter
1 in greater detail: Do real people only cooperate for tactical reasons? A large body
of evidence shows clearly «no». But in this section I have put special emphasis on
evidence that is informative with respect to our guiding question: What does the
propensity of individuals in a given group to cooperate with one another has to do
with the availability of information they have about each others’ actions?
The received body of evidence shows that part of observed non-tactical coopera-
tive behavior is not, but a significant part is conditioned on the coplayer’s behavior in
settings in which this information is readily available. This holds even for one-shot
interactions for which the traditional behavioral model based on rational selfishness
predicts no cooperation and therefore no conditioning at all (see section 1.1). How-
ever, the evidence is not yet conclusive on the quantitative importance. While mea-
surement of the degree of conditioning is in principle not subject to the same prob-
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lems as measurement of absolute degrees of non-tactical cooperation (see e.g. Zizzo,
2004; Bardsley, 2008), because it is conceptually a difference between the level of
cooperation between contingencies, there is still much unexplained variation in the
degree of measured non-tactical conditional cooperation. Nonetheless, around half
of the subjects typically exhibits a tendency to return cooperation with cooperation
even if a material return from doing so is ruled out.
But if some subjects are willing to incur a cost to confer a benefit to someone else,
are there also subjects who are willing to incur a cost to impose a cost on someone
else (such behavior was defined as spite in section 1.1.1)? I turn to this question in
the next section, again with a focus on the degree of conditioning on coplayers’ past
behavior.
2.3 Spite and punishment
Aggression and spite, that is, behaviors that are immediately costly to both the ag-
gressor and the target are widespread in the animal kingdom including, of course,
in humans (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Knauft, 1991; Pinker, 2011). Domi-
nance, relative standing, and envy are important proximate motivators of such behav-
ior (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Boehm, 1993; Kirchsteiger, 1994; Mui, 1995).32
There are a number of experimental studies that document human subjects’ willing-
ness to «burn others money» at a cost to themselves, even in simple unidirectional
matches in which they neither respond to the target’s behavior nor can enforce any
behavior in the future, and a high fraction seems to do this in order to be relatively
better off (e.g. Zizzo & Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003, 2004; Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009;
Abbink & Herrmann, 2011).
However, if applied conditionally, spite can also be used as a means of punish-
ment. Behavioral psychologists speak of «positive punishment», the presentation of
an aversive stimulus, in contrast to «negative punishment», the omission or with-
drawal of an appetitive stimulus (e.g. Powell et al., 2002; Mazur, 2002; Schachtman
& Reilly, 2011). In the context of the enforcement of cooperation, the latter form of
punishment corresponds to the withdrawal of cooperation, which is the by far domi-
nant form of punishment considered in economic theory. Is conditional spite in fact
used an additional means to enforce cooperation? If yes, then the scope of situa-
tions in which transparency might matter is even more expanded, punishment is by
definition conditioned on past play.
2.3.1 Spite and punishment in finite horizon games with perfect monitoring
The classic demonstration of spiteful behavior as an enforcer of cooperation is ob-
served second mover behavior in the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982). In the ul-
timatum game, the first mover can offer to transfer an amount of money from her or
32Arguments in bargaining theory also suggest that surplus destruction can increase bargaining power
(Avery & Zemsky, 1994).
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his endowment to the second mover, whereas the latter can either accept, which case
the transfer is implemented, or burn the entire endowment such that both get nothing.
On average, first movers offer on average about 40 percent of their endowment, about
16 percent of the offers are rejected, and rejections decrease in the amount offered,
whereas offers below 20 percent are typically rejected half of the time (Camerer,
2003; Oosterbeek et al., 2004). Thus, the evidence suggests that the average second
mover conditions her or his option to burn the money on the first mover’s behavior,
such that it serves to enforce more cooperative behavior in the latter. These results
have been replicated a large number of times (see Güth & Tietz, 1990; Güth, 1995;
Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Camerer, 2003, for overviews), and do not differ signifi-
cantly even with very large stakes (e.g. Hoffman et al., 1996; Slonim & Roth, 1998;
Cameron, 1999; Munier & Zaharia, 2002; List & Cherry, 2008). There is, however,
some cultural heterogeneity, to which I will come back below (see Henrich et al.,
2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; Oosterbeek et al., 2004).
In keeping with much of the recent literature, I focus on the public good game
here for the following reason. In dyadic games, it is in principle easier to punish the
coplayer by withholding cooperation («negative punishment») because such punish-
ment is automatically targeted on a specific player, while in games with more than
two players this becomes difficult. This is not to say that the option for «positive»
punishment is unimportant in dyadic games, since it may avoid long periods (or many
domains, if the players interact in multiple domains simultaneously) of defection. But
on top of that, it is easy to see that in public good games it becomes difficult to punish
defection of one or a few group members by withdrawing cooperation, because all
other (cooperating) group members are punished as well (Boyd & Richerson, 1988b).
The collateral damage of punishing defection with defection is therefore sizable.
The most comprehensive and influential study that allowed for costly reductions
of coplayers’ payoffs was conducted by Fehr & Gächter (2000a).33 In their experi-
ment (40 students from the University of Zurich), they used a finite horizon public
good game with ten periods played under two conditions: The control condition was
just an ordinary public good game, whereas in the treatment condition there was a
second stage in each period in which subjects where informed about each coplayers’
contribution, and given the opportunity to reduce each coplayer’s payoff at a cost to
themselves, whereas higher reductions were also more costly to the actor. Conditions
were varied within-subject by having each subject play one match in one condition,
and then under the other condition (the restart was not announced and the researchers
also reversed the sequence across sessions).
The results are remarkable. First, contribution levels were moderate and decreas-
ing over time to low levels in the control condition, and strongly increasing to almost
maximal cooperation in the treatment condition. As a result, average contributions
33Seminal studies that implemented an option of explicit punishment into public good (or closely
related) games were Yamagishi (1986) and Ostrom et al. (1992). Yamagishi (1986) allowed players to
contribute to a sanctioning system that automatically imposed punishments in the main PGG, which is
apparently itself a public good. Ostrom et al. (1992) studied punishment in a shared resource game.
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were much higher in the latter (85 percent) than in the former (38 percent). Why
does the option to reduce coplayers’ payoffs have this effect? First, the discrimi-
nate use of this option as a punishment of free riding is to some extent anticipated
since differences in contributions between conditions are already present in the very
first period. Second, punishment of free riding is actually carried out, as on aver-
age a subject’s payoff is more strongly reduced the more her or his contribution falls
short of the coplayers’ average contribution in the same period. However, not all
reductions are used in this manner, since there is also a small but positive minority
of high contributors whose payoff was reduced. However, free riders clearly faced
the option to escape significant payoff reductions by increasing their contributions to
the public good. In fact, almost 90 percent of the subjects who actually experienced
payoff reductions increased their contribution immediately in the subsequent period.
These responses induced the increase in contributions over time and and a decrease
in actual payoff reductions, such that, after falling short initially, aggregate efficiency
exceeded that in the control condition. Numerous experiments have replicated these
results (see Balliet et al., 2011, for a meta study), some with a considerably longer
horizon of 50 periods, after which aggregate efficiency more clearly exceeded that of
a control condition without payoff reduction option (Gächter et al., 2008; Ambrus &
Greiner, 2012).
2.3.2 Pecuniary returns are of minor importance
In the experiments using finite horizon games reviewed above, payoff reductions can
in principle be motivated by prospective pecuniary returns, since targeted punishment
may (and usually does, as noted above) modify the target player’s behavior towards
more cooperation in subsequent periods. As conditional cooperation in finite hori-
zon games, such behavior may be purely tactical insofar as subjects invest into costly
punishment up to the point where costs are equal to the expected future return. The
evidence reviewed in the previous section shows that parts of conditionally coopera-
tive behavior cannot be tactical in this sense, and it turns out that costly punishment
is even less.
A first hint comes already from the experiment by Fehr & Gächter (2000a) re-
viewed above. With the punishment option there was still almost full cooperation
in the terminal period, which strongly contrasts with finitely repeated games with-
out costly punishment option (see section 2.1). This suggesting that the threat of
punishment is credible even in the terminal period.
Clear evidence comes from two additional conditions in which subjects were re-
matched into new groups after any period, in one randomly («stranger condition»,
72 subjects), and in another in a round-robin fashion such that no pair of subjects
met more than once («perfect stranger condition», 24 subjects). In fact, the results
from both conditions differed not much to the finite horizon condition. There were
the same dynamic differences between the conditions with and without option to
decrease payoffs, resulting in much higher average contributions in the former (58
percent in the stranger condition) than in the latter (19 percent). Contributions in
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the perfect stranger condition were slightly below the stranger condition, but with
approximately the same differential impact of a punishment option. Fehr & Gächter
(2002) replicated the perfect stranger condition with a slightly improved design (a
constant fine-to-fee ratio, see Casari, 2005 on this issue) and a larger sample (240
students from the University and ETH of Zurich), and found the same results. Thus,
while the overall level of cooperation is higher in the finite horizon condition than in
the other two conditions,34 the impact of introducing an opportunity for direct costly
punishment is by and large the same. More interestingly, the actual payoff reduction
patterns are approximately the same in the (perfect) stranger treatment than in the
partner treatment, and still around 80 percent of the subjects who actually experi-
enced payoff reductions increased their contribution immediately in the subsequent
period.
The result have been replicated many times (see Balliet et al., 2011, for a meta-
study), and is consistent with the large amount of evidence on the ultimatum game.
Experiments by Masclet et al. (2003) and Noussair & Tucker (2005) show that pecu-
niary consequences are not necessary for punishment to have an effect on coopera-
tion, even entirely symbolic expressions of disapproval work, but pecuniary punish-
ment has a stronger effect, and a combination of both is particularly powerful (see
also Balliet et al., 2011).
There are, however, documented exceptions with respect to the payoff enhancing
effect of mutual sanctioning. One set of exceptions has to do with the structure of
interaction. For instance, the effect is weak if group structure is asymmetric in the
sense that some group members have negative costs of contributing (Reuben & Riedl,
2009), or if payoff reductions are inconsistently applied (van Prooijen et al., 2008;
Drouvelis, 2010). The second set of exceptions, likely related to the latter point, has
to do with cross-cultural variation with respect to the cooperation enhancing effect of
introducing the option to reduce others’ payoffs. I come back to this below.
But even in cases in which cooperation is enhanced, the payoff reductions and
their costs to the actor may eat up all efficiency gains such that aggregate payoffs
are frequently below a condition without option to decrease payoffs (e.g. Page et al.,
2005; Bochet et al., 2006; Sefton et al., 2007; Dreber et al., 2008; Egas & Riedl,
2008; Herrmann et al., 2008; Masclet & Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2010). This
may be particularly severe if subjects respond to received payoff reductions not by
increasing their contribution but by decreasing payoffs in return, that is, if «feuds»
emerge (Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008). However, it should be
noted that the typical of the cited studies use a relatively short duration of usually
ten periods. If the horizon is longer such that subjects have the opportunity to learn,
aggregate efficiency is usually clearly higher than in the control treatments without
payoff reduction option (Gächter et al., 2008).
34The fact that cooperation is higher in the partners treatment (see also Masclet et al., 2003) suggests
that conditional cooperation and the opportunity for payoff reductions reinforce each other (Shinada &
Yamagishi, 2007).
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2.3.3 Even unaffected third parties take action
A set of seminal experiments by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) showed that even third
parties who are completely unaffected (in pecuniary terms) from the actions of the
target player are willing to spend money to reduce the latter’s payoff. More im-
portantly, the majority conditions those reductions on the target player’s behavior
towards her or his coplayers. Specifically, in one experiment (72 students from the
University of Zurich) two players played an experimental PD strictly one-shot, and
a third player was informed about those players actions and had the option to reduce
either player’s payoff at a cost, similar to the experiment reviewed above. The ex-
periment allowed for powerful conclusion with respect to conditioning because the
strategy method was employed. Almost half of the third parties reduced the payoff of
cheaters (defectors on cooperators), and they forwent on average around 35 percent
of their payoff to do so. Around one fifth reduced also the payoff of defectors whose
coplayer defected as well. However, consistent with the evidence reviewed above a
minority (around 8 percent) also reduced the payoff of cooperators.
In a second experiment (48 subjects) in which the behavior of second parties
(the affected coplayer in the PD) and third parties was compared showed that slightly
more second parties were willing to reduce a defecting coplayer’s payoff (67 percent)
than third parties were willing to reduce the payoff of cheaters (59 percent), and
the the former spent on average clearly more than the latter. Furthermore, more
third parties reduced the payoff of cooperators (15 percent) than second parties (8
percent). Those results suggest that there may be subtle differences in the motivations
underlying third party and second party payoff reductions, but overall the patterns do
not differ very much.
This experiment has been replicated several times, at times with slightly differing
designs (e.g. Charness et al., 2008; Ottone et al., 2008; Leibbrandt & López-Pérez,
2009; Kusakawa et al., 2012, see also chapter 4), and even in a number of very di-
verse non-standard subjects pools (Henrich et al., 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; Marlowe
et al., 2008). However, while the latter experiments find that payoff reductions are
performed in all locations, the magnitude varies substantially across populations. I
will come back to this below.
2.3.4 Non-tactical but systematic
Since, in contrast to cooperative behavior, payoff reductions turned out such unre-
sponsive to the matching protocol, and exhibited even the distinctive pattern in the
perfect stranger treatment in which any possibility from return benefits was ruled
out, Fehr & Gächter (2000a, 2002) speculated that conditionally applied spite has
a functional role as punishment of uncooperative behavior, which is, however, to a
very large degree non-tactical, that is, intrinsically motivated. Observed patterns of
intrinsically motivated sanctioning behavior, and in particular the patterns and de-
gree of targeting and conditioning, can be plausibly underpinned by psychological
mechanisms. In particular, it has been argued that affect might play an important role
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(Fessler & Haley, 2003). In a post-experimental debriefing, Fehr & Gächter (2002)
confronted each participant with a number of hypothetical scenarios and asked them
to indicate their intensity of particular emotions towards a specific coplayer on a Lik-
ert scale in each scenario. Subjects reported that they were angry if the free rider
contributes less than they did, and clearly more angry when they contributed a high
amount than when they contributed a rather low amount themselves. Subjects re-
ported to be happy when their coplayer contributed more than themselves, whereas
their reported happiness is independent from whether they contributed high (but still
less than the other subject) or low themselves. In other words, the evaluation of a
coplayers contribution appears to be independent from the own contribution as long
as the former is above the latter, whereas anger on free riders seems to depend on the
own contributions. This is quite consistent with the results on betrayal aversion by
Bohnet & Zeckhauser (2004); Hong & Bohnet (2007); Bohnet et al. (2008): people
dislike being exploited, and get angry on someone who does.
Similar evidence comes from a number of related games (Pillutla & Murnighan,
1997; Bosman & van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al., 2005; Hopfensitz & Reuben,
2009; Reuben & van Winden, 2010; Cubitt et al., 2011). Informative are also ex-
periments combined with neuroscientific methods. For instance, Sanfey et al. (2003)
had their subjects play the ultimatum game, while the subjects’ brains were scanned
by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Scan contrasts showed that low
offers elicited activity in brain areas related to both emotion (anterior insula) and cog-
nition (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). Furthermore, significantly heightened activity
in the anterior insula during rejections of unfair offers suggests an important role for
emotions in punitive behavior. Interestingly, arousal is significantly mitigated when
low offers are generated by a computer instead of a human coplayer.
de Quervain et al. (2004) used positron emission tomography (PET) to to scan the
subjects’ brains while they learned about a coplayer’s defection and determined the
punishment. They found elevated activity in the dorsal striatum (which has been im-
plicated in the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed actions)
associated with an act of punishment with payoff consequences relative to symbolic
punishment without payoff consequence. Moreover, subjects with stronger activa-
tions in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur greater costs in order to punish. The
researchers interpret these findings as support for the hypothesis that people derive
satisfaction from punishing free riders and that the activation in the dorsal striatum
reflects the anticipated satisfaction from punishing defectors.35
Knoch et al. (2006) find that a disruption of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (DLPFC) reduces unfair ultimatum game offers while subjects still judge such
offers as very unfair. Knoch et al. (2010) find that baseline cortical activity in the
right prefrontal cortex to be an individual marker for the tendency to reduce others’
35Buckholtz et al. (2008) found similar patterns in «third parties» while they determined the appro-
priate punishment for presented crimes, «raising the possibility that the cognitive processes supporting
third-party legal decision-making and second-party economic norm enforcement may be supported by
a common neural mechanism in human prefrontal cortex» (p. 930).
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payoffs. Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) report on significant correlation between self-
reported anger and physical indicators of arousal. See also Fehr & Camerer (2007);
Seymour et al. (2007); Fehr (2009b) for more general overviews.
However, intrinsically motivated does not mean chaotic. Quite the contrary, it
has been shown that payoff reductions follow quite systematic patterns. A number
of studies have shown that subjects respond predictably to changes in the cost and
impact of payoff reductions (Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007a; Egas &
Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008; Ambrus & Greiner, 2012): The are less
payoff reductions the more expensive, and stronger reductions of defectors’ payoffs
(and more cooperation) with a stronger impact for a given cost.
2.3.5 The degree of conditioning is culturally specific
That people get angry on coplayers which exploit their cooperation is of course con-
sistent with a variety of motivations. They might get angry because the defector earns
more than themselves, or because the defector makes them look like the «sucker», and
the like. The experiments on third party intervention suggest that there may also be a
strong normative component, that is, that defecting is viewed as unjust in the respec-
tive situation. The issue of what specific motivations underlie payoff reductions is far
from settled and I will not go intro the details here.36 But these considerations sug-
gest a conjecture that is particularly important for the present purposes: both payoff
reductions and the responses to them may differ culturally because different moral
norms may apply. The above-mentioned results that show that the mere expression
of disapproval works as a punisher suggests that part of the responses to pecuniary
payoff reductions are not due to the material consequences alone. It is suspected that
those expressions trigger feelings of guilt or shame which may be mitigated by re-
sponding with redress (Barr, 2001; Fessler & Haley, 2003; Bowles & Gintis, 2005a).
Hopfensitz & Reuben (2009) provide confirmatory evidence. However, since those
moral emotions may be triggered only if there is indeed a known moral norm that has
been transgressed (Tangney, 1999; Tangney & Dearing, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007),
this effect likely differs between populations in which different sets of norms apply.
Recent cross-cultural evidence (see below) if affirmative. Along similar lines, the
motivations underlying payoff reductions may also differ culturally because differ-
ent moral norms and notions of status and dominance may apply. While it has been
shown that most people from virtually anywhere in the world reduce others’ payoffs
at a cost, those cultural differences might especially have an impact on the degree
of conditioning, that is, to what extent payoff reductions are used as a punishment
of uncooperative behavior and to what extent they are meted out independently from
the target player’s previous actions.
36The evidence is conflicting in a number of respects. A series of recent experiments suggest that dis-
tributional concerns are important (see Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2009, 2011), but those experiments
were designed in a way that renders those concerns particularly salient. Other experiments suggest
that consequential motives are of minor importance but intentionality and responsibility is critical (e.g.
Sutter, 2007; Falk et al., 2008; Stanca, 2010). I will come back to this below.
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A number of recent cross-cultural studies is affirmative. Interestingly, in public
good games with the option to reduce payoffs (see above), there seem to be very
little differences in the degree in free-rider’s payoff reductions across cultures, but
marked differences in the extent to which cooperator’s payoffs are reduced as well
(Herrmann et al., 2008; Gächter & Herrmann, 2009; Gächter et al., 2010). For exam-
ple, Gächter et al. (2010) found that very little costs are imposed on cooperators in
Protestant Western (Potestant Europe, UK, USA, Australia) and Confucian countries
(China, Korea), but high costs are inflicted on cooperators in Southern European and
Arabic countries. In Athens, payoffs of cooperators were even slightly stronger re-
duced than those of defectors. In sum, there are non-trivial differences in the degree
of conditioning on coplayers’ actions in the public good game. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, the differences in conditioning translate proximately to the strength of eventual
cooperation enhancing effects. Similar differences have been discovered with respect
to payoff reductions by third parties (Henrich et al., 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; Marlowe
et al., 2008). In ultimatum game experiments, there is also little cross-cultural vari-
ation in first mover behavior, but second mover behavior differs (Oosterbeek et al.,
2004). In particular, in some societies both offers and rejection rates were very low
(in fact among the Machiguenga framers in Peru all but one offer was accepted, and
offers were very low), suggesting that a norm of fair sharing seems not to exist ev-
erywhere (Henrich et al., 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006).
Various possible reasons for punishment of cooperation have been suggested. For
instance, Herrmann et al. (2008) found that it is particularly prevalent in countries
with widespread corruption and correspondingly weak rules of law and democratic
institutions. Causality may, of course, run in either direction. At the micro-level,
the most obvious reason might be relative payoff status as discussed above. Revenge
may also be a motive (Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008; Herrmann
et al., 2008). There may also be differences in distributional fairness preferences or
norms (Fliessbach, 2007; Thöni, 2011). Different norms of honor or conformism
may also play a role (Carpenter, 2004; Carpenter et al., 2004; Gächter et al., 2010).
There might also people who dislike «do-gooders» or «moral show-offers» (Monin,
2007). To sort out between those explanations is an important area for future empiri-
cal research.
2.3.6 An intermediate conclusion
In this section I have considered spite, behavior that is costly to the performing indi-
vidual and the target individual(s), again with a focus on the degree of conditioning
on coplayers’ past behavior. If spite is conditioned, it can serve as a punishment.
The evidence shows that spiteful behavior is very common in various subject pools
worldwide. Furthermore, it is frequently used as a punishment of un-cooperative be-
havior, even by unaffected third-parties, with strongly disciplining effects. It follows
predictable patterns, despite the fact that pecuniary incentives seem to play a signifi-
cantly smaller role than for cooperative behavior. But there are exceptions and strong
evidence that the degree of conditioning differs significantly across cultures.
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This has repercussions for the different motivational theories that attempt to ex-
plain both conditional cooperation and conditional spite within a single behavioral
model (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Haruvy,
2002; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Sobel, 2005; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006;
Cox et al., 2007; López-Pérez, 2007, 2008, 2010). Together with conflicting evidence
in experiments that designed to discriminate between them as well as sensitivity to
experimental parameters and designs suggest that it is still to early for alternative
behavioral models that exhibit a certain generality in the sense that they produce
sufficiently precise predictions that hold «everywhere and everytime». At lot more
evidence is needed for such an endeavor. However, I want to highlight one aspect
for the present purposes. One empirically supported motivational theory is that there
might be people who value equitable payoff distributions, that is, dislike distributions
which a sufficiently unequal (Boehm, 1993, 1999; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Dawes
et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000).
Individuals with such preferences can be willing to sacrifice own payoffs to increase
other’s payoffs that are below an equitable benchmark, and decrease other’s payoffs
that are above the benchmark. Emotions of compassion and sympathy on the one
hand, and envy on the other might be important psychological processes underly-
ing such preferences (Krebs, 1970; Trivers, 1971; Becker, 1974, 1976b; Kirchsteiger,
1994; Mui, 1995). It is easy to see that such preferences can induce uncondition-
ally cooperative or unconditionally spiteful behavior. However, they can also induce
behavior in certain games that is observationally identical to conditional behavior.
To see this, note that actions typically alter payoff distributions. If One, for exam-
ple, performs an action that alters the payoff distribution in a way that, according to
Two’s preferences, One has gotten unjustly rich (poor), then Two might be willing to
incur a personal cost to decrease (increase) One’s payoff. The respective action looks
like a punishment (reward) of One’s previous action, but Two’s behavior is not really
conditioned on One’s action but only on its consequences. To recognize the distinc-
tion, Two’s «response» would have been the same whether One had performed the
action intentionally or accidentally, or if not One would have implemented the unjust
payoff distribution but anybody else or even a some natural (random) event.
It is a matter of definition whether one wants to differentiate such behavior from
or include it in the category of conditional cooperation or punishment. The literature
is not always explicit and consistent on this issue. I take the former route because
the distinction is important for the present purposes, since for a player with equity
preferences, the actual path of play (other players’ actions) is no relevant information
over and above the payoff consequences. In other words, the player is indifferent
between any history of play that leads to the same payoff distribution, that is, it
does not matter to her or him how a particular payoff distribution was reached. This
implies that this individual, if informed about the payoff consequences of a particular
coplayer’s action(s), does not alter her or his behavior in response to information
about how this payoff distribution has come about.
Intuition suggests that it matters for most people how an outcome has been brought
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about. In fact, the above considerations suggest an obvious test to differentiate be-
tween «pseudo-reciprocal» (induced by equity preferences) and actually reciprocal
behavior: let the payoff distributions in fact be implemented exogenously, such as
a random mechanism, a computer player, or the experimenter. Such experiments
have been conducted and they generally support the intuition (Blount, 1995; Char-
ness, 2004; Falk et al., 2005; Sutter, 2007; Falk et al., 2008; Stanca, 2010; Dhaene &
Bouck, 2010). Although the fine-structure of social preferences and their distribution
in the population is far from settled and an active area of research (e.g. Charness &
Rabin, 2002; Charness & Haruvy, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Fowler et al.,
2005; Fehr & Gächter, 2005; Johnson et al., 2009; Bartling et al., 2009), one can
safely conclude that a significant fraction of non-materially motivated actions are ac-
tually conditioned on coplayers’ actions and not just their consequences (Gintis et al.,
2005; Bowles & Gintis, 2011).
2.4 Imperfect monitoring
While imperfect monitoring is an issue in the theoretical literature for quite some
time (sections 1.3 and 1.4 in the previous chapter), there is only a very small (but
growing) experimental literature. Some papers have rather little connection to the
theoretical approaches,37 some recent papers draw closely on them. In this section
I focus on studies with some random disturbance in the signals players receive, in
most of them the signals are public. Thus the studies correspond mostly to the setting
outlined in section 1.3. In the following section I will focus on studies that implement
different conceptualizations of private monitoring, corresponding therefore mostly to
the setting outlined in section 1.4.
2.4.1 Cooperation increases in the quality of a public signal
In an experiment (240 students from Ohio State University) drawing directly on the
imperfect public monitoring setting considered in section 1.3, Aoyagi & Fréchette
(2009) used an indefinitely repeated PD with termination probability 0.1 in which
subjects received a public signal after each round, which was perfect in the control
condition and imperfect in the treatment conditions. Imperfection was implemented
by perturbing the payoffs with a random shock, just as in the Green-Porter model out-
lined in section 1.3. They had three treatment conditions, low noise, medium noise,
and high noise. In addition, they implemented two further comparison conditions,
one condition in which there was no public signal at all (i.e. «infinite noise») and one
quasi-one-shot condition with perfect monitoring in which players were randomly
re-matched after any period.
37Cason & Khan (1999) conceptualize «imperfect monitoring» as a delay in which players learn the
coplayers’ actions. They implemented this idea in an experiment using a finitely repeated public good
game in which subjects are informed about the coplayers’ contributions every six periods. They did not
find any significant differences to a condition in which subjects learn contributions in every period.
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Recall the testable prediction for the case of imperfect public monitoring outlined
in section 1.3: The frequency of cooperation can be expected to increase (or at least
not decrease) as the accuracy of the public signal increases. The results of Aoyagi
& Fréchette (2009) support this hypothesis. Specifically, they find the following.
First, there is cooperation at any level of noise. Second, the frequency of cooperation
is lower than the theoretical maximum (approximately full cooperation, see section
1.3) for the lowest level of noise. Third, the frequency of cooperation decreases
as noise increases. Fourth, for high but finite noise, the frequency of cooperation
is approximately equal to that in the quasi-one-shot condition. Fifth, for infinite
noise (i.e., no public signal at all), the frequency of cooperation is lower than that in
the quasi-one-shot condition. There are also distinctive patterns in the dynamics of
play: While in the low noise treatments subjects tend to cooperate more often as they
accumulate experience, the opposite is the case for the high noise treatments.
2.4.2 Are different strategies used under imperfect monitoring?
Aoyagi & Fréchette (2009) also attempted to infer strategies from observed behavior.
They use a different approach than the ones mentioned in 2.1.3, namely assuming
that subjects play threshold strategies with regime shifts between the cooperation and
punishment states. These strategies start out in the cooperation state, switch to the
punishment state when the public signal falls below a certain threshold, which may
depend on the current state and the own action choice, and return to the cooperation
state when the signal exceeds another threshold. In all but one noise treatment, they
find that the data is best described by the simplest threshold strategies which only
have a single threshold: those strategies simply check the most recent public signal
and cooperate if is above some threshold, and defect otherwise.
In a similar indefinitely repeated PD experiment (278 students from Harvard Uni-
versity), Fudenberg et al. (2010) used another technique to infer strategies. Imperfect
monitoring in their experiment was implemented by an 18 chance that the respective
other action was signaled, whereas each player was informed about whether the sig-
nal of her or his own action to the other player was erroneous. They find that the most
common and successful cooperative strategies are somewhat more lenient variants of
the classical TFT and grim trigger strategies: they wait for a coplayer to defect two
or three times before reverting to punishment mode. They also find a high level of
forgiveness: many subjects were willing to return to cooperation after a punishment
phase has occurred when the gains from mutual cooperation were high. Thus, if
monitoring is imperfect it can pay to «cool down» and try another time. This result
supports the claim I have made in the introduction to this chapter that one cannot just
interpolate results obtained in a perfect monitoring setting to ones with informational
constraints.
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2.4.3 Imperfect monitoring and costly punishment
What if experimental games with an option to reduce coplayers’ payoffs at a cost,
such as those reviewed in section 2.3, are augmented with imperfect monitoring? Are
subjects more reserved or cautious with meting out payoff reductions if information
about the coplayers’ behavior might be wrong?
Carpenter (2007b) conduced a quasi-one-shot (random rematching) public good
game experiment (735 students from Middlebury College) with an option to decease
the payoff, just as considered in section 2.3. He varied the marginal per capita return
(low and high), the group size (five and ten subjects), and the fraction of coplayers
whose actions a subject could «monitor».38 I put the term in parentheses because
subjects were actually informed about all coplayers’ contributions, but restrictions
were introduced on how many of them a subject could punish afterwards (I comment
on this below). Four such conditions were implemented: In the no-monitoring con-
dition, no payoff reductions were possible at all. In the full-monitoring condition,
players could decrease the payoffs of all coplayers. In the half-monitoring condition,
this was possible only for half of the coplayers. Finally, in the single-monitoring
condition each player could decrease the payoff of only one coplayer.
The results show that a ceteris paribus variation of the group size does not lead
to an decline of contributions (actually a slight increase) and an ceteris paribus in-
crease in the MPCR boosts cooperation significantly. Those results are consistent
with previous experiments reviewed in section 2.2. The focus was to separate group
size effects and monitoring constraints, which are often intermingled in discussions
of public good provision settings. Specifically, he hypothesized that there is no group
size effect independent from monitoring constraints. The results are affirmative, as
average contributions are significantly higher in the full- and half- monitoring condi-
tions than in the no-monitoring conditions. However, they are slightly lower in the
single-monitoring condition. The problem with the design of this experiment is that
it not actually impose limits on monitoring but merely on which coplayers could be
sanctioned. This rules out the potentially important option of reducing payoff despite
being imperfectly informed about the target players’ behavior.
There are two recent studies that address this shortcoming.39 Ambrus & Greiner
(2012) conducted an experiment (339 students from the University of New South
Wales) using a finite horizon public good game (with fixed matching) in which they
introduce a specification of imperfect public monitoring. After the contribution stage,
players received a signal on the contribution vector of the coplayers. In the perfect
monitoring condition, the signal was accurate. In the imperfect public monitoring
condition, there was a 10 percent chance that for each player that contributed a posi-
38The MPCRs and group sizes were chosen such that the marginal return for the group was equal in
the large groups with low MPCR and the small groups with high MPCR.
39There are also studies who introduce other kinds of asymmetric information, such as Bornstein &
Weisel (2010) who vary whether subjects know about each others endowment. Such experiments can
be viewed as related to monitoring imperfections, as low contributions are not necessarily signals of
cheats.
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tive amount the signal contained a «zero contribution». Since all players got always
the same contribution vector signals, the game was one of imperfect public moni-
toring (see section 1.3).40 The researchers crossed these conditions with conditions
differing in the payoff reduction technologies: there was one condition without option
to decrease coplayers payoffs, one with a reduction option with intermediate fine-to-
cost ratio, and one with a reduction option with high fine-to-cost ratio. They found the
following. First, contributions were generally lower under imperfect (public) mon-
itoring than under perfect monitoring, whereas the difference was only statistically
significant in the high-fine condition. The same was true for aggregate efficiency,
whereas here only statistically significant in the intermediate-fine condition. Second,
in the two conditions in which payoff reductions were feasible, their averages were
also generally higher under noisy monitoring than under perfect monitoring. Thus,
subjects seem to be not more cautious under noisy monitoring. In sum, while the
introduction of noise into public signals had no measurable effects in the ordinary
public good game, there were more payoff reductions, less contributions, and lower
payoffs under imperfect public monitoring than under perfect monitoring, with the
worst outcomes in the intermediate-fine condition. The likely reason is that contribu-
tors face more payoff reductions under noisy monitoring and reduce their cooperation
in response.
Similar evidence has been found by Grechenig et al. (2010), who used a finitely
repeated public good game (with fixed matching) for their experiment (192 students
from the University of Bonn) in which they introduced a specification of imperfect
private monitoring. After contributions were made in a given round, all players re-
ceived signals on the contributions of the coplayers. Each signal received by a player
i on j’s contribution had a particular probability of being wrong, whereas errors were
drawn independently from a stationary distribution. Thus, the game involved imper-
fect private monitoring (see section 1.4), because each player received her or his own
signal that was private information. One control condition and three treatment con-
ditions were implemented: In the control condition, there was a 50 percent chance
that a signal is wrong and players had no option to decrease the coplayers contribu-
tions. In the three treatment conditions there was an option to decease the coplayers
payoff after receiving signals, and the chances of a wrong signal were 50, 10, and
zero percent, respectively. The experiment revealed the following. First, in the treat-
ment conditions the average amount of «punishment» was increasing in the chance
of error. Specifically, more noise increased the frequency of punishment acts, but
decreased the intensity of punishment for a specific punishment act, whereas the for-
mer effect was stronger. Behind this is the fact that subjects conditioned their payoff
reductions less on the signal received if it was noisy, that is, tended to ignore noisy
signals and reduce payoffs more unsystematically. Cooperation in the public good
game (and overall efficiency) turned out to be not significantly different between the
conditions without and with a little noise (10 percent error chance), respectively, but
40Note that this is a very specific kind to introduce noise. The theoretical literature (section 1.3)
generally assumes that the actions of all players may be signaled as any other action from the support.
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with more noise (50 percent error chance) it was significantly lower. This is because
high contributors tended to decrease their contributions upon payoff reductions re-
ceived, which occurred relatively frequently. Comparing the control condition to the
treatment condition with the same error probability showed that the option to decrease
coplayers payoffs did not have a significant impact on cooperation.
2.4.4 Conclusion
In this section I reviewed cooperation experiments in which the signals players re-
ceive about their coplayers’ behavior are subject to some random disturbance. In PD
experiments with an indefinite horizon and imperfect public monitoring, the available
evidence shows that there is cooperation at any level of noise, but always less than
maximal. Furthermore, the frequency of cooperation decreases as noise increases,
and cooperation in conditions with very inaccurate information is not not more fre-
quent than under one-shot play. This supports the hypothesis derived in section 1.3,
and poses empirical restrictions on the predictions of the folk theorem under imper-
fect public monitoring. Furthermore, subjects seem to resort to more lenient and
forgiving variants of the classical TFT and grim trigger strategies, that wait for a
coplayer to defect two or three times before reverting to punishment mode, and re-
turn to cooperation after a punishment phase has occurred. These result supports
the claim I have made in the introduction to this chapter: interpolating results ob-
tained in a perfect monitoring setting to ones with informational constraints is indeed
problematic.
This conclusion is reinforced by the available evidence on imperfect monitoring
in cooperation games with an option to reduce coplayers’ payoffs. Payoff reduc-
tions become more frequent and cooperation less frequent as monitoring gets more
noisy. As Grechenig et al. (2010) note, those results are «surprising, since people
could simply choose not to make use of punishment» if monitoring is imperfect. I
find these results surprising as well, because they are clearly counter-intuitive. When
experiments produce counter-intuitive results, it is always a good idea to (i) reason
for possible explanations, and (ii) investigate whether the results may be a peculiar
artifact of the experimental design. To be specific, one might ask what might be dif-
ferent if subjects would have had the opportunity to do something about the noise
before reducing payoffs? In this case, the informational constraints would have been
not imposed but chosen by the subject, and it seems likely that this has some effect
on her or his payoff reduction meted out afterwards, because it becomes more dif-
ficult to «externalize the blame» for harming others. I take up this point in the new
experimental studies reported in chapters 3 and 4.
To summarize with respect to our guiding question, the available evidence shows
that the level of cooperation (and efficiency) is generally increasing in the accuracy
of information players have about each others’ actions.
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2.5 Private monitoring and publication
In the this section I focus on studies that implement different conceptualizations of
private monitoring, corresponding to the setting outlined in section 1.4, and provide
evidence on the effects of increasing its «publicness». In section 1.4 I concluded that
the theoretical literature points towards the hypothesis that information transmission,
or the publication or disclosure of behavioral records, may facilitate cooperation rela-
tive to conditions in which monitoring is private. A few recent studies are informative
with respect to this hypothesis.
2.5.1 People care about their reputation, even affectively
In section 1.4 I briefly reviewed the theoretical literature showing that, by assuming
the existence of some honest information processing mechanism from the outset, it
can be proven that a conditional strategy that bases the decision to cooperate on the
information about the coplayer’s past behavior can occur in equilibrium. A number
of recent experiments confirm that people condition their cooperation on such infor-
mation (e.g. Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski et al., 2002b,a; Semmann et al.,
2005; Seinen & Schram, 2006; Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Stanca, 2009). As
a result, individuals with a cooperative record receive more help than people with a
less favorable reputation, which creates incentives to care for one’s reputation, self-
reinforcing the mechanism. Interestingly, people respond to (cues of) observation
even if reputation management does certainly not provide any pecuniary returns, and
even to mere cues of being observed (such as a picture of staring eyes) without any
actual observation (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; Milinski & Rocken-
bach, 2007; Burnham & Hare, 2007; Boone et al., 2008; Rigdon et al., 2009; Boero
et al., 2009; Fehr & Schneider, 2010). This suggests that part of people’s attention
and concern for one’s reputation or social image is processed affectively without ever
reaching consciousness. This is, of course, also a methodologically relevant point to
consider in conducting and evaluating experimental research.
The hypothesis with which I introduced this section immediately follows: Start-
ing from a situation with private monitoring, does «more publicness» has an effect
on the frequency of cooperation?
2.5.2 Publication of behavioral records facilitates cooperation
There are two public good experiments relevant to the question posed above. In an
experiment by Rege & Telle (2004) that was built around a simple one-shot public
good game, there was a control condition in which subjects simply made, as usual,
their contribution decision anonymously, and a treatment condition in which a sub-
ject’s contribution was publicly but silently recorded on a blackboard. All other par-
ticipants could see the decision. Since the game is one-shot, there is no pecuniary
incentive to behave differently in the two conditions. However, the researchers found
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that contributions were substantially higher in the treatment condition than in the
control condition.
Andreoni & Petrie (2004) varied confidentiality in a public good experiment
along two dimensions: First, in one condition subjects were unmasked by presenting
their digital photos to their coplayers, in the control condition the usual anonymity ap-
plied. Second, in one condition the subjects contributions are revealed to the coplay-
ers, in the control condition individual contributions remained private. They found
that, relative to a baseline in which neither information on contributions nor indi-
vidual identification was available, both adding just information on contributions or
adding just the identity of the giver had no significant effect on cooperation. How-
ever, the researchers find a substantial impact of 59 percent more contributions if
both is used in combination. In a supplementary experiment in which subjects had
a choice to remain anonymous, virtually no subject did so and cooperation was even
higher. Thus, disclosure appears to have a significantly positive effect on cooperation
in public good games.
There are also some recent studies that speak more directly to the theoretical
framework outlined in section 1.4. Recall that the hypothesis was derived that co-
operation should be more frequent in a condition with public monitoring than in a
condition with private monitoring. In a seminal study, Schwartz et al. (2000) con-
ducted a random matching PD experiment (100 undergraduates from the University
of Arizona) with indefinite horizon (random termination) involving three conditions.
In the «no disclosure» condition subjects received no information about the currently
matched coplayer’s past action. In the «delayed disclosure» condition they received
the coplayers behavioral record, except the last three periods. Finally, in the «imme-
diate disclosure» condition the full behavioral record was revealed. They found that
cooperation was more frequent in the «immediate disclosure» (42 percent) than in
the other two conditions, only slightly less frequent in the «delayed disclosure» (36
percent), and much less frequent in the «no disclosure» condition (19 percent). In
addition, subjects cooperated more frequently when encountering a player who has
tended to cooperate in the past, and less frequently when encountering a player who
has tended to defect in the past.
Duffy & Ochs (2009) also compared a private monitoring condition with two con-
ditions in which players received different amounts of information about their current
coplayer’s past behavior. In addition, they also included a fixed matching condition.
In their PD experiment (344 undergraduates from the University of Pittsburgh), all
subjects played approximately 100 rounds of a standard indefinitely repeated PD with
termination probability 0.1. In a control condition, each subject played a sequence
of approximately ten supergames with a fixed coplayer within each supergame, and
a new coplayer in each new supergame (rematching between matches ensured that
each pair met at most once). Thus, the control condition resembled the standard re-
peated game setup with the same players interacting repeatedly in a given match. The
treatment conditions implemented a random matching population game as described
in section 1.4 of the previous chapter. Specifically, for each supergame, subjects were
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matched into subgroups of size n = 14, and then also played the same stage game in
pairs, whereas in each round pairs were randomly re-matched from this population.41
The termination probability was, of course, identical to the control condition. After a
supergame was terminated, another supergame was started with the same population
until the around 100 rounds were reached.42
The main treatment variable was the information subjects received about the cur-
rent coplayer’s last action. In the private monitoring condition, subjects received no
information about current coplayer’s previous action at all. In the noisy-information
condition, subjects were informed about the average payoff realized in the current
coplayer’s previous match.43 In the full-information condition, subjects were per-
fectly informed about the current coplayer’s action in the previous round.
The population size was sufficiently small that, given the parametrization of the
experiment, a fully cooperative contagious equilibrium exists even in the private mon-
itoring condition. Intuitively, however, one might expect that the more accurate the
information players have about their current coplayers’ previous action, the more
swiftly a contagious punishment phase may unfold, and therefore the stronger the
incentives to cooperate. Duffy & Ochs (2009) indeed find modest differences in the
frequency of cooperation between the conditions. Taking session level averages, co-
operation is more frequent in the information transmission conditions (17.6 and 17.3
percent in the noisy and full information conditions, respectively) than in the private
monitoring condition (7.5 percent), whereas only the differences between the noisy
and the private monitoring condition is significant. Furthermore, the frequency of co-
operation turned out to be much higher in the control condition (54.9 percent). From
those facts the researchers concluded that «it is the matching protocol rather then
the information about the opponent’s history that plays the more important role in
the achievement of high frequencies of cooperation» (p. 806, emphasis in the orig-
inal). I find this conclusion somewhat premature for two reasons. First, the amount
of information about the coplayer’s history was changed with the matching protocol
as well. In the control condition, a player had automatically information about the
entire history of her or his current coplayer, whereas in the treatment conditions this
information is always limited. Thus, an appropriate treatment condition that tests
for the effect of the matching protocol in isolation would be one with perfect public
monitoring. Second, the specific kinds of limitations the researchers implemented
may be the reason for the low cooperation rates in the treatment conditions rather
than limitations per se. Specifically, it may be a lack of second-order information,
information about the current coplayer’s previous coplayer’s action, that rendered the
first-order information rather useless (see section 1.4.3).
41The researchers also implemented a condition with population size n = 6, but found no differences
in the main results.
42The researchers did not tell subjects the target duration of 100 periods. The experiment just contin-
ued until the experimenters ended the session unexpectedly.
43Since in the PD there are only three possible realizations of average payoffs (η −κ , κ , η−κ2 ), of
which two are perfectly informative and one leaves uncertainty about which player defected, this may
be called as a kind of imperfect monitoring.
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To see this, consider an experiment (192 students from Penn State University) by
Bolton et al. (2005), which was designed to investigate the amount of information
about coplayers’ past behavior necessary to support cooperation in a random match-
ing game. In particular, they compared a condition in which players received only
information about the currently matched coplayer’s immediate past action to a condi-
tion in which they also received one step of recursive information: information about
the currently matched coplayer’s previous round coplayer’s action. This allows for a
richer set of conditional strategies; in particular a player can then evaluate whether
the current coplayer defections were «justified». The key results are that introducing
(relative to a private monitoring condition) the availability of first-order information
had only a moderate effect, whereas the availability of second-order information un-
ambiguously boosted cooperation. Thus, if enough information is available, subjects
clearly play strategies that are more complex than just conditioning on the current
partner’s past action(s).
An experiment of Camera & Casari (2009) addresses the shortcomings of the
study of Duffy & Ochs (2009). In their experiment (160 undergraduates from Purdue
University) a population has size n = 4 and in each period they are randomly matched
in pairs to play a PD, so each subject had a one-third probability of meeting any other
subject in the population in each period. After each round, interaction terminates
with probability 0.05, that is, the expected duration of a supergame was 20 peri-
ods. Each subject played five (random matching) supergames, where the rematching
between supergames ensured that any pair of subjects were never matched into the
same population. They implemented three main treatment conditions that differed in
the amount of information available to subjects. In the private monitoring condition,
subjects could observe actions and outcomes in their pair but not the identity of their
coplayer. The remaining two conditions were public monitoring conditions, that is,
each action was observable to all other players in the community. However, in the
non-anonymous public monitoring condition, histories were associated with identi-
ties of subjects. In the anonymous public monitoring condition, subjects observed
histories but no associated identities (actions were listed in random order without
identifiers). Thus, the private monitoring condition resembles two informational fric-
tions: Players (i) cannot observe identities of coplayers, and (ii) cannot observe the
behavioral record of others, only the actions taken in their matches, respectively. The
two public monitoring conditions relax these frictions in turn.
Parameters in the experiment were set to ensure that the efficient outcome can be
sustained as one of the possible equilibria, when agents adopt the simple grim trigger
extension discussed in section 1.4: Every player cooperates unless being informed
about a defection in which case (s)he defects perpetually. The results are threefold.
First, cooperation was frequent even under private monitoring (59.5 percent aver-
aged over all supergames).44 Second, through introducing public monitoring without
44In comparison to the experiment by Duffy & Ochs (2009) this frequency appears high but is likely
the result of a relatively large gain from mutual cooperation in the stage game, a very low termination
probability, and a quite small population size. In fact, Camera & Casari (2009) also conducted a con-
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identity markers nothing changed at all (58.6 percent). Third, introducing public
monitoring with identity markers resulted in a significantly higher frequency of co-
operation (81.5 percent). Some attempts to infer strategies suggest a reason for this.
First, the researchers find evidence that under private monitoring, the average sub-
ject switched from cooperation to defection after being cheated; in particular, the
behavioral patterns for many subjects are consistent with a trigger, most often with a
grim trigger strategy. Second, while in the anonymous public monitoring condition
subjects could, in principle, switch to punishment mode once they have discovered
a defection anywhere in the population (which extremely accelerates a contagious
punishment phase), they appear to avoid such global punishment. Namely, while the
average subject displayed a strong and persistent decrease of cooperation after ex-
periencing a defection her- or himself, the response to a defection outside her or his
matches was much weaker. Third, this was also the case in the non-anonymous pub-
lic monitoring case, i.e. the average subject still largely ignored defections against
other population members, but here the average subject tended to target her or his
punishment to future encounters with the same subject, and not indiscriminately in
all subsequent matches. In other words, the average subject cooperated with coplay-
ers that have not cheated (only) on him- or herself yet, and defects discriminately
against coplayers that have. Furthermore, Camera & Casari (2009) find in all con-
ditions no evidence of forgiving, that is, grim trigger strategies seem to be the most
frequent strategy employed, whereas it is personalized whenever possible. It fol-
lows that individual-specific information is likely much more effective that aggregate
information.45
Note that the above conclusion were based on play of the average subject, that
is, at the aggregate level the data look consistent with the notion of grim trigger play.
However, an individual level analysis of the data reported in Camera et al. (2012)
relativized this conclusion. They find that only one out of four subjects behaves in a
manner consistent with the use of the grim trigger strategy, and subjects tried out a
variety of strategies. Most importantly, Moreover, most subjects appear to adopted
strategies that are not conditional on coplayers’ actions. In comparison to the evi-
dence reviewed in section 2.1.3, subjects appear to behave differently in population
games than in repeated games with the same coplayers. The literature is, however,
still in its infancy such that the is much left to be discovered.
dition with a population size of N = 14 and found a markedly lower frequency of cooperation (23.6
percent).
45The results of another private monitoring condition, in which subjects had the opportunity to re-
duce the payoff of coplayers at a cost speak along the same lines. Camera & Casari (2009) find the
frequency of cooperation close to the non-anonymous public monitoring case (74.2 percent), which is
why subjects frequently resort to the direct punishment option instead of reverting to non-cooperative
mode in subsequent periods.
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2.5.3 Information islands and pools
In matching games in which monitoring is private, Ghosh & Ray (1996) suggested
an additional way than information transmission how players might mitigate the in-
formational frictions: non-random matching.46 Indeed, in reality there are many
domains in which one can by and large freely decide with whom to interact and how
long to continue a relationship. There are many economically significant examples of
such situations. Perhaps most importantly, in non-monopolistic markets consumers
can freely choose among the products and services of different suppliers, and whether
they want to become, or cease to be, a customer of one or a few suppliers. Relatedly,
in labor markets employers may choose whom to hire, and employees may choose
for whom to work. In financial capital markets, investors are careful whom to trust
their savings.47
Renner & Tyran (2004) conducted a framed experiment around an opaque mar-
ket (market outcomes cannot be publicly observed) for an experience good with two
quality levels and a short supply side, which is essentially a matching game with
private monitoring. They implemented two conditions that differed with respect to
whether buyers and sellers can develop long-term relationships. In the customer mar-
ket condition, buyers can trade repeatedly with the same seller and can thus develop
long-term trading relationships. Specifically, at the opening of the customer market
one buyer and one seller are matched randomly. The seller then submits a price to
his buyer and chooses privately the quality he wishes to provide contingent on the
buyer’s acceptance. If the buyer accepts his seller’s offer, he learns the quality of
the good and is re-matched with the same seller in the next period (there were five
trading phases with ten periods each in total). Thus, the customer relationship is
continued as long as the buyer accepts her or his seller’s offers. If, however, the
buyer rejects an offer, the customer relationship is terminated. As a consequence,
both the buyer and the seller move to the anonymous market condition from this pe-
riod onwards.48 In this condition buyers and sellers do not know with whom they
trade. Specifically, in any period all sellers simultaneously post prices to all buy-
ers. Buyers receive a list of anonymous price offers among which they can choose
in random order. No identifying information is revealed to the players upon accep-
tance, such that trading is completely anonymous. Renner & Tyran (2004) found that
46Methodically, there is an advantage of studying random association and selective association sep-
arately, since reputation has (at least) two distinct functions when selective association is feasible: On
the one hand, it may serve as a conditioner of behavior within a given relationship. On the other hand,
the decision whether to initiate or continue a relationship in the first place may also be conditioned on
reputation.
47What these examples suggest is that selective association is intimately related to competition. If the
demand side is short, that is, there are many suppliers in market but demand is limited, market shares
become a scarce resource. This means nothing but that suppliers will compete for associations with a
limited number of potential customers. Likewise, if the supply side is short, demanders will compete
for associations with a limited number of suppliers.
48Note that returning to the customer market condition was impossible. Thus, punishment took the
form of grim trigger.
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long-term customer relationships are frequently upheld, causing a clientelization of
the market. The average product quality was about three times higher in the customer
compared to the anonymous market. Prices were also higher such that upholding the
relationship was profitable for both sellers and buyers on average. In addition, com-
paring the average payoff differences between sellers and buyers by treatment shows
that surpluses are shared almost equally in the customer market, while in the anony-
mous market the distribution of incomes are quite unequal with sellers making very
small profits, since the buyers’ distrust forces them to low pricing. Related market-
embedded experiments obtained similar results (Brown et al., 2004, 2008). Slonim &
Garbarino (2008) also finds clientelization and more cooperation in a repeated trust
game with the possibility to form relationships (see also Slonim & Guillen, 2010).
Chiang (2010) finds that more generous proposers and more tolerant responders are
preferred as partners in an ultimatum game experiment. In a repeated public good
experiment by Page et al. (2005), each subject was given a list (in random order
and without further identifying information) of contributions of all other subjects in
the session each third period, and the opportunity to express a preference order over
those players, that is, with whom (s)he wishes to interact in the following three peri-
ods most. Rematching was implemented according to those preferences. They also
found that cooperation is markedly higher under this kind of non-random than under
random matching.
A plausible hypothesis about why this clientelization occurs is that long-term
relationships are a response to the privateness of monitoring. Since each player ob-
serves only what happens in her or his own matches, and therefore only has infor-
mation about players (s)he interacted with personally, switching partners carries an
opportunity cost of lost «informational capital» (Bernanke, 1983).49 The reputations
(see section 1.2) acquired, based on the accumulated information about the common
history, are a non-transferable, relation-specific asset.50 Thus, the relationships that
form in the setting with private monitoring can be viewed as «information islands»
(Seabright, 2010, p. 251f), bonded by the accumulated informational capital. But
if this is really the only glue that binds the relationships together, then disclosure of
this information should mitigate such clustering. Falk et al. (2004) addressed this
question by adding a condition with perfect public monitoring to the setup of Brown
et al. (2004) in which all first movers could observe all previous outcomes in other
matches as well. They find that clustering is indeed reduced in this condition, but the
effect was surprisingly small; there was still a distinct clientelization into long-term
relationships. However, the public monitoring condition turned out to produce more
efficient results, presumably because there is now a more credible (implicit) threat to
switch partners.
49See also the industrial organization literature on «switching costs» (see Klemperer, 1995, for an
overview).
50Bernanke (1983) termed this asset «informational capital» and argued that its large-scale vaporiza-
tion during the US banking crisis in the early 1930s through disruptions of long-term credit relationships
was a major cause of the Great Depression.
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However, in a related experiment (144 students from Penn State University) in
which matching was fixed, Bolton et al. (2004) found the opposite. Subjects played
30 rounds of a trust game, and there were three conditions. In the «strangers market»
subjects were randomly matched in the first period and then re-matched in a round
robin fashion; subjects learned the outcomes of their own matches but no informa-
tion about one another’s history of action across matches was made available (i.e.
monitoring was private). The «partners market» was identical except that each pair
of subjects remained to be matched together for the entire duration. The «feedback
market» was identical to the «strangers market» except that full previous histories of
their coplayers were made available to the players. The results show a clear order it
terms of efficiency, the «partners market» being most efficient, the «strangers mar-
ket» very inefficient, and the «feedback market» in between. Thus, the differences
seem to have to do with the matching procedure. However, more research to find out
more about this and the fact that even under public monitoring many interactions take
the form of enduring relationships would be interesting.
2.5.4 Conclusion
In the this section I considered studies that implement different conceptualizations
of private monitoring. In section 1.4 I concluded that the theoretical literature points
towards the hypothesis that information transmission, or the publication or disclosure
of behavioral records may facilitate cooperation relative to conditions in which mon-
itoring is private. The received evidence is affirmative. The frequency of cooperation
is generally lowest in private monitoring conditions and information transmission in
some from or the other increases cooperation. If matching is non-random, disclo-
sure also reduces the clientelization effects observed under private monitoring. The
evidence is more ambiguous with respect to the question whether random matching
games with public monitoring provide for equally efficient results as repeated inter-
action among the same individuals, as suggested by the theorem of Kandori (1992a)
reviewed in section 1.4.1.
2.6 Conclusion
What does the propensity of individuals in a given group to cooperate with one an-
other has to do with the availability of information they have about each others’ ac-
tions? To find answers to this question, I have considered a number of more specific
questions that remained open at the end of the previous chapter: Do real people ac-
tually perform such tactics as envisaged in the theoretical models? Do real people
only cooperate for tactical reasons? What strategies do they actually play in repeated
games? What information about the coplayers’ actions do they use? How do they
respond if such information becomes limited? After having screened the existing
experimental literature the following can be concluded.
In section 2.1 I focused on the first question (Do real people actually perform
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such tactics as envisaged in the theoretical models?) by reviewing evidence of be-
havior in repeated games with perfect monitoring. Results show that a majority of
subjects actually cooperates tactically. In indefinitely repeated cooperation games,
cooperation is more likely to prevail if it is a supergame equilibrium (in particular if
it is risk dominant) than when it is not. As predicted by the folk theorem, subjects
respond to changes in the termination probability and the size of the gains from mu-
tual cooperation. Most importantly with respect our guiding question, subjects use
the available information about the coplayers’ past behavior to condition their current
behavior. The evidence suggests that the most commonly employed strategies are the
two trigger strategies considered in section 1.2.3: TFT and GRIM.
The evidence also shows that there is typically significant cooperation in finitely
repeated cooperation games. The average within-match dynamics are consistent with
the strategic imitation model considered in section 1.2.2: significant cooperation over
some fraction of the duration, with cooperation in the first period being increasing
in the remaining duration, and a sharp decline as the terminal period approaches.
However, while most people seem clearly to condition their behavior on past play,
the individual level fine-structure of behavior is often inconsistent with the strategic
imitation model, and subjects seem to have more difficulties to settle on a particular
strategy. Finally, there is a persistent residuum of cooperation even in (approximated)
one-shot interactions which cannot be accounted for by tactical considerations.
In section 2.2 I considered this residuum in more detail, and have put special
emphasis on evidence that is informative with respect to our guiding question. A
large body of evidence shows clearly that people do not always cooperate for tactical
reasons, but there is also evidence that such cooperation is conditioned on coplayers’
behavior anyway. This holds even for one-shot interactions for which the traditional
behavioral model based on rational selfishness predicts no cooperation and therefore
no conditioning at all (see section 1.1). While the evidence is not yet conclusive on
the quantitative importance, typically around half of the subjects exhibits a tendency
to return cooperation with cooperation even if a material return from doing so is ruled
out.
If some subjects are willing to incur a cost to confer a benefit to someone else,
are there also subjects who are willing to incur a cost to impose a cost on someone
else? I reviewed the evidence on this question with a focus on the degree of condi-
tioning on coplayers’ past behavior, in which case it can serve as a punishment, in
section 2.3. The evidence shows that such spiteful behavior is very common in var-
ious subject pools worldwide. Furthermore, it is frequently used as a punishment of
non-cooperative behavior, even by unaffected third-parties, with strongly disciplin-
ing effects. It follows predictable patterns, despite the fact that pecuniary incentives
seem to play a significantly smaller role than for cooperative behavior. But there are
exceptions and strong evidence that the degree of conditioning differs significantly
across cultures.
In sum, the evidence from experiments under perfect monitoring shows that if in-
formation about the other players’ past behavior is readily available, this information
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is used in order to play a discriminatory strategy, even in situations in which material
returns from doing so is ruled out. As a result, there are material incentives to co-
operate which is reflected in the notably higher frequency of cooperation in repeated
games compared to (approximated) one-shot games. But there is also significant co-
operation in the latter, in particular if costly punishment is available. In one sentence:
if information about the other players’ past behavior is readily available, cooperation
generally occurs and can be very high if the interaction is repeated. But what happens
if such information is limited?
While imperfect monitoring is an issue in the theoretical literature for quite some
time (sections 1.3 and 1.4 in the previous chapter), there is only a very small (but
growing) experimental literature, which I reviewed in sections 2.4 and 2.5. In sec-
tion 2.4 I considered cooperation experiments in which the signals the players re-
ceive about their coplayers behavior are subject to some random disturbance (cor-
responding to the setting outlined in section 1.3). In PD experiments with an in-
definite horizon and imperfect public monitoring, the available evidence shows that
there is cooperation at any level of noise, but always less than maximal. Further-
more, the frequency of cooperation decreases as noise increases, and cooperation in
conditions with very inaccurate information is not higher than under one-shot play.
This supports the hypothesis derived in section 1.3, and poses empirical restrictions
on the predictions of the folk theorem under imperfect public monitoring. Further-
more, subjects seem to resort to more lenient and forgiving variants of the classical
TFT and grim trigger strategies, that wait for a coplayer to defect two or three times
before reverting to punishment mode, and return to cooperation after a punishment
phase has occurred. These result supports the claim I have made in the introduction
to this chapter that one cannot just interpolate results obtained in a perfect monitoring
setting to ones with informational constraints. This conclusion is reinforced by the
available evidence on imperfect monitoring in cooperation games with an option to
reduce coplayers’ payoffs. Payoff reductions become more frequent and cooperation
less frequent as monitoring gets more noisy.
Finally, in section 2.5 I considered studies that implement different conceptual-
izations of private monitoring. In section 1.4 I concluded that the theoretical litera-
ture points towards the hypothesis that information transmission, or the publication
or disclosure of behavioral records may facilitate cooperation relative to conditions
in which monitoring is private. The received evidence is affirmative. The frequency
of cooperation is generally lowest in private monitoring conditions and information
transmission in some from or the other increases cooperation. If matching is non-
random, disclosure also reduces the clientelization effects observed under private
monitoring. The evidence is more ambiguous with respect to the question whether
random matching games with public monitoring provide for equally efficient results
as repeated interaction among the same individuals, as suggested by the theorem of
Kandori (1992a) reviewed in section 1.4.1. To summarize with respect to our guiding
question, the available evidence suggest that the level of cooperation (and efficiency)
is generally increasing in the accuracy and symmetry of information players have
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about each others’ actions.
I conclude this chapter with two remarks. First, the insights obtained in the re-
views conducted in chapters 1 and 2 feed back on the two divergent views (outlined
in the general introduction) about why people cooperate and what role information
about coplayers’ behavior might play. The evidence shows that both views have
merit. People cooperate to a significant extent tactically, use reciprocity strategically
to realize mutual benefits as envisaged by game theory, and thereby draw strongly
on information about coplayers’ past behavior. But people also forgo own material
gains to cooperate or reduce incomes of others. A significant fraction of those lat-
ter behaviors are conditioned on information about coplayers’ past play anyway. In
sum, there typically is cooperation even in situations in which people have minimal
or no information about others’ behavior, but increasing such information generally
facilitates cooperation significantly.
The second remark is the continuation of the second remark I have made in the
conclusion of the previous chapter. Just as in the theoretical literature, the experimen-
tal literature considers information structures generally as an exogenous parameter. I
explained in the previous chapter (and the general introduction) why this may narrow
down our understanding of the guiding question of this thesis. I argue that an exten-
sion of the strategy set for opportunities to acquire and transmit information about
others’ behaviors might provide valuable insights not only in theory but empirical
research as well. They might also qualify a number of results obtained under ex-
ogenous information structures. For instance, I noted above that the counter-intuitive
results obtained in experiments with sanctioning opportunity under noisy monitoring
may be an artifact exactly this design choice. The notion of viewing the information
structure as endogenous is the core thrust underlying the contributions reported upon
in the remaining chapters 3 through 7.
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Chapter 3
Costly Monitoring and Non-Strategic
Sanctioning: Experimental Evidence1
3.1 Introduction
Understanding the role of sanctions for maintaining cooperation in social dilemmas
is a central theme in a rapidly growing experimental literature in economics. Since
the seminal paper by Fehr & Gächter (2000a), the literature has examined many di-
mensions of this theme, for example the impact on punishment and cooperation of
variations in the distance of the time horizon (Gächter et al., 2008), in the severity of
punishment (Egas & Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), and in the cost of
punishment (Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007a). One recent dimension
within the literature concerns the impact of variations in the information structure of
the social dilemma. Carpenter (2007b), for example, studies in a group setting how
exogenous restrictions in the number of coplayers whose action a subject can observe
affect that subject’s punishment behavior. Ambrus & Greiner (2012) examine the im-
pact of varying the severity of punishment on punishment and cooperation when there
is a small amount of exogenous noise in the information on coplayers’ actions. In a
related paper, Bornstein & Weisel (2010) introduce exogenous noise in the endow-
ments of players in a public good game. By introducing such exogenous information
imperfections, these papers have not only added realism to the experimental designs,
but have also delivered important insights into the role of different information struc-
tures in supporting, or weakening, the application of social sanctions in particular and
mutual cooperation in general.
In this chapter, we build on the momentum towards more realistic settings. In
particular, we extend the literature in a new direction by allowing important parts of
the information structure of the game to be endogenously determined by the players.
In many social dilemmas, information on coplayers’ actions is not only imperfect, but
players are frequently in a position to augment available information through costly
1This chapter is co-authored with Timo Goeschl.
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effort. In other words, the player’s choice whether to impose social sanctions on
the coplayer is frequently preceded by a choice on whether to invest resources into
monitoring his or her actions. Such monitoring effort to overcome imperfect infor-
mation on coplayers’ actions is well known in a variety of economically relevant con-
texts, such as shared resource management (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993;
Seabright, 1993), production teams (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Kandel & Lazear,
1992; Dong & Dow, 1993; Craig & Pencavel, 1995) and alliances (Acheson, 1975,
1987, 1988; Palmer, 1991), labor relations (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Kanemoto &
MacLeod, 1991; Lazear, 1993), micro-finance (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2005) or
neighborhood watch (Sampson et al., 1997), to name just a few. Do individuals mon-
itor actively and how does this interact with the supply of sanctions? Do subjects
resort to «blind sanctioning», i.e. do they sanction without monitoring coplayer be-
havior? If present, both responses should, for different reasons, have problematic
implications for maintaining cooperation through sanctions. Yet, there is little ex-
perimental evidence on how subjects respond to the option to overcome information
imperfections at a cost. The experiment reported on in Carpenter (2007b), for ex-
ample, links monitoring and punishment in the sense that it is infeasible to impose
damages on coplayers whose previous actions were unknown. Ambrus & Greiner
(2012) introduce noise into monitoring and vary the cost of punishment, but not the
option of reducing noise at a cost.
The experiment we report upon in this chapter is designed to investigate the im-
pact of information acquisition costs on mutual monitoring and punitive behavior
in a setting in which sanctioning can only happen for subjective reasons. Our de-
sign extends a well studied dyadic cooperation game form that includes a mutual
sanctioning stage (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b) by incorporating a monitoring deci-
sion into the sanctioning stage. In this mutual cooperation-monitoring-punishment
(MCMP) game, subjects always have the option to impose punishment, at a cost to
themselves, on their coplayer. Without payment of the information cost in the mon-
itoring stage, however, their decision in the sanctioning stage remains uninformed
about the coplayer’s action at the cooperation stage of the game. By choosing to
pay the fee they are able to condition their sanctioning on complete information re-
garding the coplayer’s action. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no previ-
ous experimental evidence on endogenous mitigation of information asymmetries in
games with an option to impose penalties. On the basis of this design, we address
three main questions by comparing a baseline with zero information costs with two
treatments with two different levels of information costs: First, what is the informa-
tion acquisition behavior when observing coplayers’ actions is costly? Second, how
does information acquisition behavior respond to changes in the price of informa-
tion? Third, how does the endogeneity of information impact on the occurrence and
incidence of mutual sanctions? Having answered these three questions, we explore
the link between the observed behavior to subjects’ beliefs and risk postures and the
impact of variations in monitoring costs on cooperation in a single round setting.
The key results are the following. First, positive information costs have the pre-
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dicted impact of decreasing the supply of punishment. The supply of punishment re-
sponds to the presence of monitoring costs as if the costs of sanctioning had increased
(Anderson & Putterman, 2006). Second, while all sanctioning is discriminate at zero
information costs, in the presence of positive information costs a distinct share of sub-
jects switches to «blind» punishment rather than refraining from sanctioning. The rise
of deliberately blind punishment is an interesting new finding of this chapter. Third,
positive information costs lead to defectors making up a smaller share of the pun-
ished and receiving smaller punishment compared to zero information costs. Fourth,
we find that beliefs and risk aversion contribute to explaining individuals’ monitoring
and punishment behavior. Fifth, turning to cooperation, single-round cooperation un-
der positive monitoring costs is maintained because subjects overestimate monitoring
and punishment, in contrast to the baseline of zero information costs.
We proceed as follows. In section 3.2 we describe the aim, design, and procedures
of the experiment. We proceed to present the main results in section 3.3. In section
3.4 we discuss the main results and likely mediating mechanisms. We conclude in
section 3.5.
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The aim of the design is to generate empirical evidence on social sanctioning be-
havior when information structures are endogenous. In particular, we are interested
in the amount of costly information acquisition, the impact of price variation on in-
formation acquisition, and the relationship between these endogenized information
structures and sanctioning behavior. The previous literature has been careful to iden-
tify and isolate non-strategic sanctioning. In keeping with this focus, we design the
experiment such that strategic and altruistic motives for monitoring coplayers’ actions
are ruled out as far as possible and the observed monitoring and sanctioning should
be driven only by subjective rewards to the individual carrying out these activities.
Different experimental game forms have been used to study costly punitive be-
havior experimentally (for an overview, see for example Gintis et al., 2005). The
established game form involves a two-stage design consisting of a cooperation stage
and a mutual sanctioning stage. The innovative step in our experiment consists of
adding a monitoring stage between the cooperation and the sanctioning stage, result-
ing in a MCMCP game. At the monitoring stage, subjects decide whether to give up
material rewards in order to receive full information about the actions of their coplay-
ers at the cooperation stage. If they choose not to buy the information, they forgo the
option of being able to discriminate between a cooperating and defecting coplayer
at the sanctioning stage. If they do, sanctioning can be conditioned on observed
coplayer behavior. We exogenously vary the magnitude of this fee as our treatment
variable to observe how behavior is adjusted.
Among the experimental game forms used in the literature, we choose as starting
point the simple cooperation game form by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b), which is
a one-shot two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma in material payoffs. We do so for four
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reasons. First, due to its simplicity, the game is easily understood even by inexperi-
enced subjects. Second, the two-person design eliminates second-order coordination
problems (Yamagishi, 1986) that are present in groups with more than two members.
Third, the simplicity of the game form facilitates the use of Selten’s strategy method
for eliciting behavior in the monitoring stage. Finally, by drawing on established
parameter constellations, our choice facilitates comparability with previous research.
Specifically, our baseline condition constitutes an effective replication of the experi-
ment by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b).
3.2.1 Experimental game form
Subjects played a two-stage experimental game with one randomly matched and un-
known coplayer. In the first stage, both players in a given group of two were en-
dowed with 10 tokens and interacted with one another in a strategic game of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma type with monetary payoffs. Subjects’ first-stage decision was
binary: Players could either keep their tokens or transfer all of them to the other
group member, in which case the experimenter tripled them. Thus, denoting a given
player by i and his or her coplayer by j, the first stage decision by ai ∈ {0,1} where
ai = 1 means cooperation, the first stage payoff equal to 10(1−ai+3a j). The bene-
fit of a binary choice at the cooperation stage is not only a reduction in complexity
(Ambrus & Greiner, 2012), but also a gain in experimenter control over the value of
information that subjects can obtain through monitoring.
At the beginning of the second stage, each player received an additional endow-
ment of 40 tokens. Subsequently, both players in each group had the opportunity
to observe the coplayer’s action in the first stage («monitor») and could choose to
punish the other. In order to avoid potential biases due to a variable cost-impact ratio
(see Casari, 2005), we chose a linear sanctioning technology commonly employed
in the literature (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Gächter et al.,
2008; Ambrus & Greiner, 2012): Denoting by pi j player i’s expenditure for punishing
player j, the latter’s payoff is reduced by 3pi j tokens. Expenditures were restricted to
integers and damage was limited to sixty tokens, therefore pi j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,20}. Sub-
jects reported their choices in the monitoring and punishment stages jointly using a
modified version of the strategy method. Without a monitoring stage, players would
simply announce a contingent punishment plan,
pi j (a j) ∶ {0,1}→ {0,1, . . . ,20}
indicating the number of deduction points pi j for each of the coplayer’s possible
transfer decisions a j, given their own decision in the first stage. The presence of
a monitoring stage was implemented in the strategy method by allowing subjects a
choice between two punishment plans. One was the standard contingent punishment
plan pi j (a j) that allowed the subject to condition their punishment on the coplayer’s
action a j. This choice, denoted by mi = 1, required payment of an exogenously set
monitoring fee κm in addition to the applicable punishment costs pi j. The alternative,
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denoted mi = 0, was a punishment plan pi j in which the subject could not condition
the punishment on the coplayer’s action a j. This plan did not involve a fee over and
above the cost of punishment. After the punishment stage, the game ended.
In summary, the pecuniary payoff function of each subject i in this mutual moni-
toring game was
wi = 10(1−ai+3a j)+40−miκm− pi j −3p ji
When discussing the monitoring and punishment behavior at the individual level,
the analysis will focus on three main behavioral types. One type are «non-punishing»
subjects with mi = 0 and pi j = 0 that decide not to monitor and do not punish. These
subjects are referred to as behavioral type N. Among the punishing subjects, there
are two types. «Blind punishers» with mi = 0 and pi j > 0 devote no resources to
monitoring, but still punish indiscriminately. This type is denoted as B. The other
type T are «targeted punishers» with mi = 1 and pi j > 0 that devote resources both to
monitoring and to punishment. The B-types and T -types together form the class of
«punishers», denoted P. The forth possible type (monitoring without punishment) is
excluded by design.
3.2.2 Additional tasks
We supplemented the MCMP game by incentivized elicitation of first-order beliefs
and risk preferences. Both are potentially relevant in accounting for observed behav-
ior (Keser & van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher & Gächter,
2010). Since subjects receive no actual information in the course of play, they re-
spond to their beliefs on their coplayer’s behavior, and this response involves a de-
cision under strategic risk. Thus, in addition to the MCMP game described above,
every subject performed the following tasks, which were identical in each treatment
and for every subject. Following their decision in the first stage, we asked subjects
to state their belief about the transfer decision of the coplayer and, following their
decision in the second stage, their belief about the punishment they expected from
their coplayer. Those statements were incentivized with a opportunity to earn extra
tokens in case of accurate predictions (see appendix).
At the end of each session we employed the Holt-Laury lottery choice method
(Holt & Laury, 2002) to obtain an indication of each subject’s risk preferences (see
appendix). Subjects were only informed about this task after the MCMP game. The
method may not capture the specific kind of risk involved in the situation, but we
think it is worth investigating.
3.2.3 Design
Our primary focus in the design is on the relationship between information costs and
monitoring and punishment behavior. The objective of the treatments is to introduce
an exogenous variation in the cost of information acquisition with the aim of forc-
ing a materially consequential choice by subjects regarding the desired information
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status prior to the punishment decision. As a result, information structures become
endogenous and observable.
We employ between-subjects variation in the monitoring fee κm and examine
the changes in the shares of types N, B, and T as κm changes. For understanding the
evolution of these shares of behavioral types, evidence on monitoring and sanctioning
activity when monitoring is costless, i.e. when κm = 0, is an obvious starting point:
It provides a direct replication of the PD experiment by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b)
and therefore a meaningful baseline treatment. This treatment is labeled M0. In the
alternative treatments M5 and M10, the monitoring fee is set at κm = 5 and κm = 10.
The choice of three fee levels κm = {0,5,10} was on the basis that we had strong
priors for a non-linear effect. In order to achieve efficient identification, we set the
values at the extremes and the midpoint of the range and allocated approximately
half of the subjects to the midpoint cell, a third to maximum cell, and a sixth to the
minimum cell, respectively (see for example McClelland, 1997; List et al., 2011, for
efficient sample arrangement methods).
On the basis of the design, we are able to test for responses in monitoring and
punishment behavior with respect to changes in those costs by comparing the rela-
tive proportions of the three behavioral types in treatments M0, M5, and M10. In
addition, we can exploit information about the resources spent on punishment and on
behavior at the cooperation stage to understand more about the direction, intensity,
and heterogeneity of social sanctions in the presence of costly monitoring.
3.2.4 Subjects and procedures
All experiments were conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Alfred-Weber-
Institute (AWI-Lab) at Heidelberg University in late 2010. Participants were recruited
from the general undergraduate student population using the online recruitment sys-
tem ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total 134 subjects participated, of which 49.3 percent
were female. A share of 64.2 percent had never participated in a laboratory exper-
iment before. The mean age was 21.8 years. No subject participated in more than
one session and treatment. Based on the sample arrangement described above, 22
subjects were assigned to M0, 66 to M5, and 46 to M10.
At the beginning of each session, upon entering the laboratory subjects were ran-
domly assigned to the computer terminals. Direct communication among them was
not allowed for the duration of the entire session. Booths separated the participants
visually, ensuring that they made their decisions anonymously and independently.
Furthermore, subjects did not receive any information on the personal identity of any
other participant, neither before nor while nor after the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, that is, before any decisions were made, sub-
jects received detailed written instructions that explained the exact structure of the
game and the procedural rules. The experiment was framed in a sterile way using
neutral language and avoiding value laden terms in the instructions (see supplemen-
tary material). Participants had to answer a set of control questions individually at
their respective seats in order to ensure comprehension of the rules. We did not start
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the experiment before all subjects had answered all questions correctly.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The exact timing of events was as follows. First, the subjects were randomly matched
into groups of two. Then each subject made her or his decisions and reported expec-
tations. After being informed about the payoffs, the experimenter announced that
another (and definitely final) experiment will now be conducted and distributed addi-
tional instructions that explained the supplementary lottery choice experiment. Thus,
subjects did not know until this announcement that the experiment involved another
task in order to rule out confounding effects of the lottery-choice task on the main ex-
perimental game. We cannot rule out reverse confounds which is, however, of minor
significance. After being informed about the payoffs, subjects were asked to answer
a short questionnaire while the experimenter prepared the payoffs. Subjects were
then individually called to the experimenter booth, payed out (according to a random
number matched to their decisions; no personal identities were used throughout the
whole experiment) and dismissed.
In every session subjects received a fixed show-up fee of e2, which was not
part of their endowment. The whole experiment lasted approximately one hour and
subjects earned an average of e10.99 (e0.10 per token earned), including the fixed
show-up fee. Earnings exceed the local average hourly wage of a typical student job
and can hence be considered meaningful to the participants.
3.3 Results
We organize our discussion of the experimental results in the following way. We
begin by discussing our results from the baseline treatment that replicate previous
experimental evidence on sanctioning behavior. We then describe the core result of
the experiment, namely the relative prevalence of the three possible behavioral types
N, B, and T for each of the monitoring cost treatments M0, M5, and M10. We relate
the results from the additional treatments in which the monitoring cost was varied to
the existing literature on variations in sanctioning costs and discuss the parallels and
differences. In addition, we exploit the endogenous nature of information acquisition
in our setting to move from the observable level of behavioral types to more sophis-
ticated explanations of the observed evidence as a result of social preferences and
beliefs. We believe that the evidence permits understanding more about the underly-
ing nature of social sanctioning.
Figure 3.1 shows the relative frequencies of behavioral types N, B, and T for
monitoring costs at three levels κm = {0,5,10}. Normalization is required on account
of the between-subjects design with a variable number of subjects in each treatment.
A readily apparent first diagnosis of the evidence is therefore that variations in the
cost of information are associated with different patterns of monitoring and punish-
ment behavior. The detailed nature of these differences is the subject of the following
sections. In particular, our key result can also be highlighted: when information is
imperfect and information costs are positive, a substantial share of subjects responds
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of behavioral types at different monitoring cost levels.
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with information acquisition prior to punishment, that is, a significant share of sub-
jects does not take exogenously imposed information constraints as given in a social
sanctioning situation as long as the costs of overcoming these constraints are not
prohibitive.
3.3.1 Punishment with costless monitoring: Replication of previous findings
The baseline treatment with κm = 0 replicates earlier experiments on costly sanctions
(see Camerer, 2003; Gintis et al., 2005; Gächter & Herrmann, 2009; Balliet et al.,
2011, for overviews) and specifically the experiment run by Fehr & Fischbacher
(2004b). These experiments find that when there are no hindrances to monitoring,
the general propensity among subjects to punish coplayers in experiments involving
social sanctions is high. Even after eliminating strategic motives for punishment, the
share of subjects that apply costly sanctions consistently exceeds one half. Fehr &
Fischbacher (2004b) find that 67 percent of subjects applied costly sanctions. Our
results, displayed in the left-hand column in figure 1, are consistent with theirs.
Result 3.1. When information costs are zero, most subjects make use of the non-
strategic punishment option.
In particular, we find a large majority of 73 percent (16 out of 22) willing to
impose costly sanctions on their coplayers for non-strategic reasons. The class of
punishers P therefore dominates when there are no monitoring costs.
Previous experiments have also generated clear evidence that when information
about coplayer behavior at the cooperation stage is perfect, then punishment is tar-
geted. For example, Fehr & Gächter (2000a) find evidence of a clear relationship
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Figure 3.2: Individual heterogeneity in punishment and targeting in the baseline condition.
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(a) Distribution of punishment expenditures.
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punishment expenditure targeted on defection and
cooperation, respectively, among the punishing
individuals.
between deviation from average contribution in a public goods game. Fehr & Fis-
chbacher (2004b) also find that behavior at the cooperation stage is a highly signif-
icant predictor of receiving punishment. Our experiment replicates these findings
closely.
Result 3.2. When information costs are zero, non-strategic punishment is always
targeted.
When monitoring was costless, every subject that imposed a punishment acquired
the information whether her or his coplayer cooperated or defected. In other words,
all sanctions were conditioned on the coplayer’s first stage behavior. Specifically, of
those 16 out of 22 subjects that imposed damages in at least one contingency, all 16
monitored their coplayer. The remaining six subjects neither monitored nor imposed
any damages. In terms of our behavioral types, there are only T -type and N-types,
but no B-types. The extent of targeting in the baseline treatment is reported in the
right panel of figure 3.2. This depicts the cumulative distribution in the differences,
at the level of individual punisher, between expenditures on punishing defectors and
punishing cooperators. As evident, every punisher differentiates between cooperators
and defectors and more than half the punishers differentiate their purchase of punish-
ment by at least five tokens between defectors and cooperators. This may be viewed
as a measure of the strength of the preference for targeting.
The third aspect of our replication concerns the direction of punishment. In pre-
vious experiments, the direction and intensity is clear in that cooperators dominate
as punishers and defectors are their specific targets. Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) do
not report the composition of the group of punishers, but the following numbers are
indicative: 69 percent of cooperators imposed sanctions on defectors as opposed to
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50 percent of defectors imposing sanctions on other defectors. The two groups of
punishers diverge even more in terms of the volume of sanctions. There, cooperators
punishing defectors spent on average 9.2 tokens on sanctions while defectors punish-
ing defectors spent 2.7 tokens. Previous experiments have also uncovered consider-
able heterogeneity among subjects with respect to sanctioning behavior (Charness &
Rabin, 2002; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010; Blanco et al., 2011). For example, along-
side the targeted punishment of defectors by cooperators, punishment of cooperators
is a less frequent but also robust empirical regularity (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006;
Gächter et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Ertan et al., 2009; Gächter & Herrmann,
2010).2 In Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b), 8.3 percent of cooperators were targeted at
the punishment stage.
Result 3.3. When information costs are zero, the dominant direction and intensity of
punishment is cooperators imposing high sanctions on defectors, but heterogeneity is
high.
19 punishment actions were carried out in the baseline treatment by 14 cooper-
ators and 2 defectors.3 Of these punishment actions, 15 (79 percent) were taken by
cooperators (1 out of 14 cooperators decides to punish his co-player irrespective of his
behavior) and 4 (21 percent) by defectors. Among the class of punishers, therefore,
cooperators clearly supplied most of the punishment action. Taking intensity into
account, cooperators accounted for 84 percent of total investment into punishment
while defectors accounted for 16 percent. Whom were the punishments imposed on?
No punisher targeted exclusively cooperators. In 16 out of 19 punishment decisions
(84 percent) the target of a punishment action was a defector. Cooperators were the
target of 14 percent of punishment actions. Again, taking intensity into account, de-
fectors received 93 percent of all the punishment imposed while cooperators received
7 percent. Summarizing, punishment originates with cooperators and arrives at de-
fectors.4 At the same time, the general observation hides significant heterogeneity
in individual-level behavior. The left panel of figure 3.2 provides an illustration by
plotting the cumulative distribution of observed punishment expenditures by target.
A majority of 84 percent chose zero punishment for those cooperating in the first
2In an experiment designed to differentiate between a variety of different motivations to impose
costly sanctions, Leibbrandt & López-Pérez (2009, 2011) find substantial heterogeneity, with a combi-
nation of inequity aversion, self-interest, spite and direct reciprocal motivations accounting for observed
patterns best.
3Recall that the strategy method allows each subject to punish up to two times, once for the case that
the coplayer cooperates and once that he defects.
4To make our results comparable with Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b), 78 percent (14 out of 18) of
cooperators imposed sanctions on defectors, with an average expenditure of 10.7 tokens, while only
one (5.6 percent) of them also spent 2 tokens on sanctioning a cooperator (besides her or his spending
of 8 tokens on sanctioning a defector). Two out of four defectors did not punish, while the remaining
two imposed damages on both other defectors and cooperators: one expended 10 tokens for a sanction
on a defector and 5 tokens for a sanction on a cooperator, the other expended 7 tokens for a sanction on
a defector and 6 tokens for a sanction on a cooperator. Thus, defectors rather than cooperators are the
prevailing target of sanctions.
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stage. A minority of 16 percent of the subjects chose a positive punishment for co-
operators, but no subject more than 6 tokens. A quarter of subjects chose to impose
no punishment on defectors. Among the majority who imposed damages on defec-
tors, the expenditures differ considerably between individuals, ranging from 3 to the
maximum of 20 tokens.
A corollary of result 3.3 is that when monitoring was costless, defection was
highly unprofitable: Defectors received much stronger punishment (22.8 tokens) on
average than cooperators (1.8 tokens) such that the difference was sufficient for the
average net punishment of defection (22.8−1.8 = 21 tokens) to exceed the gain (10
tokens) by a substantial margin. We return to this observation again when examining
positive costs.
3.3.2 Monitoring and punishment with positive information costs
Results 3.1 through 3.3 underline the benchmark quality of the baseline treatment
by providing additional evidence to support similar findings in the literature. We
confirm the presence of non-strategic sanctioning, the dominance of targeted punish-
ment, the direction and intensity of punishment, and the degree of behavioral hetero-
geneity. Against this benchmark, we now report in the following three results on the
behavioral implication of endogenizing subject’s information status at the time of the
punishment decision through a costly choice.
When monitoring is costly, the relative shares of behavioral types diverge from
the baseline: A higher overall cost of sanctioning is associated with a higher share
of subjects that neither monitor nor punish, which is in line with previous evidence
showing that increasing cost of punishment reduce the supply of sanctions (Suleiman,
1996; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007a; Egas
& Riedl, 2008).
Result 3.4. In the presence of positive information costs, the propensity to punish
decreases relative to the baseline.
Figure 3.1 illustrates this first finding: The share of subjects that neither monitor
nor punish (type N) increases from 27 percent at κm = 0 to 67 percent when κm = 5
and 74 percent when κm = 10. The hypothesis that the frequency of N-types and
monitoring costs are independent can be clearly rejected (Kruskal-Wallis test, p <
.001). Overall, the relationship is clearly negative (Kendall’s τb = −.260, p = .002),
whereas pairwise, only the former change is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney
test, p = .001), the latter is not (p = .414). The ratio of the frequency of punishers
to the frequency of N-types decreases successively from 2.67 at κm = 0 to 0.5 at
κm = 5 and to 0.35 at κm = 10. Total expected expenditures for sanctioning, given
subjects’ elicited priors about their coplayer’s first stage behavior, remain constant
or at most decrease slightly (p = .062) for higher monitoring costs. The observed
pattern is consistent with the view that subjects interpret a positive monitoring cost
as comparable to an increase in the cost of punishment.
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In addition to the result on the propensity to punish at all, our design explicitly
allows to study punitive behavior of those individuals that opt to remain ignorant
about their coplayer’s first stage behavior.
Result 3.5. In the presence of positive information costs, the propensity to punish
indiscriminately increases relative to the baseline.
Figure 3.1 again reports the share of blind punishers (type B) that do not acquire
information and yet impose sanctions. This share increases from zero (none of 22) in
the baseline to 12 (8 out of 66) and 13 percent (6 out of 46) as the monitoring costs
increase to 5 and 10 tokens, respectively. Here, the former change is statistically
marginally significant (Mann-Whitney test, p = .089), the latter not (p = .885). How-
ever, both frequencies under positive monitoring costs are statistically significantly
different from zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p = .005 and p = .014, respectively).
The ratio of the frequency of indiscriminate punishers to the frequency of all punish-
ers (the frequency of targeted punishers) increases successively from zero at κm = 0
to 0.36 (0.57) at κm = 5 and to 0.5 (1) at κm = 10.
Finally, the share of targeted punishers (type T ) decreases from 73 percent for
costless monitoring to 21 percent when κm = 5 and 13 percent when κm = 10. Again,
the hypothesis that the frequency of T -types and monitoring costs are independent
can be clearly rejected (Kruskal-Wallis test, p < .001), while pairwise only the former
change is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p < .001), the latter is not (p =
.269).
Result 3.6. At positive information costs, cooperators remain the dominant origin of
the direction of punishment relative to the baseline, but defectors dominate less as its
target.
31 percent (15 out of 48) and 29 percent (10 out of 35) of cooperators imposed
sanctions on defectors in M5 and M10, respectively, with respective average expen-
ditures of 11.6 tokens and 8.2 tokens. Five and four of the cooperators in M5 and
M10, respectively, also imposed punishments on other cooperators, with respective
average expenditures of 6.8 tokens and 3 tokens. 11 out of 18 (61 percent) and 9 out
of 11 (82 percent) of the defectors did not punish in M5 and M10, respectively. Of
the remaining seven defectors in M5, four punished indiscriminately (B-type) with
an average expenditure of 5.8 tokens, and three targeted (T -type) with an average
expenditure of 6 tokens on defectors and 5 tokens on cooperators, plus the five to-
kens monitoring fee. Likewise, of the remaining two defectors in M10, both punished
indiscriminately (B-type) with an average expenditure of 2 tokens.
Despite the rise in monitoring costs, defectors rather than cooperators remain the
prevailing target of sanctions on average, although less pronounced. Defection is still
punished significantly more often than cooperation in both M5 (32 vs. 17 percent,
p= .004, Wilcoxon signed-rank test), and M10 (26 vs. 13 percent, p= .014, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test). Also, defectors continue to receive stronger punishment on average
than cooperators in both M5 (9.8 vs. 3.3 tokens, p= .006, Wilcoxon signed-rank test),
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and M10 (5.6 vs. 1.1 tokens, p = .014, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). However, in both
conditions defection was no longer unprofitable. We return to this below.
To sum up, a setting with a perfect, but costly monitoring option leads to three
important differences compared with zero monitoring costs: (1) The supply of social
sanctions decreases as if punishment costs increased. (2) A small, but significant
share of subjects sacrifices resources to actively monitor their coplayer and thus tar-
get their punishment. (3) A small, but significant share of subjects chooses to punish
without information on whether the coplayer cooperated. The first-order impact of
exogenous information imperfections that can be overcome at a cost is therefore to
reduce the supply of sanctions.5 These imperfection also bring to light important het-
erogeneities across subjects with respect to the type of sanctioning they will supply,
targeted or blind. Targeted sanctioning is conducive to maintaining cooperation be-
cause it rewards cooperative behavior in relative terms. The deliberately blind sanc-
tioning observed in the experiment on the other hand is unproductive for maintaining
cooperation.
3.4 Further results section
3.4.1 The role of beliefs and risk aversion at the cooperation and the moni-
toring stage
The comparison between results 3.1 through 3.3 on the one hand and results 3.4
through 3.6 on the other form the core of this chapter. Yet, exploiting the elicita-
tion of beliefs and risk attitudes carried out in the course of the experiment provides
further insight into drivers of behavior identified in earlier papers. Table 3.1 reports
the results of system probit regression on both stages. The estimates derive from a
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), with adjusted standard errors clustered at
the session level.6 The transfers reported in the left-hand column document subjects’
behavior at the cooperation stage. The remaining columns report on behavior at the
monitoring stage by explaining subjects sorting into the three behavioral types N, B,
and T .
Before discussing the effects of the belief and risk attitudes, note that the top row
of table 3.1 summarizes results 3.1 through 3.6: At the monitoring stage monitoring
costs decrease the propensity to become a T -type, but increase the propensity to
become an N- and B-type (all results statistically significant). At the cooperation
stage, however, monitoring costs do not have a significant effect on the size of the
transfer.
5This qualifies results reported in a related paper by Grechenig et al. (2010) in the sense that if it
is the subject’s own choice of whether to acquire information on their coplayer’s behavior, the vast
majority refrain from punishment altogether if they opted to remain ignorant.
6We use SUR since it is reasonable to assume that the error terms in the equations are correlated.
As a robustness check, we also carried out a system probit regression estimated by maximum simulated
likelihood (using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulator), and a system logit SUR that delivered
equivalent results.
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Table 3.1: Results of a system probit model estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR)
Second stage
First stage transfer Being a P-type Being a T -type Being a B-type
Monitoring fee -0.036 0.133 -0.186 0.066
(0.028) (0.035) (0.039) (0.033)
.201 .000 .000 .047
Pessimistic belief -2.339 0.312 -0.259 -0.164
(0.443) (0.283) (0.301) (0.185)
.000 .271 .389 .375
Optimistic belief 1.207 0.030 0.015 -0.196
(0.411) (0.222) (0.253) (0.318)
.003 .891 .952 .538
Risk averse -0.707 -0.654 0.451 0.970
(0.361) (0.170) (0.224) (0.428)
.050 .000 .045 .023
Female 0.214 0.222 -0.415 0.196
(0.330) (0.215) (0.250) (0.209)
.517 .301 .097 .348
Age 0.016 0.039 -0.084 0.011
(0.031) (0.023) (0.068) (0.036)
.598 .093 .215 .765
Exp. net cost of defect -0.003
(0.024)
.895
Constant 0.810 -0.985 2.087 -2.679
(0.757) (0.775) (1.469) (0.997)
.285 .203 .155 .007
Obs 134 134 134 134
Log likelihood -47.599 -78.293 -63.507 -40.381
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.175
Pseudo R2 0.364 0.116 0.186 0.100
For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient, the second row the stan-
dard errors in brackets), and the third row the p-value of a test with Null that the coefficient is equal
to zero (in italics). Standard errors take into account clustering by session. Pessimistic (elicited belief
of 0.3 or less) and optimistic (elicited belief of 0.7 or more) belief is relative to an indeterminate belief
(elicited belief between 0.4 and 0.6), respectively. Risk averse (4 or less risky choices in the Holt-Laury
task) is relative to risk neutral and risk seeking (5 or more risky choices), respectively.
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Beliefs about coplayer behavior and risk aversion have been shown to play a
role in determining subject’s actions in many previous cooperation experiments (e.g.
Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Houser et al., 2010; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). Our first
result confirms these findings in our experiment.
Result 3.7. At the cooperation stage, subjects’ pessimistic (optimistic) beliefs about
the coplayer’s cooperation and their risk aversion (tolerance) inhibit (facilitate) co-
operative behavior.
The evidence from the cooperation stage of the game provides support for the
broad notion of strong reciprocity among subjects. As the regressions in table 3.1
show, optimistic beliefs about coplayer behavior have a positive influence on sub-
ject’s transfer and vice versa. Risk aversion interacts negatively with the size of
first-stage transfers, as predicted in a first-stage transfer without information about
the coplayer’s type.
Result 3.8. In contrast to a situation with zero monitoring costs, beliefs about coplayer
behavior fail to explain the sorting into behavioral types at the monitoring stage when
monitoring costs are positive. Risk aversion decreases the probability of sorting into
non-punishment and increases the probability of sorting into targeted and blind pun-
ishment.
In the baseline treatment with zero monitoring costs, the evidence suggest the
prevalence of strong (negative) reciprocity among subjects, as result 3.2 makes clear.
However, if this interpretation was correct, then beliefs about coplayer behavior
should also be relevant in the second stage. Compared to subjects that declare to
be uncertain about their coplayer’s action, subjects with an optimistic belief about
the coplayer’s action should be more likely to sort into type N, pessimists into type
B. As Table 3.1 makes clear, these predictions are not supported by the data: Both
optimistic and pessimistic beliefs are statistically insignificant drivers at the monitor-
ing stage.7 Risk aversion, on the other hand, is associated in a statistically significant
way with behavior in the monitoring stage: Risk averse individuals have a higher
propensity to sort into type T and lower propensity to sort into type N. Blind pun-
ishment (type B), however, is also associated with higher risk aversion. To explain
what to us is an unexpected finding, we draw attention to the fact that the informa-
tional imperfections of the MCMP game give rise to two separate types of risk that
interact differently with a subject’s other preferences. One risk of the informational
imperfections is that a defecting coplayer «gets away with it», i.e. does not receive
punishment. The net benefits associated with punishing defectors (net of punishment
7Among the 14 B-types, only one (7 percent) has a pessimistic belief (exactly 0.3), seven (50 per-
cent) are completely uncertain (exactly 0.5), and the remaining five (36 percent) even stated an op-
timistic belief (0.7 or higher). Among the 78 N-types in the costly monitoring conditions, seven (9
percent) stated a pessimistic belief, 33 (42 percent) were uncertain, and 38 (49 percent) had an opti-
mistic belief. Finally, among the 20 T -types in the costly monitoring conditions, one (5 percent) stated
a pessimistic belief, 9 (45 percent) were uncertain, and 10 (50 percent) had an optimistic belief.
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costs) would be affected by the presence of this type of risk. The other risk is that
a coplayer gets punished whom the subject would not like to impose any losses on.
The effect of this risk is typically associated with blind punishment being applied to
a cooperating coplayer. It is then the relative strength of the two effects that deter-
mines, for a given level of risk aversion, whether subjects will sort into type T and
spend resources to ensure that only intended targets get punished, or into type B that
ensures that no intended target gets away unpunished. Our evidence demonstrates
that both outcomes can be observed.
3.4.2 The emerging incentive structure
The non-repeated, between-subjects design of our experiment ensures the exclusive
presence of non-strategic motivations for punishment and therefore enhances exper-
imenter control. It constitutes an important step towards an exhaustive analysis of
the equilibrium effects of endogenous information structures on cooperation that is
an area of future research. Part of this first step is to assess what can be learned
from first-round behavior about the emerging incentive structure for cooperation (see
Ambrus & Greiner, 2012).
We start with the baseline treatment of costless monitoring. Here, in line with
previous experiments, the credible threat of cheap targeted punishment for defectors
favors cooperative behavior. Punishment was widespread and every subject that im-
posed a punishment did so discriminately. For positive monitoring costs, however,
this was no longer the case and therefore changes the incentives for cooperation at
the first stage.
Result 3.9. If monitoring is costless, defection is highly unprofitable relative to co-
operation. At positive monitoring costs, defection does pay.
Table 3.2: Frequency of punishment and mean punishments received (3 ⋅ p ji).
Relative frequency Mean damages
κm Cooperation Defection Cooperation Defection Net Damages
0 .136 .727 1.8 22.8 21.0
5 .167 .318 3.3 9.8 6.5
10 .130 .261 1.1 5.6 4.6
The impact of endogenizing the information structure by varying the monitoring
costs is summarized in table 3.2. We first observe that there is no significant variation
in punishment of cooperation (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .756). Punishment of defec-
tion, however, is significantly different between treatments (p < .001), exhibiting a di-
minishing trend as monitoring costs rise (Kendall’s τb = −.266, p < .001). The same
is true for the mean net punishment of defection, which is the difference between
damages imposed on defection and cooperation, respectively (Kendall’s τb = −.299,
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p < .001). Hence, on average defecting gets less costly as monitoring costs rise. As
a result, defection did pay when monitoring costs were positive.
Do subjects anticipate the effects of monitoring costs on punishment and the in-
centives to cooperate, as predicted previously?8 There is little guidance to be derived
from the literature since most papers do not report elicited expectations.9 In the
baseline condition of the present experiment, subjects’ beliefs support the «punish-
ment anticipation hypothesis». On average, subjects expected to receive punishment
of 21.2 (1.0) tokens in case of defection (cooperation). This is a remarkably accu-
rate prediction of the actual punishments of 22.8 (1.8) tokens. The rank correlation
between expectations and realizations is significantly positive (Kendall’s τb = .547,
p = .001, in case of defection, τb = .622, p = .004, in case of cooperation). In the
presence of positive monitoring costs, on the other hand, the punishment anticipation
hypothesis fails in a non-repeated design.
Result 3.10. While subjects correctly predict the direction and intensity when moni-
toring costs are zero, the intensity of punishment and mean net punishment are over-
estimated for positive monitoring costs. According to subjects’ beliefs, defection is
on average unprofitable under costly monitoring when, in fact, defection paid on
average.
Table 3.3: Frequency of subjects expecting to be punished and mean expected damages.
Relative frequency Mean damages
κm Cooperation Defection Cooperation Defection Net Damages
0 .136 .864 1.0 21.1 20.2
5 .212 .636 3.2 15.5 12.3
10 .196 .652 2.4 12.4 10.0
The evidence underpinning this result is shown in table 3.3. Qualitatively, sub-
jects anticipate the actual impacts patterns as shown in table 3.2. Quantitatively,
however, they significantly underestimate the effects of increasing monitoring costs
on their coplayers’ monitoring and punishment behavior. As in the case of actual pun-
ishments, expected punishment of cooperation (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .626) does
not vary significantly with monitoring costs while the expected punishment of de-
fection does (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .045). The difference is that in the subjects’
expectations, positive monitoring costs have a much weaker impact on the punish-
ment of defectors (and hence the net punishment of defecting) (Kendall’s τb = −.156,
p = .033, and τb = −.166, p = .024, respectively) than is actually the case (see test
8Defection «may cause strong negative emotions among the cooperators [which] may trigger their
willingness to punish ... and that most people expect these emotions» (Fehr & Gächter, 2002, p. 139,
emphasis added).
9A notable exception is López-Pérez & Kiss (2012) who explicitly address the issue of whether
subjects anticipate positive and negative sanctions. They obtain similar results as ours. Notably, they
find that punishments are better anticipated than rewards.
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results above). For example, the actual net cost of defecting amounted to 6.5 tokens
on average when κm = 5 and 4.6 on average when κm = 10. The expected net costs
were 12.3 and 10.0, respectively, on average. As a result, cooperation still payed in
subjects’ expectation.
Turning finally to cooperation rates, there are no statistically significant differ-
ences between treatments. In the baseline treatment with κm = 0, 82 percent cooper-
ated. When κm = 5 and κm = 10, the cooperation rate is73 percent and 76 percent,
respectively. The differences are not statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test,
p = .688). Monitoring costs did therefore not have a systematic impact on cooper-
ation in the single round design. There are two, probably complementary, explana-
tions for this. The first is the overestimation of punishments summarized in result
3.10. The second explanation is a second-order effect that the overestimation of pun-
ishment has on the beliefs of conditional cooperators that others will cooperate: This
belief, in turn, makes conditional cooperators more willing to cooperate (Shinada &
Yamagishi, 2007, see also Fehr & Gächter, 2000a; Gächter et al., 2008 for support-
ing evidence). We find, for example, that first stage cooperation correlates strongly
with the belief about the coplayer’s cooperation (Kendall’s τb = .473, p = .000). At
the same time, those beliefs do not differ significantly between treatments (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p = .754), which is consistent with this second explanation. Additional
support comes from the regression results on behavior at the cooperation stage re-
ported in Table 3.1. The coefficient of the net expected punishment of defection in
the first stage cooperation equation was insignificant, while the estimated coefficients
of the belief indicator variables were significant and consistent with a conditionally
cooperative motivation.
The extent to which these single round results persist in a setting with repetition
is a matter of future research.10
10There are several reasons why one might expect that cooperation rates in the costly monitoring
treatments will deteriorate if the game is played repeatedly. First, one might expect that beliefs will be
updated in the course of play so as to converge to the observable reality. However, note that this learning
effect is, of course, dependent on the subjects’ information acquisition behavior. We are currently
experimenting on this issue. Second, as shown in previous research, cooperation appears to suffer
if there is exogenous uncertainty about others’ possible contributions or the reasons for contributing
little (Bornstein & Weisel, 2010; Grechenig et al., 2010; Patel et al., 2010). Besides direct pecuniary
incentives, this may be related to the hypothesis that cooperators and defectors respond differently to
punishment because the former may feel anger when punished while the latter may feel shame (Bowles
& Gintis, 2005a). If monitoring gets so costly that a large fraction of damages is inflicted untargeted,
then sanctions may fail to induce feelings of shame in defectors, which seem to be an important deterrent
besides any pecuniary harm (Barr, 2001; Fessler & Haley, 2003; Gintis, 2008; Hopfensitz & Reuben,
2009; Jacquet et al., 2011), and anger in cooperators who respond with withdrawing their cooperation.
This is consistent with findings that mutual enforcement appears not to work well if punishment is
perceived to be unfair or unjustified (Barclay, 2006; van Prooijen et al., 2008; Drouvelis, 2010).
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3.5 Conclusion
We extend previous research about the effects of information imperfections on the
role of sanctions for maintaining mutual cooperation in social dilemmas. To our
knowledge, this chapter is the first to consider endogenous, rather than exogenously
given, information structures by allowing for information acquisition on coplayer be-
havior in the context of a mutual-cooperation mutual-punishment game. This design
enables both a close replication of previous evidence on the presence of non-strategic
sanctioning and the observation of new types of heterogeneities among subjects. We
show that a majority of subjects responds to positive monitoring costs in a manner
that is broadly equivalent to a rise in punishment costs and obeys the Law of De-
mand. At the same time, we observe, on the one hand, active information acquisition
for targeting sanctions that do not provide material returns either to the punisher or
anybody else. On the other, the design also allows subjects to punish «blindly» if they
so wish, and we find a significant share of subjects that chooses this course of action.
Given the practical relevance of an endogenous information structure in many social
dilemmas, we believe that there are three important implications. First, informational
imperfections combined with perfect, but costly monitoring have a first-order neg-
ative effect on the supply of sanctions. Secondly, there is a second-order negative
impact because some players choose to punish without monitoring. The productive
type of sanctioning, namely that targeted at defectors, is provided, but only by a small
share of subjects. Beliefs and risk aversion appear to determine how subjects sort into
these latter two groups. Harnessing a group’s propensity to supply sanctioning such
as to maintain cooperation is therefore likely to hinge on the possibility to decrease
monitoring costs and therefore the cost of targeting sanctions. Several avenues for
future research along these lines suggest themselves, for example extending the set-
ting to interactions with a longer horizon, increasing the group size, and varying the
conditions and nature of information acquisition.
Appendix
Elicitation of beliefs
After subjects made their decisions in the first and second stage, respectively, we
asked them to state their beliefs about the transfer decision of the coplayer as well
as the damages they expect from their coplayer. Those statements were incentivized
with a opportunity to earn extra tokens in case of good predictions. To elicit the
subjects’ beliefs at the transfer stage, we used an affine transformation of the one-
dimensional Brier score (Brier, 1950). Let aˆij ∈ [0,1] subject i’s probability prediction
that the target player j cooperated, then the Brier score is given by
sBrier = (aˆij −a j)2 ∈ [0,1]
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We implemented the specific transformation
s = 8−8sBrier = 8−8(aˆij −a j)2 ∈ [0,8]
such that a perfect prediction was rewarded by eight tokens and the opposite by zero
tokens. This scoring rule belongs to the class of quadratic score functions which are
known to be proper (see for example Selten, 1998 and Gneiting & Raftery, 2007).
Physically, we implemented the belief elicitation at the first stage by a screen with a
slider with which subjects could specify their probabilistic belief that the target player
transferred her or his endowment in ten-percent steps.
At the sanctioning stage we asked the subjects for point predictions of the dam-
ages assigned to them by their coplayers and incentivized statements with a distance
score similar to those used, for example, by Gächter & Renner (2010) or Fischbacher
& Gächter (2010). Here, each perfect prediction was rewarded by four tokens, a
deviation of one point by two tokens, a deviation by two points by one token, and
deviations of three of more points received no reward. This elicitation was physically
implemented by a screen with input boxes shown at the end of the second stage.
Elicitation of risk preferences
At the end of each session we used the Holt-Laury lottery choice method (Holt &
Laury, 2002) to obtain an indication of each subject’s risk attitude. As described be-
low in more detail, subjects were not told of this second task before the experimental
game. Subjects faced a set of choices between two lotteries for each of ten decisions.
The payoffs were identical for each lottery A (20 tokens or 16 tokens) and each lottery
B (38.5 tokens and 1 token).11 Probabilities for high and low payoffs are the same
for both alternatives for each decision. Thus lottery B always has higher variance. As
the subject moves down the ten decisions, the probability gradually shifts from the
lower to the higher payoff. The expected return is higher for lottery A for the first
four decisions, and for lottery B after that. We were interested in the point where
subjects switch from the more risky option (lottery B) to the less risky option (lottery
A) and how often they switch if applicable. A risk neutral agent is expected to switch
in line three or four; the further down the switching point the higher the agent’s de-
gree of risk aversion. Physically, subjects made their choices on a screen with two
check boxes for option A and B, respectively, for any of the ten decisions that were
arranged row-wise on the screen. The lotteries had been resolved by throwing a ten-
sided die, simulated by a random number generator program. One of the ten choices
was actually paid out. Which one was determined by a second virtual ten-sided die.12
Table 3.4 contains summary data for the choices in the Holt-Laury task. The data
is coded by the number of risky choices (option B).13 Zero (ten) risky choices indicate
11These payoffs correspond to the payoffs in the low-stakes condition in Holt & Laury (2002).
12Laury (2005) provides evidence that supports the validity of using this random-choice payment
method.
13Note that Holt & Laury (2002) report their data by the number of safe choices. We made the
appropriate adjustments in comparing our data with theirs.
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics of the Holt-Laury instrument
Share by gender Total share
Risky choices Male Female All Consistent Holt & Laury
0−1 .029 .106 .067 .076 .01
2 .074 .121 .097 .101 .03
3 .250 .197 .224 .235 .13
4 .250 .273 .261 .269 .23
5 .132 .167 .149 .135 .26
6 .132 .076 .105 .109 .26
7 .088 .046 .067 .059 .06
8 .015 .000 .008 .000 .01
9−10 .029 .015 .022 .017 .01
Mean 4.41 3.77 4.10 3.92 4.8
In the fifth column subjects whose choices were inconsistent with the typical one-crossover pattern (option A at the top, switching to B at some point) are
removed.
extreme risk aversion (preference), six risky choices indicate risk neutrality. The
subjects in our sample are somewhat risk averse, with an average of 4.1 risky choices.
Consistent with most findings in the risk literature (see Eckel & Grossman, 2008),
women are more risk averse than men, and this difference is marginally statistically
significant in our sample (Mann-Whitney test, p = .078). The distribution of risk
preference is similar to Holt & Laury (2002), however, the distribution in our sample
is stronger skewed to the right indicating our subjects to be somewhat more risk
averse. About 12 percent of the subjects had more than one crossover between the
two options. The sub-sample of those inconsistent subjects is significantly different
from the consistent subjects (Mann-Whitney test, p = .009), the former choosing on
average more risky options (5.44) than the latter (3.92). In subsequent analysis, we
include all subjects’ choices.
Finally, since we conducted the lottery choice task at the end of each session, it
may be possible that the prior tasks had some impact on the subjects’ choices. In
particular, choices in the lottery choice task may be different for subject’s whose
coplayer defected than for those whose coplayer cooperated in the first part of the
session. However, a Mann-Whitney tests indicates that this is not the case: in terms
of risky choices in the lottery choice task the sub-sample whose coplayer defected is
not significantly different from the sub-sample whose coplayer cooperated (p= .721).
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Chapter 4
Costly Monitoring and Third-Party Sanc-
tioning: Experimental Evidence1
4.1 Introduction
Social norms, normative standards of behavior that are enforced by informal social
sanctions, exist in every human society, and economists increasingly recognize their
importance in accounting for a broad range of economic phenomena. Nonetheless,
although they are frequently invoked as «all-round explanations» of behaviors that are
inconsistent with standard behavioral models, their formation, content, and enforce-
ment are still poorly understood (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Schram & Charness,
2011).
In this chapter we focus on the latter aspect, the underlying enforcement mech-
anisms. Social norms are enforced by the (justified) expectation that infringements
will be sanctioned. Indeed, social enforcement is what social norms distinguish from
moral norms, the latter being individually internalized and «enforced» internally (El-
ster, 2009). Thus, observation of behavior, Elster (2009) argues, is a core element
of social norms, because this information is a critical conditioner of social sanctions.
In fact, recent experimental research suggests that the efficacy of social sanctions is
hampered by restrictions on observability (Carpenter, 2007b; Bornstein & Weisel,
2010; Grechenig et al., 2010; Ambrus & Greiner, 2012).
However, there are two important issues that have not been considered in com-
bination so far. First, whether and to what extent a potential sanctioner is in the
position to observe, or otherwise acquire information about the potential target indi-
vidual’s behavior, is rarely an exogenous matter of fact. In many situations, infor-
mation on the target individual’s actions is not immutably imperfect, but players are
frequently in a position to augment available information through costly effort, either
ex ante (e.g. putting oneself in a better «vantage point») or ex post (e.g. collecting
evidence). In other words, a player’s choice whether to impose social sanctions on
1This chapter is co-authored with Timo Goeschl.
123
another player is frequently preceded by a choice on whether to invest resources into
monitoring his or her actions. Such monitoring effort to overcome imperfect infor-
mation on coplayers’ actions is well known in a variety of economically relevant con-
texts, such as shared resource management (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993;
Seabright, 1993), production teams (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Kandel & Lazear,
1992; Dong & Dow, 1993; Craig & Pencavel, 1995) and alliances (Acheson, 1975,
1987, 1988; Palmer, 1991), labor relations (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Kanemoto &
MacLeod, 1991; Lazear, 1993), micro-finance (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2005) or
neighborhood watch (Sampson et al., 1997), to name just a few.
Second, while the vast majority of theoretical and experimental literature focuses
on sanctions imposed by parties that are directly affected by the sanctioned behavior,
so-called second parties, it has been argued that social sanctions by materially unaf-
fected third parties are of particular importance to social norms in larger communities
(Bendor & Mookherjee, 1990; Kandori, 1992a; Bendor & Swistak, 2001). There are
some narrative accounts on third party sanctioning (e.g. Greif, 1993, 1994; Sober &
Wilson, 1998; Fessler, 2002), and Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) provided rigorous ex-
perimental evidence that third parties punish uncooperative behavior even at a cost to
themselves.2
In this study we combine those two practically important aspects of social norm
enforcement in a single experiment. In particular, we draw on the seminal experi-
mental paradigm of Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) that is designed to study third party
punishment in the laboratory. This study was critical in the study of third party en-
forcement because the laboratory allows for control of many factors that may simul-
taneously drive punitive behavior in the field. Most importantly, since punishment is
costly and there are certainly no pecuniary returns for third parties from sanctioning,
we can be confident that any third party intervention is driven by subjective benefits
alone. We augment this paradigm in a novel direction by allowing important parts of
the information structure of the game to be endogenously determined by the players.
Namely, while in Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) third parties were automatically and
freely informed about the target player’s behavior before they had the opportunity to
punish, third parties need to actively acquire this information, eventually at a cost,
in our experiment. Without information acquisition, their decision in the sanctioning
stage remains uninformed about the target player’s action at the cooperation stage of
the game. By choosing to acquire information they are able to condition their sanc-
tioning on complete information regarding the coplayer’s action. To the best of our
knowledge, there exists no previous experimental evidence on endogenous mitigation
of information asymmetries in a third party punishment game.
On the basis of this design, we address three main questions by comparing a
baseline with zero information costs with two treatments with two different levels of
2This experiment has been replicated several times, sometimes with slightly differing designs (e.g.
Charness et al., 2008; Ottone et al., 2008; Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2009; Kusakawa et al., 2012, see
also chapter 4), and even in a number of very diverse non-standard subjects pools (Henrich et al., 2001,
2004, 2005, 2006; Marlowe et al., 2008).
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information costs: First, what is the information acquisition behavior when observing
target players’ actions is costly? Second, how does information acquisition behavior
respond to changes in the price of information? Third, how does the endogeneity of
information impact on the occurrence and incidence of third party sanctions? Having
answered these three questions, we compare third party behavior to second party be-
havior using another experimental condition that is identical except before-mentioned
relation between sanctioner and sanctioned.3
The key results are the following. First, positive information costs have the pre-
dicted impact of decreasing the supply of third party punishment. Second, while
virtually all sanctioning is discriminate at zero information costs, in the presence of
positive information costs a distinct share of subjects switches to «blind» punishment
rather than refraining from sanctioning. The rise of deliberately blind third party
punishment is an interesting new finding of this chapter. Third, conditional on the
decision to remain uninformed, it is risk averse subjects that tend to punish blindly,
and more risk tolerant subjects that tend to refrain from punishment. Fourth, positive
information costs lead to defectors making up a smaller share of the punished and
receiving smaller punishment compared to zero information costs. Fifth, while third
party punishment provides for weaker incentives to cooperate than second party pun-
ishment already when monitoring is costless, positive information costs render this
difference even larger.
We proceed as follows. In section 4.2 we describe the aim, design, and procedures
of the experiment. We proceed to present the main results in section 4.3. In section
4.4 we compare third party to second party behavior. We conclude in section 4.5.
4.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The aim of the design is to generate empirical evidence on social sanctioning be-
havior when information structures are endogenous. In particular, we are interested
in the amount of costly information acquisition, the impact of price variation on in-
formation acquisition, and the relationship between these endogenized information
structures and sanctioning behavior. The previous literature has been careful to iden-
tify and isolate non-strategic sanctioning. In keeping with this focus, we design the
experiment such that strategic and altruistic motives for monitoring coplayers’ actions
are ruled out as far as possible and the observed monitoring and sanctioning should
be driven only by subjective rewards to the individual carrying out these activities.
We draw on the seminal study by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b), who use a two-
stage design consisting of a cooperation stage and a third-party sanctioning stage.
The innovative step in our experiment consists of adding a monitoring decision into
the sanctioning stage, in which third parties decide whether to give up material re-
wards in order to receive full information about the actions of their target player at
3We refer the reader to chapter 3 for a more thorough treatment of second party monitoring and
punishment.
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the cooperation stage. If they choose not to buy the information, they forgo the op-
tion of being able to discriminate between a cooperating and defecting target player
at the sanctioning stage. If they do, sanctioning can be conditioned on observed tar-
get player behavior. We exogenously vary the magnitude of this fee as our treatment
variable to observe how behavior is adjusted.
4.2.1 Experimental game form
Each subject played two two-stage experimental games, a second party monitoring
game (SPMG) and a third party monitoring game (TPMG) with randomly matched
and unknown coplayers in random sequence. Both games had two stages, wheres
the first stage was identical in both games. In the first stage, both players in a given
group of two were endowed with 10 tokens and interacted with one another in a
strategic game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma type with monetary payoffs. Subjects’
first-stage decision was binary: Players could either keep their tokens or transfer all of
them to the other group member, in which case the experimenter tripled them. Thus,
denoting a given player by i and his or her coplayer by j, the first stage decision by ai ∈{0,1} where ai = 1 means cooperation, the first stage payoff equal to 10(1−ai+3a j).
The benefit of a binary choice at the cooperation stage is not only a reduction in
complexity (Ambrus & Greiner, 2012), but also a gain in experimenter control over
the value of information that subjects can obtain through monitoring.
The second stage differed between the SPMG and the TPMG. At the beginning
of the second stage, each player received an additional endowment of 40 tokens in
both games. Subsequently, in the SPMG both players in each group had the op-
portunity to observe the coplayer’s action in the first stage («monitor») and could
choose to punish the other. In the TPMG, the first (second) player in a group had the
opportunity to monitor and punish a player from another (a third) group. The match-
ing protocol was identical to the one used by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) and rules
are any reciprocity between third party monitors. In order to avoid potential biases
due to a variable cost-impact ratio (see Casari, 2005), we chose a linear sanctioning
technology commonly employed in the literature (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Fis-
chbacher, 2004b; Gächter et al., 2008; Ambrus & Greiner, 2012): Denoting by pi j
player i’s expenditure for punishing player j, the latter’s payoff is reduced by 3pi j
tokens. Expenditures were restricted to integers and damage was limited to sixty
tokens, therefore pi j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,20}.
In both games, subjects reported their choices in the monitoring and punishment
stages jointly using a modified version of the strategy method. Specifically, in the
SPMG without a monitoring stage, players would simply announce a contingent pun-
ishment plan,
pi j (a j) ∶ {0,1}→ {0,1, . . . ,20}
indicating the number of deduction points pi j for each of the coplayer’s possible
transfer decisions a j, given their own decision in the first stage. The presence of
a monitoring stage was implemented in the strategy method by allowing subjects a
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choice between two punishment plans. One was the standard contingent punishment
plan pi j (a j) that allowed the subject to condition their punishment on the coplayer’s
action a j. This choice, denoted by mi = 1, required payment of an exogenously set
monitoring fee κm in addition to the applicable punishment costs pi j. The alternative,
denoted mi = 0, was a punishment plan pi j in which the subject could not condition
the punishment on the coplayer’s action a j. This plan did not involve a fee over and
above the cost of punishment.
Likewise, in the TPMG each third party, while being informed about the first
stage transfer decision of the other member in their own group, had the choice be-
tween four punishment plans (since there are four possible transfer combinations in
the other group). Specifically, denoting the first stage actions of the players in the
other group by ak and al , a generic punishment plan of third party i and target player
k is given by
pik (ak,al) ∶ {0,1}2→ {0,1, . . . ,20}
where mi = 1 if pik (0,al) ≠ pik (1,al) for all a j ∈ {0,1}, else mi = 0. Again, choosing
mi = 1 required payment of an exogenously set monitoring fee κm in addition to the
applicable punishment costs. After the punishment stage, both games ended.
In summary, the pecuniary payoff function of each subject i in the SPMG was
wi = 10(1−ai+3a j)+40−miκm− pi j −3p ji
and in the TPMG
wi = 10(1−ai+3a j)+40−miκm− pik −3phi
where phi is the punishment i receives from h, the third party that is eligible to punish
i.
When discussing the monitoring and punishment behavior at the individual level,
the analysis will focus on three main behavioral types. One type are «non-punishing»
subjects with mi = 0 and pi j = 0 or pik = 0 that decide not to monitor and do not punish.
These subjects are referred to as behavioral type N. Among the punishing subjects,
there are two types. «Blind punishers» with mi = 0 and pi j > 0 or pik > 0 devote no
resources to monitoring, but still punish indiscriminately. This type is denoted as
B. The other type T are «targeted punishers» with mi = 1 and pi j > 0 and pik > 0
that devote resources both to monitoring and to punishment. The B-types and T -
types together form the class of «punishers», denoted P. The forth possible type
(monitoring without punishment) is excluded by design.
4.2.2 Additional tasks
We supplemented the two games by incentivized elicitation of first-order beliefs and
risk preferences. Both are potentially relevant in accounting for observed behavior
(Keser & van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010).
Since subjects receive no actual information in the course of play, they respond to
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their beliefs on their coplayer’s behavior, and this response involves a decision un-
der strategic risk. Thus, in addition to the games described above, every subject
performed the following tasks, which were identical in each treatment and for every
subject. Following their decision in the first stage, we asked subjects to state their be-
lief about the transfer decision of the target player and, following their decision in the
second stage, their belief about the punishment they expected to receive. Those state-
ments were incentivized with a opportunity to earn extra tokens in case of accurate
predictions (see appendix).
At the end of each session we employed the Holt-Laury lottery choice method
(Holt & Laury, 2002) to obtain an indication of each subject’s risk preferences (see
appendix). Subjects were only informed about this task after the two experimental
games. The method may not capture the specific kind of risk involved in the situation,
but we think it is worth investigating.
4.2.3 Design
Our primary focus in the design is on the relationship between information costs and
monitoring and punishment behavior. The objective of the treatments is to introduce
an exogenous variation in the cost of information acquisition with the aim of forc-
ing a materially consequential choice by subjects regarding the desired information
status prior to the punishment decision. As a result, information structures become
endogenous and observable.
We employ between-subjects variation in the monitoring fee κm and examine the
changes in the shares of types N, B, and T as κm changes, both in the TPMG in
isolation and in comparison to the SPMG. For understanding the evolution of these
shares of behavioral types, evidence on monitoring and sanctioning activity when
monitoring is costless, i.e. when κm = 0, is an obvious starting point: It provides a
direct replication of the PD experiment by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) and therefore
a meaningful baseline treatment. This treatment is labeled M0. In the alternative
treatments M5 and M10, the monitoring fee is set at κm = 5 and κm = 10. The choice
of three fee levels κm = {0,5,10} was on the basis that we had strong priors for a
non-linear effect. In order to achieve efficient identification, we set the values at
the extremes and the midpoint of the range and allocated approximately half of the
subjects to the midpoint cell, a third to maximum cell, and a sixth to the minimum
cell, respectively (see for example McClelland, 1997; List et al., 2011, for efficient
sample arrangement methods). In order to counterbalance for possible order effects,
one part of the subjects in each treatment cell played the SPMG before the TPMG,
the other part the other way around.4
4It turned out that there were no systematic differences between sequences anyway. Using Mann-
Whitney tests we find no significant differences among sequences in monitoring of second parties
(p = .160) and third parties (p = .775), second party punishment of defectors (p = .132), second party
punishment of cooperators (p = .066), third party punishment of defectors (p = .122 when the target’s
coplayer defected, p = .116 when the target’s coplayer cooperated) and of cooperators when the target’s
coplayer cooperated (p = .187). Behavior was significantly different between sequences with respect to
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On the basis of the design, we are able to test for responses in monitoring and
punishment behavior with respect to changes in those costs by comparing the rela-
tive proportions of the three behavioral types in treatments M0, M5, and M10. In
addition, we can exploit information about the resources spent on punishment and on
behavior at the cooperation stage to understand more about the direction, intensity,
and heterogeneity of social sanctions in the presence of costly monitoring.
4.2.4 Subjects and procedures
All experiments were conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Alfred-Weber-
Institute (AWI-Lab) at Heidelberg University in late 2010. Participants were recruited
from the general undergraduate student population using the online recruitment sys-
tem ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total 134 subjects participated, of which 49.3 percent
were female. A share of 64.2 percent had never participated in a laboratory exper-
iment before. The mean age was 21.8 years. No subject participated in more than
one session and treatment. Based on the sample arrangement described above, 22
subjects were assigned to M0, 66 to M5, and 46 to M10.
At the beginning of each session, upon entering the laboratory subjects were ran-
domly assigned to the computer terminals. Direct communication among them was
not allowed for the duration of the entire session. Booths separated the participants
visually, ensuring that they made their decisions anonymously and independently.
Furthermore, subjects did not receive any information on the personal identity of any
other participant, neither before nor while nor after the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, that is, before any decisions were made, sub-
jects received detailed written instructions that explained the exact structure of the
game and the procedural rules. The experiment was framed in a sterile way using
neutral language and avoiding value laden terms in the instructions (see supplemen-
tary material). Participants had to answer a set of control questions individually at
their respective seats in order to ensure comprehension of the rules. We did not start
the experiment before all subjects had answered all questions correctly.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The exact timing of events was as follows. First, the subjects were randomly matched
into groups of two. Then each subject made her or his decisions and reported expec-
tations in the SPMG or TPMG, depending on the sequence. After being informed
about the payoffs, the experimenter announced that second experiment will be con-
ducted and distributed additional instructions that explained the differences to the
first game. After being randomly re-matched into new groups, each subject made her
or his decisions and reported expectations in the TPMG or SPMG, depending on the
sequence. After being informed about the payoffs, the experimenter announced that
another (and definitely final) experiment will now be conducted and distributed addi-
tional instructions that explained the supplementary lottery choice experiment. Thus,
third party punishment of cooperators when the target’s coplayer defected (p = .006). Fisher exact tests
yield similar results which are available on request.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of behavioral types at different monitoring cost levels.
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subjects did not know until this announcement that the experiment involved another
task in order to rule out confounding effects of the lottery-choice task on the main ex-
perimental games. We cannot rule out reverse confounds which is, however, of minor
significance. After being informed about the payoffs, subjects were asked to answer
a short questionnaire while the experimenter prepared the payoffs. Subjects were
then individually called to the experimenter booth, payed out (according to a random
number matched to their decisions; no personal identities were used throughout the
whole experiment) and dismissed.
In every session subjects received a fixed show-up fee of e2, which was not part
of their endowment. The whole experiment lasted approximately 90 minutes and
subjects earned an average of e18.46 (e0.10 per token earned), including the fixed
show-up fee. Earnings exceed the local average hourly wage of a typical student job
and can hence be considered meaningful to the participants.
4.3 Third Party Behavior
We organize our discussion of the experimental results in the following way. We be-
gin by discussing our results from the baseline treatment in the third party monitoring
condition that replicate previous experimental evidence on third party sanctioning be-
havior. We then describe the first core result of the experiment, namely the relative
prevalence of the three possible behavioral types N, B, and T for each of the moni-
toring cost treatments M0, M5, and M10.
Figure 4.1 shows the relative frequencies of behavioral types N, B, and T for mon-
itoring costs at three levels κm = {0,5,10}. Normalization is required on account of
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the between-subjects design with a variable number of subjects in each treatment. A
readily apparent first diagnosis of the evidence is therefore that variations in the cost
of information are associated with different patterns of monitoring and punishment
behavior. The key result of this section can already be highlighted: when information
is imperfect and information costs are positive, a substantial share of third parties
responds with information acquisition prior to punishment, that is, a significant share
of subjects does not take exogenously imposed information constraints as given in a
social sanctioning situation as long as the costs of overcoming these constraints are
not prohibitive. The detailed nature of these differences is the subject of the following
sections.
4.3.1 Third party punishment with costless monitoring: Replication of previ-
ous findings
The baseline treatment with κm = 0 replicates earlier experiments on third party pun-
ishment, specifically the experiment run by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b). They find
that when there are no hindrances to monitoring, the general propensity among third
parties to punish target players is marked. Even after eliminating all strategic motives
for punishment, through the matching scheme described in the previous section, the
share of third parties that apply costly sanctions is somewhat above one half. Specif-
ically, Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) find that 59 percent of third parties applied costly
sanctions on cheaters (unilateral defectors). Our results, displayed in the left-hand
column in figure 1, are consistent with theirs.
Result 4.1. When information costs are zero, most third parties make use of the non-
strategic punishment option.
In particular, we find a large majority of 73 percent (16 out of 22) willing to
impose costly sanctions on the target players. The class of punishers P therefore
dominates when there are no monitoring costs.
Previous experiments have also generated clear evidence that when information
about coplayer behavior at the cooperation stage is perfect, then punishment is, on
average, targeted. Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) find that behavior at the cooperation
stage is a highly significant predictor of receiving punishment from third parties. Our
experiment replicates these findings closely.
Result 4.2. When information costs are zero, third party punishment is targeted.
When monitoring was costless, 15 out of 16 third parties that imposed a punish-
ment acquired the information whether the target player cooperated or defected. In
other words, almost all sanctions were conditioned on the target player’s first stage
behavior. In terms of our behavioral types, there are 68 percent T -types, 27 percent
N-types, and 5 percent B-types.
Third parties also make a difference on whether defection of the target player is
mutual or unilateral, that is, they also monitored the target player’s coplayer. Among
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the 15 T -types, 13 (or 87 percent) also conditioned punishment on the first stage
behavior of the target player’s coplayer.
The third aspect of our replication concerns the direction of punishment. In pre-
vious experiments, the direction and intensity is clear in that cooperators dominate
as punishers and cheaters are their specific targets. Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) do
not report the composition of the group of punishers, but the following numbers are
indicative: 68 percent (36 percent) of cooperating third parties imposed sanctions on
unilateral (mutual) defectors as opposed to 40 percent (27 percent) of defecting third
parties imposing sanctions on other unilateral (mutual) defectors. The two groups of
punishers diverge even more in terms of the volume of sanctions. There, cooperat-
ing third parties punishing unilateral (mutual) defectors spent on average 3.7 tokens
(1.7 tokens) on sanctions while defecting third parties punishing unilateral (mutual)
defectors spent 1.9 tokens (0.9 tokens). While cooperating third parties sanctioning
defectors, in particular unilateral ones, being the dominant direction of punishment,
Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) also uncovered that 15 percent of cooperators were tar-
geted at the punishment stage (independently from the behavior of the target player’s
coplayer). Again, those patterns reappear in the baseline condition of our experiment.
Result 4.3. When information costs are zero, the dominant direction and intensity
of punishment is cooperating third parties imposing stiff sanctions on cheaters, but
there is individual heterogeneity.
36 punishment actions were carried out in the baseline treatment of whom 28 (78
percent) were taken by cooperating third parties and 8 (22 percent) by defecting third
parties.5 Among the class of third party punishers, therefore, cooperators clearly
supplied most of the punishment action. Taking intensity into account, cooperating
third parties accounted for 70 percent (166 of 237 tokens) of total investment into
punishment while defecting third parties accounted for 30 percent.
Whom were the punishments imposed on? No third party targeted exclusively
cooperators. In 26 out of 36 punishment decisions (72 percent) the target of a pun-
ishment action was a defector, 16 actions against unilateral defectors and 10 actions
against mutual defectors. Cooperators were the target of 28 percent of punishment
actions. Again, taking intensity into account, defectors received 77 percent (182 out
of 237) of all the punishment imposed, 60 percent (142 out of 237) unilateral defec-
tors and 17 percent (40 out of 237) mutual defectors, while cooperators received 23
percent (55 out of 237). Summarizing, punishment originates predominantly with
cooperating third parties and arrives predominantly at cheaters.
A corollary of result 4.3 is that when monitoring was costless, cheating was
clearly unprofitable: Unilateral (mutual) defectors received on average 6.0 ⋅3 = 18.0
tokens (2.3 ⋅ 3 = 6.9 tokens) of punishment, while cooperators received on average
1.6 ⋅ 3 = 4.8 tokens, such that the difference was sufficient for the average net pun-
ishment of cheating (18.0− 4.8 = 13.2 tokens) to exceed the gain (10 tokens) by a
5Recall that the strategy method allows each subject to punish up to four times, once for each
possible first stage action profile in the target player’s group.
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sufficient margin.
4.3.2 Third party monitoring and punishment with positive information costs
Results 4.1 through 4.3 underline the benchmark quality of the baseline treatment by
providing additional evidence to support similar findings in the literature. We con-
firm the presence of non-strategic third party punishment, the dominance of targeted
punishment, the direction and intensity of punishment, and the degree of behavioral
heterogeneity. Against this benchmark, we now report in the following three results
on the behavioral implication of endogenizing third party’s information status at the
time of the punishment decision through a costly choice.
When monitoring is costly, the relative shares of behavioral types diverge from
the baseline: A higher overall cost of sanctioning is associated with a higher share
of subjects that neither monitor nor punish, which is in line with previous evidence
on second party punishment showing that increasing cost of punishment reduce the
supply of sanctions (Suleiman, 1996; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Anderson & Putterman,
2006; Carpenter, 2007a; Egas & Riedl, 2008).
Result 4.4. In the presence of positive information costs, the propensity to punish
decreases relative to the baseline.
Figure 4.1 illustrates this first finding: The share of subjects that neither monitor
nor punish (type N) increases from 27 percent at κm = 0 to 62 percent when κm = 5
and 57 percent when κm = 10. The hypothesis that the frequency of N-types and
monitoring costs are independent can be clearly rejected (Kruskal-Wallis test, p =
.017), whereas pairwise, only the change associated with increasing the fee from zero
to five is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p = .005), the change associated
with increasing the fee from five to ten is not (p = .554). The ratio of the frequency
of punishers to the frequency of N-types decreases from 2.67 at κm = 0 to 0.61 at
κm = 5 and to 0.77 at κm = 10. Thus, part of the effect of positive monitoring costs
in the supply of punishment is comparable to the effect of an increase in the cost of
punishment.
In addition to the result on the propensity to punish at all, our design explicitly
allows to study punitive behavior of those third parties that opt to remain ignorant
about the target player’s first stage behavior.
Result 4.5. In the presence of positive information costs, the propensity to punish
indiscriminately increases relative to the baseline.
Figure 4.1 again reports the share of blind punishers (type B) that do not acquire
information and yet impose sanctions. This share increases from 5 percent (one out
of 22) in the baseline to 21 (14 out of 66) and 26 percent (12 out of 46) as the mon-
itoring costs increase to 5 and 10 tokens, respectively. Here, the change associated
with increasing the fee from zero to five is statistically marginally significant (Mann-
Whitney test, p = .073), the change associated with increasing the fee from zero to
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ten is statistically significant (p = .036), while the change associated with increasing
the fee from five to ten is not significant (p = .550). However, both frequencies under
positive monitoring costs are statistically significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests, p < .001, respectively). The ratio of the frequency of indiscrimi-
nate punishers to the frequency of all punishers (the frequency of targeted punishers)
increases successively from 0.06 (0.07) at κm = 0 to 0.56 (1.27) at κm = 5 and to 0.6
(1.5) at κm = 10.
Finally, the share of targeted punishers (type T ) decreases from 68 percent for
costless monitoring to 17 percent when κm = 5 and κm = 10, respectively. Again, the
hypothesis that the frequency of T -types and monitoring costs are independent can
be clearly rejected (Kruskal-Wallis test, p < .001). Pairwise the changes associated
with increasing the fee from zero to five and zero to ten, respectively, are statistically
significant (Mann-Whitney test, p= .000 and p= .036, respectively), while the change
associated with increasing the fee from five to ten is clearly not (p = .920).
Result 4.6. In the presence of positive information costs, cooperating third parties
remain the dominant origin of the direction of punishment relative to the baseline,
but unilateral defectors dominate less as its target.
35 percent (15 out of 43) and 44 percent (14 out of 32) of cooperating third
parties imposed sanctions on defectors in M5 and M10, respectively, with respec-
tive average expenditures for punishing unilateral (mutual) defectors of 2.9 tokens
(1.3 tokens) and 3.2 tokens (2.0 tokens). Eight (19 percent) and ten (31 percent) of
the cooperators in M5 and M10, respectively, also imposed punishments on other
cooperators, with respective average expenditures for punishing unilateral (mutual)
cooperators of 0.7 tokens (1.2 tokens) and 0.6 tokens (1.6 tokens). 13 out of 23 (57
percent) and 8 out of 14 (57 percent) of the defecting third parties did not punish in
M5 and M10, respectively. Of the remaining ten defectors in M5, seven punished
indiscriminately (B-type) with an average expenditure of 4.6 tokens in case the tar-
get player’s coplayer defected, and 4.3 tokens in case the target player’s coplayer
cooperated. Three targeted (T -type) with an average expenditure of 6.7 tokens on
unilateral defectors, 5 tokens on mutual defectors, and 1.7 tokens on cooperators,
plus the five tokens monitoring fee. Likewise, of the remaining six defectors in M10,
four punished indiscriminately (B-type) with an average expenditure of 4.3 tokens in
case the target player’s coplayer cooperated, and 1.8 tokens in case the target player’s
coplayer defected. Two targeted (T -type) with an average expenditure of 6 tokens on
unilateral defectors, 2.5 tokens on mutual defectors, and between 0.5 and 1 tokens on
cooperators, plus the ten tokens monitoring fee.
Despite the rise in monitoring costs, unilateral defectors rather than cooperators
remain the prevailing target of sanctions on average, although less pronounced. In
M5, unilateral defection is still punished significantly more often than mutual de-
fection (36 vs. 26 percent, p = .020, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) or cooperation (24
percent, p = .011). The same is true for M10, where unilateral defection is punished
41 percent of the time, and mutual defection (30 percent) or cooperation (33 percent)
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less often, although the differences are not statistically significant in this condition
(p = .059 and p = .103, respectively). Also, unilateral defectors continue to receive
stronger punishment on average than mutual defectors or cooperators in both M5
(2.6 vs. 1.6 vs. 1.4 tokens, p = .038 for the first and p = .018 for the second differ-
ence), and M10 (2.8 vs. 1.7 vs. 1.5 tokens, p < .001 for the first and p = .055 for the
second difference). However, in both conditions unilateral defection was no longer
unprofitable. We return to this below.
To sum up, a setting with a perfect, but costly monitoring option leads to three
important differences compared with zero monitoring costs: (1) The supply of third
party sanctions decreases if punishment costs increase. (2) A small, but signifi-
cant share of third parties sacrifices resources to actively monitor the target player
and thus target their punishment. (3) A small, but significant share of third parties
chooses to punish without information on whether the coplayer cooperated. The first-
order impact of exogenous information imperfections that can be overcome at a cost
is therefore to reduce the supply of third party sanctions. These imperfection also
bring to light important heterogeneities across third parties with respect to the type
of sanctioning they will supply, targeted or blind. Targeted sanctioning is conducive
to maintaining cooperation because it rewards cooperative behavior in relative terms.
The deliberately blind sanctioning observed in the experiment on the other hand is
unproductive for maintaining cooperation.
System binary response regressions, reported in tables 4.6 in the appendix, sug-
gest that third parties’ beliefs about the target player’s behavior and their risk pref-
erences play a role in accounting for observed assortment into behavioral types.6 In
particular, while the probability of being a T -type is clearly negatively related to the
monitoring fee, a subject’s degree of risk aversion is significantly positively related
to the probability of being a B-type, and significantly negatively related to the prob-
ability of being a N-type. That is, relatively risk averse subjects tend to be B-types,
and relatively risk tolerant subjects tend to be N-types. This suggests that third par-
ties tend to weight the risk of type-II enforcement errors, that is, letting a cheater go
unpunished, stronger than type-I errors (punishing cooperators). In addition, B-types
tend to be more pessimistic about the target player’s cooperation, but this relationship
is only marginally significant.
Result 4.7. Conditional on the decision to remain uninformed, it is relatively risk
averse subjects that tend to punish blindly, and relatively risk tolerant subjects that
tend to refrain from punishment.
6We use SUR since it is reasonable to assume that the error terms in the equations are correlated.
As a robustness check, we also carried out a system probit regression estimated by maximum simulated
likelihood (using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulator), and a system logit SUR that delivered
equivalent results.
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4.3.3 The emerging incentive structure
As shown above, in the baseline treatment of costless monitoring third party sanctions
were sufficiently strong and targeted on unilateral defection to render it unprofitable.
Hence, incentives were such that cooperative behavior is favored. For positive moni-
toring costs, however, this was no longer the case.
Result 4.8. If monitoring is costless, unilateral defection is unprofitable relative to
cooperation. At positive monitoring costs, unilateral defection does pay.
Table 4.1: Frequency of third party punishment by treatment condition.
Cooperation Defection
κm Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual
0 .227 .227 .727 .455
5 .200 .227 .364 .258
10 .174 .326 .413 .304
Table 4.2: Mean damages (punishment points times three) through third party punishment
by treatment condition.
Cooperation Defection
κm Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual
0 3.4 4.1 18.0 6.8
5 3.0 4.0 7.9 4.8
10 1.7 4.6 8.5 5.0
The impact of endogenizing the information structure by varying the monitoring
costs is summarized in tables 4.1 and 4.2. We first observe that there is no significant
variation in punishment of cooperation (Kruskal-Wallis tests, p = .796 for unilateral
and p = .600 for mutual cooperation) and mutual defection (p = .291). Punishment of
unilateral defection, however, is significantly different between treatments (p = .005),
its strength being markedly lower when monitoring is costly compared to the baseline
condition. Hence, on average defecting gets less costly as monitoring costs rise. As
a result, unilateral defection did pay when monitoring costs were positive.
Do subjects anticipate the effects of monitoring costs on third party punishment
and the incentives to cooperate, as predicted previously? There is little guidance to
be derived from the literature on third party punishment in a PD since we are not
aware of papers who elicited expectations. In the baseline condition of the present
experiment, subjects’ beliefs support the «punishment anticipation hypothesis». On
average, subjects expected to receive punishment of 17.9 tokens in case of unilateral
defection, 8.7 in case of mutual defection, and at most 4.2 in case of cooperation.
This is a remarkably accurate prediction of the actual punishments of 18.0 tokens
in case of unilateral defection, 6.8 in case of mutual defection, and at most 4.1 in
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case of cooperation. The rank correlation between expectations and realizations is
significantly positive (Kendall’s τb = .440 in case of unilateral defection, τb = .552 in
case of mutual defection, τb = .426 in case of unilateral cooperation, τb = .453 in case
of mutual cooperation, all p = .000). In the presence of positive monitoring costs, on
the other hand, the punishment anticipation hypothesis fails.
Result 4.9. While subjects correctly predict the direction and intensity when monitor-
ing costs are zero, the intensity of third party punishment of defection is overestimated
for positive monitoring costs.
Table 4.3: Mean damages (punishment points times three) through third party punishment
expected by the target players.
Cooperation Defection
κm Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual
0 2.6 4.2 17.9 8.7
5 4.4 2.9 11.2 7.5
10 3.1 2.7 11.4 6.0
The evidence underpinning this result is shown in table 4.3. Qualitatively, sub-
jects anticipate the actual impacts patterns as shown in table 4.2. Quantitatively,
however, they significantly underestimate the effects of increasing monitoring costs
on their coplayers’ monitoring and punishment behavior.
4.4 Third Party and Second Party Behavior Compared
In this section, we compare the subjects’ behavior in the role of a third party with that
in the role of a second party. Figure 4.2 depicts the same data as in figure 4.1 but in
direct comparison to the relative frequencies of behavioral types N, B, and T in the
SPMG.7
4.4.1 Aggregate Comparison
Result 4.10. When information costs are zero, the frequency of second party punish-
ment is equal to the frequency of third party punishment.
In particular, 73 percent (16 out of 22) of the second parties were willing to
impose costly sanctions, exactly the same relative frequency as for third parties. The
16 subjects are not identical in the two conditions, respectively. Two subjects who
did not impose sanctions as a third party did so as a second party. Likewise, two
subjects who did not impose sanctions as a second party did so as a third party.
7The results of the SPMG have been dealt with in detail in chapter3. Here we just compare the
results to the TPMG results.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of behavioral types at different monitoring cost levels for third and
second parties.
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Result 4.11. When information costs are zero, the share of targeted punishment is
about equal in third and second parties.
When monitoring was costless, all second parties (16 out of 16) that imposed
a punishment acquired the information whether the target player cooperated or de-
fected. In other words, all sanctions were conditioned on the target player’s first
stage behavior. In terms of our behavioral types, there are only T -types and N-types,
but no B-types among the second parties. This distribution is approximately equal to
the one in the third party monitoring condition.
Result 4.12. When information costs are zero, the dominant direction and intensity
of both third and second party punishment is cooperators imposing stiff sanctions on
cheaters, but third party punishment is less targeted on defectors and weaker than
second party punishment.
19 punishment actions were carried out in the baseline treatment by second par-
ties of whom 15 (79 percent) were taken by cooperators and 4 (21 percent) by defec-
tors. Recall that among the third parties, 78 percent of punishment actions were taken
by cooperators and 22 percent by defectors. Taking again intensity into account, co-
operating second parties (third parties) accounted for 84 percent (70 percent) of total
investment into punishment while defecting second parties (third parties) accounted
for 16 percent (30 percent). Thus, the distributions do not differ much: Among the
class of both second party and third party punishers, cooperators clearly supplied
most of the punishment action.
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Whom were the second party punishments imposed on? In 84 percent (72 per-
cent) second parties’ (third parties’) punishment decisions the target of a punishment
action was a defector. Cooperators were the target of 14 percent (28 percent) of
second party (third party) punishment actions. Again, taking intensity into account,
defectors received 93 percent (77 percent) of all the second party (third party) pun-
ishment imposed while cooperators received 7 percent (23 percent). Summarizing,
both second and third party punishment originates predominantly with cooperators
and arrives at defectors, but third parties are somewhat less targeting, imposing more
punishment on cooperators.
Against the above benchmark comparisons, we now report on differential behav-
ioral implication of endogenizing second and third parties’ information status at the
time of the punishment decision through a costly choice, respectively.
Result 4.13. The propensity to punish decreases (relative to the baseline) slightly
more strongly with information costs in second than in third parties.
Figure 4.2 illustrates this first finding: The share of second parties (third parties)
that neither monitor nor punish (type N) increases from 27 percent (27 percent) at
κm = 0 to 67 percent (62 percent) when κm = 5 and 74 percent (57 percent) when
κm = 10. Thus, the share of N-types is slightly less increasing in third than in second
parties. The ratio of the frequency of second (third) party punishers to the frequency
of N-types decreases from 2.67 (2.67) at κm = 0 to 0.5 (0.61) at κm = 5 and to 0.35
(0.77) at κm = 10.
Result 4.14. The propensity to punish indiscriminately increases (relative to the
baseline) more strongly in third than in second parties.
Figure 4.2 again reports, in second and third parties, the share of blind punishers
(type B) that do not acquire information and yet impose sanctions. In second (third)
parties this share increases from zero (5 percent) in the baseline to 12 (21 percent)
and 13 percent (26 percent) as the monitoring costs increase to 5 and 10 tokens,
respectively. Analogously, the share of targeted second party (third party) punishers
(type T ) decreases from 73 percent (68 percent) for costless monitoring to 21 percent
(17 percent) when κm = 5 and 13 percent (17 percent) when κm = 10, respectively.
The ratio of the frequency of indiscriminate second party (third party) punishers to
the frequency of all second party (third party) punishers increases successively from
zero (0.06) at κm = 0 to 0.36 (0.56) at κm = 5 and to 0.5 (0.6) at κm = 10. The ratio of
the frequency of indiscriminate second party (third party) punishers to the frequency
of targeted second party (third party) increases successively from zero (0.07) at κm = 0
to 0.57 (1.27) at κm = 5 and to 1 (1.5) at κm = 10. Thus, third parties have clearly a
stronger tendency to punish indiscriminately if monitoring is costly.
Result 4.15. The incentives to cooperate are weaker in the third party than in the sec-
ond party punishment condition at zero information costs. The presence of positive
information costs increases this difference.
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31 percent (35 percent) and 29 percent (44 percent) of cooperating second par-
ties (third parties) imposed sanctions on (unilateral) defectors in M5 and M10, re-
spectively, with respective average expenditures of 11.6 tokens (2.9 tokens) and 8.2
tokens (3.2 tokens). 10 percent (19 percent) and 11 percent (31 percent) of the co-
operating second parties (third parties) in M5 and M10, respectively, also imposed
punishments on other cooperators, with respective average expenditures of 6.8 to-
kens (between 0.7 and 1.2 tokens) and 3 tokens (between 0.6 and 1.6 tokens). 61
percent (57 percent) and 82 percent (57 percent) of the defecting second (third) par-
ties did not punish in M5 and M10, respectively. Of the remaining defecting second
(third) parties in M5, 57 percent (70 percent) punished indiscriminately (B-type) with
an average expenditure of 5.8 tokens (between 4.3 and 4.6 tokens), and 43 percent
(30 percent) targeted (T -type) with an average expenditure of 6 tokens (between 5
and 6.7 tokens) on defectors and 5 tokens (1.7 tokens) on cooperators, plus the five
tokens monitoring fee. Likewise, of the remaining defecting second (third) parties in
M10, all (67 percent) punished indiscriminately (B-type) with an average expenditure
of 5.8 tokens (between 1.8 and 4.3 tokens), and none (33 percent) targeted (T -type).
Despite the rise in monitoring costs, cheaters rather than cooperators remain the
prevailing target of both second and third party sanctions on average, although less
pronounced. Defection is still punished clearly more often by second parties than
cooperation in both M5 (32 vs. 17 percent), and M10 (26 vs. 13 percent). The same
has been shown above for third parties. Also, defectors continue to receive stronger
punishment on average than cooperators by second parties in both M5 (9.8 vs. 3.3
tokens), and M10 (5.6 vs. 1.1 tokens). Again, the same has been shown above for
third parties. The difference between average punishment of cheaters and average
punishment of cooperators, however, decreases less strongly in second parties (from
20.1 tokens in M0 over 6.5 tokens in M5, a 68 percent decrease, to 4.5 tokens in
M10, a further 31 percent decrease, for a total decrease of 78 percent) than in third
parties (from 14.3 tokens in M0 over 1.2 tokens in M5, a 92 percent decrease, to 1.3
tokens in M10, for a total decrease of 91 percent). This reinforces the conclusion
that while both second and third party punishment tends to become less targeted on
cheaters through the introduction of monitoring costs, the effect is stronger in third
parties. In other words, while third party punishment is provides weaker incentives
to cooperate already at costless monitoring, introducing monitoring costs makes the
difference even larger.
Result 4.16. In both the second party and the third party monitoring games, cheating
is only unprofitable if monitoring is costless.
To sum up, while second parties respond to the introduction of monitoring costs
more often than third parties with refraining from sanctioning altogether, third parties
opt more often than second parties to indiscriminate punishment. Thus, third parties
appear to be more willing to go for the risk of hitting a cooperator than second parties.
In consequence, while both second and third party punishment gets less targeted, and
third party punishment provides weaker incentives to cooperate than second party
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punishment already when information costs are zero, introducing monitoring costs
has a more deteriorating effect on the incentive structure emerging from third party
punishment than from second party punishment.
4.4.2 Some fine-structure underlying the aggregate results
Consider punishment in the baseline treatment first. Previous and our own evidence
shows that second party punishment of cheaters is stiffer than third party punishment
on average. To what extent does this hold individually? Of the 18 subjects that im-
posed punishments on cheaters, eight (44 percent) punished strictly stiffer in the role
of a second party than in the role of a third party, with an average expenditure dif-
ference of 6.6 tokens, and six (33 percent) made no difference. Thus, a majority of
14 subjects (78 percent) indeed punished at least as strong as a second party than as
a third party. The remaining four subjects (22 percent), however, punished strictly
stiffer in the role of a third party than in the role of a second party, with an average
expenditure difference of 4.5 tokens. Although this individual level comparison re-
veals some additional heterogeneity, the conclusion that most people are willing to
spend more on punishment when it is themselves who is cheated compared to when
it is someone else is reinforced.
Nevertheless, what we are more interested in is the behavioral type, as defined
above, subjects exhibited. In the baseline treatment M0, 17 out in 22 (77 percent)
revealed the same behavioral type as both a second and a third party. The majority
of those (13 subjects, or 76 percent) are universal T -types, that is, T -type as both a
second party and as a third party. The rest (4 subjects, or 24 percent) are universal N-
types, there exist no universal B-types when monitoring is costless. Of the remaining
five subjects that revealed a different behavioral type as a second and a third party,
respectively, two where type T as a second party and type N as a third party, two the
reverse, and one subject was type T as a second party and type B as a third party.
Things were somewhat different when monitoring was costly. There, 80 out in
112 (71 percent) revealed the same behavioral type as both a second and a third party
(49 out in 66 in M5, 31 out in 46 in M10). This is approximately equal to the baseline,
but the composition of types differed: The clear majority are now the universal N-
types (62 subjects, or 78 percent, 37 in M5 and 25 in M10). In addition, there is
now a marked minority of universal B-types (8 subjects, or 10 percent, 5 in M5 and
3 in M10). The rest (10 subjects, or 12 percent, 7 in M5 and 3 in M10) are universal
T -types, which were in the clear majority under costless monitoring.
Furthermore, the transition paths of those 32 subjects that revealed a different be-
havioral type as a second and a third party, respectively, are richer than in the baseline
treatment. The complete transition matrix is shown in table 4.4 (a transition matrix
including the baseline treatment can be found in 4.7 in the appendix). Apparently,
transitions in all directions occur, but one trend can be highlighted: while only six
subjects switch to B-type (from either N-type or T -type in the TPMG) in the SPMG,
18 subjects do so (from either N-type or T -type in the SPMG) in the TPMG. This is
the fine-structure underlying the finding reported above that third party punishment
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Table 4.4: Transition matrix of behavioral types across the SPMG and the TPMG for the
costly monitoring treatments.
TPMG Type
SPMG Type N T B Margin
N (62) .554 (6) .054 (10) .089 (78) .696
T (2) .018 (10) .089 (8) .071 (20) .179
B (3) .027 (3) .027 (8) .071 (14) .125
Margin (67) .598 (19) .170 (26) .232 (112) 1.000
Relative frequencies. Absolute frequencies in parantheses.
becomes relatively less targeted than second party punishment when monitoring gets
costly.
Of course, it is those subjects that change their behavioral type across the SPMG
and the TPMG that drive the aggregate differences highlighted above. Thus, in order
to understand those differences better, we take a closer look on them.
Pooling over all treatments, 37 out of 134 subjects change their behavioral type
between the role of a second and a third party, respectively. There are two possible,
not mutually exclusive explanations why subjects might behave differentially in the
two roles. First, the kind of social or moral preferences applying to the situation
are different. Second, the subjects’ prior about the target player’s behavior differs
between the second and the third party monitoring condition.8
We have data to address the second hypothesis directly. Overall, the subjects’
beliefs about the target player’s behavior did not differ significantly between the sec-
ond and the third party condition (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = .340): the average
second party expected the target player to cooperate with probability .667, the av-
erage third party with probability .643.9 For investigating the differential effects of
monitoring costs on second and third party information acquisition and punishment,
however, the relevant population is not the whole sample but only those 37 sub-
jects that changed their behavioral type. But those subjects’ beliefs about the target
player’s behavior did not differ significantly between the second and the third party
condition either (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = .766): the average second party ex-
pected the target player to cooperate with probability .703, the average third party
with probability .676.10
Thus, beliefs appear to be of minor significance in accounting for the differential
effects of monitoring costs on second and third party information acquisition and
punishment. This suggests that the key driver are differences in the kind of social or
8One might add that the shape of the risk preferences differs between conditions, but this appears
not very plausible.
9Separated by treatment, only when monitoring is costless there is a significant difference (p= .046),
the average second party expecting the target player to cooperate with probability .618, the average third
party with probability .718.
10Separated by treatment, there are also no significant differences.
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moral preferences applying in second and third parties, respectively.
4.5 Conclusion
We extend previous experimental research on social norms by combining two prac-
tically important aspects of their enforcement: third party sanctioning and the ac-
tive mitigation of informational asymmetries. To our knowledge, this chapter is the
first to consider endogenous, rather than exogenously given, information structures
by allowing for information acquisition on target players’ behavior in the context
of a cooperation game with third party punishment. This design enables both a close
replication of previous evidence on the presence of third party sanctioning and the ob-
servation of new types of heterogeneities among subjects. We show that a majority of
third parties responds to positive monitoring costs in a manner that is broadly equiva-
lent to a rise in punishment costs and obeys the law of demand. At the same time, we
observe, on the one hand, active information acquisition for targeting sanctions that
do not provide material returns either to the punisher or anybody else. On the other,
the design also allows third parties to punish «blindly» if they so wish, and we find
a significant share of subjects that chooses this course of action. Given the practical
relevance of an endogenous information structure in many cooperation problems, we
believe that there are three important implications. First, informational imperfections
combined with perfect, but costly monitoring have a first-order negative effect on the
supply of sanctions. Secondly, there is a second-order negative impact because some
players choose to punish without monitoring. The productive type of sanctioning,
namely that targeted at defectors, is provided, but only by a small share of subjects.
The enforcement of cooperative social norms therefore likely hinges on the possibil-
ity to decrease monitoring costs and therefore the cost of targeting sanctions.
Appendix
Elicitation of beliefs
After subjects made their decisions in the first and second stage, respectively, we
asked them to state their beliefs about the transfer decision of the coplayer as well
as the damages they expect from their coplayer. Those statements were incentivized
with a opportunity to earn extra tokens in case of good predictions. To elicit the
subjects’ beliefs at the transfer stage, we used an affine transformation of the one-
dimensional Brier score (Brier, 1950). Let aˆij ∈ [0,1] subject i’s probability prediction
that the target player j cooperated, then the Brier score is given by
sBrier = (aˆij −a j)2 ∈ [0,1]
We implemented the specific transformation
s = 8−8sBrier = 8−8(aˆij −a j)2 ∈ [0,8]
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such that a perfect prediction was rewarded by eight tokens and the opposite by zero
tokens. This scoring rule belongs to the class of quadratic score functions which are
known to be proper (see for example Selten, 1998 and Gneiting & Raftery, 2007).
Physically, we implemented the belief elicitation at the first stage by a screen with a
slider with which subjects could specify their probabilistic belief that the target player
transferred her or his endowment in ten-percent steps.
At the sanctioning stage we asked the subjects for point predictions of the dam-
ages assigned to them by their coplayers and incentivized statements with a distance
score similar to those used, for example, by Gächter & Renner (2010) or Fischbacher
& Gächter (2010). Here, each perfect prediction was rewarded by four tokens, a
deviation of one point by two tokens, a deviation by two points by one token, and
deviations of three or more points received no reward. This elicitation was physically
implemented by a screen with input boxes shown at the end of the second stage.
Elicitation of risk preferences
At the end of each session we used the Holt-Laury lottery choice method (Holt &
Laury, 2002) to obtain an indication of each subject’s risk attitude. As described be-
low in more detail, subjects were not told of this second task before the experimental
game. Subjects faced a set of choices between two lotteries for each of ten decisions.
The payoffs were identical for each lottery A (20 tokens or 16 tokens) and each lottery
B (38.5 tokens and 1 token).11 Probabilities for high and low payoffs are the same
for both alternatives for each decision. Thus lottery B always has higher variance. As
the subject moves down the ten decisions, the probability gradually shifts from the
lower to the higher payoff. The expected return is higher for lottery A for the first
four decisions, and for lottery B after that. We were interested in the point where
subjects switch from the more risky option (lottery B) to the less risky option (lottery
A) and how often they switch if applicable. A risk neutral agent is expected to switch
in line three or four; the further down the switching point the higher the agent’s de-
gree of risk aversion. Physically, subjects made their choices on a screen with two
check boxes for option A and B, respectively, for any of the ten decisions that were
arranged row-wise on the screen. The lotteries had been resolved by throwing a ten-
sided die, simulated by a random number generator program. One of the ten choices
was actually paid out. Which one was determined by a second virtual ten-sided die.12
Table 4.5 contains summary data for the choices in the Holt-Laury task. The data
is coded by the number of risky choices (option B).13 Zero (ten) risky choices indicate
extreme risk aversion (preference), six risky choices indicate risk neutrality. The
subjects in our sample are somewhat risk averse, with an average of 4.1 risky choices.
Consistent with most findings in the risk literature (see Eckel & Grossman, 2008),
11These payoffs correspond to the payoffs in the low-stakes condition in Holt & Laury (2002).
12Laury (2005) provides evidence that supports the validity of using this random-choice payment
method.
13Note that Holt & Laury (2002) report their data by the number of safe choices. We made the
appropriate adjustments in comparing our data with theirs.
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics of the Holt-Laury instrument
Share by gender Total share
Risky choices Male Female All Consistent Holt & Laury
0−1 .029 .106 .067 .076 .01
2 .074 .121 .097 .101 .03
3 .250 .197 .224 .235 .13
4 .250 .273 .261 .269 .23
5 .132 .167 .149 .135 .26
6 .132 .076 .105 .109 .26
7 .088 .046 .067 .059 .06
8 .015 .000 .008 .000 .01
9−10 .029 .015 .022 .017 .01
Mean 4.41 3.77 4.10 3.92 4.8
In the fifth column subjects whose choices were inconsistent with the typical one-crossover pattern
(option A at the top, switching to B at some point) are removed.
women are more risk averse than men, and this difference is marginally statistically
significant in our sample (Mann-Whitney test, p = .078). The distribution of risk
preference is similar to Holt & Laury (2002), however, the distribution in our sample
is stronger skewed to the right indicating our subjects to be somewhat more risk
averse. About 12 percent of the subjects had more than one crossover between the
two options. The sub-sample of those inconsistent subjects is significantly different
from the consistent subjects (Mann-Whitney test, p = .009), the former choosing on
average more risky options (5.44) than the latter (3.92). In subsequent analysis, we
include all subjects’ choices.
Finally, since we conducted the lottery choice task at the end of each session, it
may be possible that the prior tasks had some impact on the subjects’ choices. In
particular, choices in the lottery choice task may be different for subject’s whose
coplayer defected than for those whose coplayer cooperated in the first part of the
session. However, a Mann-Whitney test indicates that this is not the case: in terms of
risky choices in the lottery choice task the sub-sample whose coplayer defected is not
significantly different from the sub-sample whose coplayer cooperated (p = .721).
Supplementary material
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Table 4.6: Results of a system probit model estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR)
Dependent variable
Being a N-type Being a T -type Being a B-type
Monitoring fee 0.072 -0.138 0.062
(0.043) (0.062) (0.040)
.097 .027 .124
Pessimistic belief -0.064 -0.373 0.187
(0.329) (0.527) (0.185)
.845 .479 .072
Optimistic belief -0.409 0.451 0.087
(0.258) (0.309) (0.127)
.113 .144 .493
Risk averse -0.529 0.320 0.489
(0.241) (0.253) (0.265)
.028 .205 .065
Female 0.090 -0.142 0.041
(0.183) (0.229) (0.285)
.622 .533 .885
Age 0.038 -0.040 -0.016
(0.022) (0.024) (0.031)
.080 .094 .595
Constant -0.616 0.614 -1.338
(0.578) (0.837) (0.739)
.287 .463 .070
Obs 134 134 134
Log likelihood -86.288 -65.283 -63.126
Prob > χ2 0.060 0.002 0.210
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.140 0.062
For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient, the second row the stan-
dard error (in brackets), and the third row the p-value of a test with Null that the coefficient is equal
to zero (in italics). Standard errors take into account clustering by session. Pessimistic (elicited belief
of 0.3 or less) and optimistic (elicited belief of 0.7 or more) belief is relative to an indeterminate belief
(elicited belief between 0.4 and 0.6), respectively. Risk averse (4 or less risky choices in the Holt-Laury
task) is relative to risk neutral and risk seeking (5 or more risky choices), respectively.
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Table 4.7: Transition matrix of behavioral types across the SPMG and the TPMG pooled
over all treatments.
TPMG Type
SPMG Type N T B Margin
N (66) .493 (8) .060 (10) .075 (84) .627
T (4) .030 (23) .172 (9) .067 (36) .269
B (3) .022 (3) .022 (8) .060 (14) .104
Margin (73) .545 (34) .254 (27) .201 (134) 1.000
Relative frequencies. Absolute frequencies in parantheses.
147
148
Chapter 5
Costly Monitoring and the Emergence
of Blind Trust1
5.1 Introduction
The realization of mutual gains from cooperation is jeopardized by opportunism in
a variety of economic interactions. For example, expert service providers, such as
car mechanics, have plenty opportunity to cheat on their customers, inter alia by
performing unnecessary fixes or charge for services that they did not actually perform
(see Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006, for more examples).
It is well known that the prospect for repeat business, the «shadow of the future»,
can have, under appropriate conditions, a disciplining function in those situations
(Rubinstein, 1979; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Kreps et al., 1982), and the experi-
mental evidence is clearly supporting (see section 5.2). One key component of those
«appropriate conditions» is the perfectness of monitoring, that is, cheating is imme-
diately and effortless detected. The introducing example illustrates that this is often
not the case: most car owners have no idea how their car work, so they typically can-
not assess the mechanic’s service quality even after consumption; they often happen
to trust the mechanic blindly. This monitoring imperfection is the key characteristic
of «credence qualities» (Darby & Karni, 1973) as opposed to «experience qualities»
(Nelson, 1970). While cheating on the latter is also possible, the consumer cannot
perfectly monitor the occurrence or extent of fraud in the latter, and this persistent in-
formation asymmetry significantly heightens the temptation to cheat (Emons, 1997).
Since credence qualities are ubiquitous in modern economies,2 an important ques-
tion, therefore, is how monitoring imperfections impact on relational enforcement.
1This chapter is co-authored with Timo Goeschl.
2For example, not only externally bought services involve credence qualities, the services bought
from employees as well. It is also instructive to think of many forms of pollution as credence «bads»
because the victims often not know how much they exposed to a particular pollutant nor how exposure
translate into health states.
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There is an increasing number of theoretical and experimental studies that intro-
duce «noise» into the system (see section 5.2), that is, monitoring is subject to error.
These papers have not only introduced an important practical feature of relational
enforcement, but have also delivered important insights into the role of different in-
formation structures in supporting, or weakening, mutual cooperation in ongoing re-
lationships. However, the entirely passive characterization of monitoring is some-
what at odds with the more active nature of monitoring in practice:3 Information
on coplayers’ actions is routinely not only imperfect, but players are frequently in
a position to augment available information through costly effort. In other words,
the player’s choice whether to cooperate is frequently accompanied by a choice on
whether to invest resources into monitoring the coplayers’ actions. Indeed, Darby &
Karni (1973, p. 69) mentioned in their seminal article that «credence qualities are
those which, although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use. Instead, the
assessment of their value requires additional costly information . . . Credence qualities
are expensive to judge even after purchase.» Efforts to overcome imperfect informa-
tion on coplayers’ actions is well known in a variety of further economically rele-
vant contexts as well, such as shared resource management (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom
& Gardner, 1993; Seabright, 1993), production teams (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972;
Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Dong & Dow, 1993; Craig & Pencavel, 1995) and alliances
(Acheson, 1975, 1987, 1988; Palmer, 1991), labor relations (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984;
Kanemoto & MacLeod, 1991; Lazear, 1993), micro-finance (Armendáriz & Mor-
duch, 2005) or neighborhood watch (Sampson et al., 1997), to name just a few. In
this chapter, we account for this fact, and thereby extend the experimental literature
in a new direction by allowing important parts of the information structure of the
game to be endogenously determined by the players.
Specifically, we report upon an experiment in which subjects play finite horizon
modified trust games with information structures that are endogenous in this respect.
The trust game (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Kreps, 1990) is a generic representation
of transactions such as those involving the opportunity to cheat on qualities, both of
the experience and the credence types, and thus highlighting the need for the cus-
tomer’s trust for the exchange to occur: The latter may either purchase the service
(cooperate) or not (defect), the provider may respond to a purchase by honest per-
formance (cooperate) or fraud (defect). The novel feature in our experiment is that a
cooperating first mover does not automatically learn her or his payoff at the end of a
period, just as in the credence quality example, but may actively acquire information
about the second mover’s action in that period.
As indicated above, conceiving monitoring as an action also gives rise to a stronger
notion of trust. In the experimental literature, «trust» is typically defined by a coop-
erative choice of the first mover in the trust (or related) game.4 However, for Elster
3While those studies differ in the details of the specific monitoring imperfection considered, all of
them share the assumption that those impediments are exogenous and fixed. Indeed, the commonly used
definition of monitoring as «the ability of agents to observe each other’s actions in the marketplace»
(Holcomb & Nelson, 1997, p. 79, emphasis by us) underlines the implicit exogeneity assumption.
4Apart from the fact that there is no universally agreed upon definition of trust, one may question
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(2007, p. 344) trust requires more, not only going for the risk of being exploited but
«to refrain from taking precautions against an interaction partner» (emphasis in the
original), to «lower one’s guard». Thus, trust is, according to Elster, «the result of
two successive decisions: to engage in the interaction and to abstain from monitor-
ing the interaction partner» (p. 345, emphasis by us). Our experimental game design
allows exactly for this succession. Elster’s definition is narrow, indeed, but it cer-
tainly describes a particularly strong form or trust. To avoid confusion with broader
definitions, we shall refer to this behavior as blind trust.
The primary questions we pose are: (i) Do first movers always make use of the
monitoring option when there is a strategic reason to do so, or conversely, is blind
trust an empirically relevant option? (ii) What are the consequences for coopera-
tion, efficiency, and distribution? (iii) How do the answers to the previous questions
change with the cost of monitoring? Another goal is to investigate the dynamic pat-
terns of relationships under these conditions. As a working hypothesis, we draw on
a proposition from the management literature which poses that ongoing relationships
develop through a process starting with the control-driven stage and converging to a
trust-based one (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewicki et al., 1998). In our experiment,
this proposition predicts that, at least in the costly monitoring condition, monitor-
ing will occur predominantly in the initial periods, whereas revealed trustworthiness
eventually leads to increased blind trust over time.
To answer these questions we implement two experimental conditions in which
we exogenously vary the cost of information acquisition: it is costless in one con-
dition while information on the coplayer’s action costs a fee in the other. The key
results are the following. First and foremost, the introduction of information costs
resulted in a decrease of monitoring but an emergence of blind trust as a new behav-
ior type. The latter effect was quantitatively so strong that (i) blind trust turned out to
be the dominant behavior under costly monitoring, (ii) such that first mover coopera-
tion was significantly more frequent and payoffs higher under costly monitoring than
under costless monitoring. Furthermore, the average first mover did not worse in the
costly monitoring condition than in the costless monitoring condition, and the aver-
age blind trustor did not worse than the average monitor or defector. In sum, (i) blind
trust is an empirically relevant phenomenon, and (ii) it is caused by monitoring costs,
and (iii) seems to be a successful adaption to a setup in which monitoring is costly.
We find that this static differences between conditions stem from some important dif-
ferences in the respective dynamic patterns. In the costly monitoring condition, there
is a dynamic shift from monitoring towards blind trust, fueled by remarkably high
reciprocation rates in the initial rounds that shifted interactions on an very coopera-
tive trajectory. Our preferred interpretation is a «second-order reputation building»
hypothesis, according to which some second movers try to strategically exploit the
whether first mover behavior in the trust game, or the related investment game, actually measures trust.
While it certainly measures cooperation, it may include unconditional cooperation which is distinct
from trust if the latter is defined as cooperation conditional on the expectation of reciprocation (Cox,
2004).
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costliness of monitoring by investing in a sufficiently favorable reputation in the ini-
tial periods in which they are likely to be monitored in order induce blind trust and
reap larger gains from exploitation in later periods. We provide further results that
support this interpretation.
In the remainder we proceed as follows. In section 5.2 we briefly review related
work. In section 5.3 we describe the design of the experiment and report on proce-
dures and implementation. The results are presented in section 5.4. We summarize
and conclude in section 5.5.
5.2 Related Literature
The idea that relational enforcement of cooperation can be a sub-game perfect or
sequential equilibrium of a repeated game has been shown by Fudenberg & Maskin
(1986) for the case of an indefinite horizon and by Kreps et al. (1982) for the case
of a finite horizon.5 Empirical support from experimental research is strong for both
results: Findings based on a variety of specific stage games, such as the simultane-
ous PD (e.g. Andreoni & Miller, 1993; Cooper et al., 1996; Dal Bó, 2005; Dal Bó
& Fréchette, 2011), the public good game (Andreoni & Croson, 2008, provide an
overview), or the gift exchange game (Kirchler et al., 1996; Fehr et al., 1998a; Falk
et al., 1999; Gächter & Falk, 2002) generally show that repeated play (with perfect
monitoring) generates cooperation strictly above the one-shot Nash equilibrium level
and below the first-best level. Specifically, there are three studies using a finite hori-
zon trust game (Anderhub et al., 2002; Engle-Warnick & Slonim, 2004, 2006a), as
we do, who find significantly more cooperation compared to a condition with random
rematching in non-terminal rounds and a collapse in terminal rounds; Cochard et al.
(2004) obtained similar results with an repeated investment game.
However, both theoretical results and related experiments are based on the as-
sumption of perfect public monitoring, that is, each action taken by each player is
observed by all other players automatically, immediately and without error. Specif-
ically, monitoring is called public if the signal generated by one player’s action is
identical for all players. If the signal accurately confers a player’s action, monitoring
is called perfect. Likewise, if the signal is noisy in the sense that it may at times
confer a different action than actually performed by the player, monitoring is called
imperfect.
There is a growing literature attempting to extent the Folk Theorem to the case
of imperfect monitoring. Fudenberg et al. (1994) extended their earlier result to im-
perfect public monitoring (see Fudenberg & Yamamoto, 2011, for generalizations).
If different players receive different signals, including the case where some receive
no signal at all, monitoring is called private. There are some approaches to prove
5The latter result hinges on the assumption that players hold a belief that some coplayers are com-
mitted to cooperate even in the terminal period, given they have not been cheated previously, a belief
that is indeed justified as demonstrated by a vast amount of recent evidence (Gintis et al., 2005; Henrich
et al., 2004).
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a Folk Theorem with private monitoring (e.g. Sekiguchi, 1997; Piccione, 2002; Ely
& Välimäki, 2002; Bhaskar & Obara, 2002; Mailath & Morris, 2002; Hörner & Ol-
szewski, 2006), but this case is technically challenging. Typically, those approaches
are based on «close-to-public» monitoring, that is arbitrarily small disturbances from
public monitoring, but it is difficult to assess how critical the informational require-
ments of these Folk Theorems are because generally a discussion of the actual order
of magnitude of the disturbances from public monitoring is missing (Gintis, 2009).
Furthermore, there are, to our knowledge, no general results extending the Kreps
et al. (1982) result for finite horizon games to cases with imperfect monitoring.
For empirical purposes, however, those models suggest a simple intuitive predic-
tion concerning the introduction of monitoring imperfections: Since under imperfect
monitoring punishments are likely to occur along the trigger-strategy equilibrium
path, payoffs will likely be lower compared to the perfect information case. This
intuition has long been articulated in the industrial organization literature, beginning
with Stigler (1964) who suggested that collusion in concentrated industries may be
difficult to sustain in a repeated game with secret price cuts (see also Green & Porter,
1984). Hence, there are also some experimental studies that were framed in this
context. Holcomb & Nelson (1997) study a repeated (Cournot) duopoly experiment
in which information about the coplayer’s quantity choice is randomly changed half
of the time and find that such manipulation significantly hampers collusion relative
to a perfect monitoring condition. Feinberg & Synder (2002) conducted a repeated
(Bertrand) duopoly experiment with a similar monitoring imperfection and also found
less collusive behavior in the noisy monitoring compared to a perfect information
treatment. Specifically, while players did resort to punishments for undercutting un-
der perfect monitoring, they appeared to refrain from trigger strategies and settle on
the competitive stage game outcome under noisy monitoring.6 Game theoretically,
both studies examine imperfect private monitoring, that is, players do neither neces-
sarily observe the same nor an accurate signal about the coplayers’ actions. Using
an imperfect public monitoring (the signal is not necessarily accurate but identical
for all subjects), Aoyagi & Fréchette (2009) find that subjects’ payoffs (i) decrease
as noise increases, and (ii) are lower than the theoretical maximum for low noise, but
exceed it for high noise.
There are also two studies introducing some specific monitoring imperfections
into the experimental public good game. Sell & Wilson (1991) conducted a repeated
public good experiment with three conditions: (1) no information about other mem-
bers’ contributions, (2) aggregated information about other members’ contributions,
and (3) individualized information about each member’s contribution. They find that
contributions in the individualized information condition are greater than contribu-
tions in the other two conditions, while contribution levels for no information and
aggregated information do not differ. Also studying a repeated public good experi-
ment, Cason & Khan (1999) compare standard perfect monitoring with perfect, but
6Note that both Holcomb & Nelson (1997) and Feinberg & Synder (2002) used finite horizon super-
games but did not report what was told to the subjects about the horizon in the instructions.
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Figure 5.1: Experimental «stage game». The complete game is the twelve-fold sequence
with monitoring decisions in between.
delayed monitoring of past actions. They do not find any significant difference in the
levels of contributions between the two treatments.
As noted in the introduction, common to all of those models and experiments is
the operationalization of monitoring imperfections as «noise». To our knowledge,
there are to date no studies that operationalize monitoring as an active decision. In
this chapter, we extend the literature in this new direction.
5.3 Experiment
5.3.1 Design
We used the conventional (binary) trust game (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Kreps,
1990), as depicted in figure 5.1, as our point of departure. The first mover chooses
between cooperation (option «pink» in the instructions) or an outside option («yel-
low»). In case the outside option is chosen, both players get 15 tokens and the period
ends. In case the first mover chooses to cooperate, the period continues with the sec-
ond mover’s choice between cooperation (option «brown») or exploitation (option
«blue»). If the second mover cooperates, he gets 25 tokens and his coplayer 30 to-
kens. Otherwise, he exploits the first mover by taking 50 tokens for himself while his
coplayer gets 5 tokens. Every subject plays the game for 12 periods.
The novel feature in our experiment is that a cooperating first mover is not auto-
matically informed about the second mover’s choice. Specifically, without knowing
the second mover’s action, a first mover decides whether he wants to monitor the
second mover’s action or not. In the former case, the first mover was informed about
whether their coplayer responded with «brown» or «blue», respectively, at the end
of the round. In the latter case, (s)he received no information. Second movers were
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never informed about whether their coplayer monitored them or not.7
In order to learn more about the belief dynamics, we supplemented the experi-
mental game by (non-incentivized) elicitations of the participants first-order beliefs
about their current coplayer’s behavior in a given period. In each period, before any
decisions were made, first movers were asked to state their belief about whether their
coplayer will respond with «brown» or «blue» to «pink», and second movers were
asked to state their belief whether their coplayer will play «pink» or «yellow». Given
that «pink» was played, second movers were asked after their decision to state their
belief that their decision will be monitored.
The experimental game was manipulated along one dimension for a two factor
between-subjects design. In the first experimental condition the acquisition of in-
formation on the coplayer’s action in the current period was costless, in the second
condition first movers had to incur a fee of five tokens in order to acquire this infor-
mation. Except for this variation, both treatment conditions were exactly identical.
5.3.2 Subjects and Procedures
Participants were recruited from the general undergraduate student population of
the University of Heidelberg using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner,
2004). In total 48 subjects participated of which 47.9 percent have been female and
83.3 percent German citizen. The mean age was 23.7 years. Subjects were randomly
assigned to treatment conditions, 24 subjects in each cell. No subject participated
more than once or in more than one treatment condition.
All experiments were conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Alfred-
Weber-Institute (AWI-Lab) at the University of Heidelberg in spring 2012. Upon
entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to the computer terminals.
Besides each terminal, an empty sheet of paper and a pen was prepared which partic-
ipants were allowed to use for taking notes during the experiment.8 Booths separated
the participants visually, ensuring that they made their decisions anonymously and
independently. Direct communication among them was strictly forbidden for the du-
ration of the entire session. Furthermore, subjects did not receive any information on
the personal identity of any other participant, neither before nor while nor after the
experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, that is, before any decisions were made,
subjects received detailed written instructions that explained the exact structure of
the game and the procedural rules. All subjects received the same instructions (only
the monitoring fee being replaced across conditions) and this was commonly known.
The experiment was framed in a sterile way using neutral language and avoiding
7This is an empirically accurate representation of many, but not all monitoring activities. If the
second mover gets to know whether he or she is monitored, he or she may respond to this information
in the subsequent periods (if any). We study this setup and evaluate a «crowding» hypothesis in a
different paper.
8They were instructed to take this sheet with them after the experiment to ensure that nobody, in-
cluding the experimenters, could observe their eventual notes.
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value laden terms in the instructions (see supplementary material). Post-experimental
debriefings attested that no participant had difficulties in comprehending the instruc-
tions.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The exact timing of events was as follows. First, the subjects were randomly matched
into groups of two. Then twelve rounds of the experimental game described above
were played. The binary decisions were made by input boxes to be marked with the
computer mouse, beliefs were indicated by a screen slider with a resolution of 100
points. After the twelve rounds, subjects were asked to answer a short questionnaire
while the experimenter prepared the payoffs. Subjects were then informed about their
payoffs, and then individually called to the experimenter booth, payed out (according
to a random number matched to their decisions; no personal identities were used
throughout the whole experiment) and dismissed.
In every session subjects received a fixed show-up fee of e3, which was not part
of their endowment. The average session had a duration of about 45 minutes and
subjects earned e11.21 (e0.03 per token earned) on average, including the fixed
show-up fee, with a minimum of e7.80 and a maximum of e14.25. Earnings exceed
the local average hourly wage of a typical student job and can hence be considered
meaningful to the participants.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Main results
The key results of this chapter are illustrated in figures 5.2 and 5.3. The main re-
sult is the emergence of blind trust as monitoring becomes costly. As evident from
the bottom panel of figure 5.2, cooperation accompanied by monitoring decreases by
roughly 24 percent (from 50 percent to 37.8 percent) as one moves from the cost-
less to the costly monitoring condition. Basing this and the following statistical tests
on a cross-section in which each observation is an individual average taken over all
12 rounds,9 this difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney rank sum test,
p = .023). This is what one might expect. However, at the same time there is there is a
new behavior type «blind trust», cooperating without monitoring, monitoring, when
monitoring is costly, whose frequency is statistically significantly different from the
costless monitoring condition (Mann-Whitney, p < .001). This behavior type is so
dominant in the costless monitoring condition, that first mover cooperation rates are
actually higher in the costly monitoring condition (Mann-Whitney, p = .005). First
movers trusted blindly in remarkable 52.8 percent (76 out of 144) of the cases, re-
sulting in a total cooperation rate of 80.6 percent (116 out of 144), which is much
higher than in the costless monitoring condition (50 percent, 72 out of 144). Indeed,
9Note that the individual observations in our data set are not independent in a rigorous statistical
sense, that is, strictly speaking each of the 24 matches constitute one independent observation. The
procedure used here is a common response to this fact (e.g. Vanberg, 2009).
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Figure 5.2: Relative frequency of first mover cooperation by treatment condition averaged
over time.
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Figure 5.3: Relative frequency of reciprocation by treatment condition averaged over time.
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Figure 5.4: Average payoff per subject and round by treatment condition.
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in the terminal round all instances of cooperation, after all 6 out of 12 cases, were
blind trust (upper right panel of figure 5.2). Thus, in the costly monitoring condition
blind trust turns out to be the dominant behavior.
Result 5.1. There is less monitoring if it is costly then when it is costless. But there
is a behavior type «blind trust», cooperating without monitoring, that is more fre-
quent when monitoring is costly than when it is costless. Taken together, first mover
cooperation is more frequent when monitoring is costly than when it is costless.
But this raises the question why blind trust is so common, since one might ex-
pect that this option does not pay, because blind trustors are easily cheated upon,
perhaps over multiple periods without noticing it. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show a first
indication that, on average, this was not the case. The reciprocation rate, depicted
in figure 5.3, is actually slightly higher in the costly monitoring condition, although
the difference is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney, p = .276). Figure 5.4
shows the average payoffs earned per subject and round, including monitoring costs,
by treatment.10 Again, first movers earned on average actually more in the costly
monitoring condition (21.9 tokens) than in the costless monitoring condition (18.9
tokens), even including monitoring costs, the difference being marginally significant
(Mann-Whitney, p = .082). The average second mover also earned more in the costly
10Recall that, excluding monitoring costs, the minimum joint payoff was 30 tokens (i.e. 15 on aver-
age) and the maximum 55 tokens (27.5 on average). While expenditures on monitoring were, of course,
zero in the costless monitoring condition, first movers spent per subject and period 1.39 tokens on mon-
itoring in the costly monitoring condition (i.e. 16.7 tokens per match). Averaging only over those first
movers who actually cooperated, they spent 1.72 tokens per period (i.e. 20.6 tokens per match).
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Figure 5.5: Average first mover payoffs by behavioral type.
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monitoring condition (26.9 tokens) than in the costless monitoring condition (23.6
tokens), the difference being significant (Mann-Whitney, p = .049), such that on aver-
age both types of player were, conservatively, not worse off through the introduction
of monitoring costs. Jointly, the average pair earned significantly more in the costly
than in the costless monitoring condition (Mann-Whitney, p = .027). Note that those
marked behavioral effects result already at a relatively moderate cost of monitoring:
5 tokens are only 20 percent of the loss of betrayal, 33 percent of the gain from mu-
tual cooperation, and about 26 percent of the average first mover per period payoff in
the costless monitoring condition.
Of course, more appropriate to judge whether blind trust does or does not pay is
to compare the payoff of blind trustors to the other behavioral alternatives.11 Such
comparison is depicted in figure 5.5. On average, cooperating clearly payed to first
movers. Monitoring cooperators earned more than defectors, whereas blind trustors
did not worse than the former. We thus can conclude that, on average, blind trust was
not unprofitable.
Result 5.2. The average first mover in the costly monitoring condition did not do
worse than in the costless monitoring condition. Likewise, the average blind trustor
did not do worse than the average monitor or defector.
Summing up so far, three facts can be highlighted. First, blind trust is an empir-
ically relevant option. In fact, in the costly monitoring condition, it is the dominant
11Note that we can do this because second movers were not informed about the monitoring deci-
sion. If they would have been, they might have adjusted their behavior and the comparison becomes
problematic. This methodical point was the second major reason for this design choice.
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Figure 5.6: Aggregate dynamics of first mover cooperation and beliefs about reciprocation.
The left column depicts the costless monitoring condition, the right column the costly moni-
toring condition.
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behavior. Second, blind trust is caused by monitoring costs, as there is no blind trust
if monitoring is costless. Finally, blind trust seems to be a successful adaption to a
setup in which monitoring is costly, since neither did the average first mover in the
costly monitoring condition worse than in the costless monitoring condition, nor did
the average blind trustor worse than the average monitor or defector. In the remain-
der of this section we examine the data in more detail in order to get an idea how this
works out.
5.4.2 Dynamics of first mover behavior under costless monitoring
We begin by examining the dynamics of first mover behavior. The upper panel of
figure 5.2 depicts aggregate first mover behavior splitted up into terminal and non-
terminal periods, and figure 5.6 depicts the full aggregate dynamics of first movers’
behavior. In the latter, the dark shaded area represents the relative frequency of co-
operation accompanied by monitoring, the light shaded area represents the relative
frequency of blind trust, where both areas are stacked such that the joint area depicts
first mover cooperation rates.
The left-hand column of figure 5.6 depicts the results for the costless monitoring
condition. We already know that first movers never cooperated without monitoring
the second mover’s response, so the frequencies of cooperation coincide with the
frequencies of monitoring. This is what one might expect based on elementary eco-
nomic reasoning, because any non-negative valuation of the information suffices for
rendering its acquisition a best response. In fact, the information about the second
mover’s behavior is clearly valuable in non-terminal periods of a given match. It is of
least instrumental value in terminal rounds, but still, when the monitoring fee is zero,
there is still no reason to refrain from monitoring contingent on cooperating. Con-
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sistent with these considerations, none among the 72 instances of cooperation (out
of 144 opportunities) was blind. As a result, in matches of the costless monitoring
condition first movers were de facto perfectly informed about the entire history of the
game at any time.
As a first step, we observe that the average dynamic pattern of first mover coop-
eration in the costless monitoring condition fits well into the previous literature that
studied repeated trust games (and related cooperation games) under perfect moni-
toring, referred to in section 5.2: moderate cooperation at the beginning, eventually
slightly increasing over time before it collapses towards the terminal period. Coop-
eration rates are clearly higher in non-terminal rounds than in terminal rounds, first
movers cooperating in 53.0 percent (70 out of 132) of the time in the former and in
16.7 percent (2 out of 12) of the time in the latter. We summarize sloppily:
Result 5.3. If monitoring is costless, average first mover cooperation follows the
typical pattern of finite horizon cooperation games with perfect monitoring.
5.4.3 Dynamics of first mover behavior under costly monitoring
Based on this benchmark result, we now consider the costly monitoring condition
in more detail. As evident from the right-hand column of figure 5.6, first mover
cooperation rates exhibit a similar pattern than under costless monitoring, although
at a notably higher level due to the emergence of blind trust.
Result 5.4. If monitoring is costly, average first mover cooperation follows a similar
dynamic pattern as under costless monitoring, although at a markedly higher level.
In this condition, the value of information about the second movers’ response is
unchanged, but the cost of acquiring it is now positive. Thus, by standard economic
reasoning it can be expected that subjects acquire the information only if its subjective
value amounts to at least five tokens, the monitoring fee. This leads to a number of
predictions.
First, because for some players in some periods the subjective valuation of the
information may be less than five tokens, the frequency of monitoring is predicted
to be lower than in the costless monitoring condition. The lower panel of figure 5.2
shows that, averaged over time, this clearly turned out to be the case, and figure 5.6
illustrates that this also holds for each period individually.
Second, while there might be different motivations to monitor, considering the
«instrumental value» of the information, the extent to which the information can be
used to adjust one’s behavior afterwards, might be a first guide to form an expectation
about what one might observe: Since the instrumental value of information tends to
decrease over time, or is at the very least lower in terminal than in non-terminal peri-
ods, the frequency of monitoring can be expected to decrease over time. To see this,
consider the incentive to monitor in terminal periods. The instrumental value of the
information is clearly zero in the terminal period, because there is no opportunity to
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Figure 5.7: Relative dynamics of monitoring and blind trust in the costly monitoring condi-
tion.
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act on the information, such that it is reasonable to expect there to be little monitor-
ing. In fact, in the terminal period, none out of 12 first movers monitored. In contrast
to terminal periods, the instrumental value of the information about the coplayer’s
response is clearly positive in non-terminal periods, both for strategic and learning
reasons. Thus, it is reasonable to predict higher monitoring rates in non-terminal than
in terminal rounds. This prediction is supported by the data as well. In non-terminal
rounds, first movers cooperated together with monitoring their coplayer in 30.3 per-
cent (40 out of 132) of the time, while they never monitored their coplayer (0 out of
12) in terminal rounds. Figure 5.6 illustrates the decreasing trend of monitoring over
time.
A first mover who does plan to not monitor the second mover has two alternatives:
non-cooperation or blind trust. Figure 5.6 shows that the decrease in monitoring is
only weakly accompanied by an increase in non-cooperation but by a marked increase
in blind trust. While blind trust is already present in the first round, it is clearly the
exception initially but strongly increases throughout the first four periods to become
the dominant behavior.
This dynamic pattern is also informative about a proposition claiming that a re-
lationship develops through a process starting with the control-driven stage and con-
verging to a trust-based one (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewicki et al., 1998). In our
experiment, this corresponds to the prediction that first movers predominantly resort
to monitoring at the beginning of a match while tending to trust blindly towards the
end. Putting the above results together, it is clear that this turns out to be the case:
In the first period, the majority of cooperating first movers monitor, blind trustors
are a minority. However, this changes over time, as blind trust increases notably in
the initial four periods and then remaining approximately stable, while the frequency
of monitoring successively decreases over time. The shift from monitoring towards
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Figure 5.8: Aggregate dynamics of second mover reciprocation and beliefs about being mon-
itored. The left column depicts the costless monitoring condition, the right column the costly
monitoring condition.
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blind trust over time can be seen even more clearly in figure 5.7, which depicts the
frequency of blind trust and monitoring, respectively, as a fraction of all instances of
first mover cooperation. However, our results also adds an important qualification to
the above proposition, as it is only supported under costly monitoring. Thus, moni-
toring costs appear to be a key driver of convergence towards (blind) trust in ongoing
relationships.
Result 5.5. If monitoring is costly, monitoring gets less frequent and blind trust gets
more frequent towards the terminal round, that is, there is a shift from monitoring
towards blind trust over time.
The implication is that much of blind trust is a dynamic phenomenon, that is, a
great deal may likely be explained by the dynamics of the initial periods. We turn to
an investigation of this conjecture next.
5.4.4 How does blind trust emerge? – Dynamics of second mover behavior
We begin by taking a closer look at the dynamics of second mover behavior. The
upper panel of figure 5.3 depicts aggregate second mover behavior splitted up by ter-
minal and non-terminal periods, and figure 5.8 depicts the full aggregate dynamics
of second mover’s behavior. The left-hand column of figure 5.8 depict the results for
the costless monitoring condition. The time trend of the reciprocation rate is non-
monotone since reciprocation is always contingent on first mover cooperation. Thus,
a sorting effect tends to increase reciprocation rates over time, since exploiters are
no longer trusted (at least for some time), while the strategic reciprocation incentive
diminishes towards the terminal period, inducing a trend tendency into the oppo-
site direction. Consistent with a strategically reciprocal strategy, cooperation rates
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are clearly higher in non-terminal rounds than in terminal rounds. In non-terminal
rounds, second movers reciprocated in 71.4 percent (50 out of 70) of the time, while
in in terminal rounds, they returned cooperation in 50.0 percent (1 out of 2) of the
time. As a result, overall second mover reciprocation rates were 70.8 percent (51 out
of 72).
Consider now the costly monitoring condition depicted in the right-hand column
of figure 5.8. As in the costly monitoring condition, cooperation rates are clearly
higher in non-terminal rounds than in terminal rounds. In non-terminal rounds, sec-
ond movers reciprocated in 82.7 percent (91 out of 110) of the time, while in in ter-
minal rounds, they returned cooperation in 50.0 percent (3 out of 6) of the time. As
a result, overall second mover reciprocation rates were 81.0 percent (94 out of 116),
which is somewhat higher than under costless monitoring. Figure 5.8 illustrates why:
while reciprocation rates are similar in both treatment conditions towards the terminal
period, they are clearly higher in the costly monitoring condition than in the costless
monitoring condition over the initial rounds, in fact at remarkable 100 percent in pe-
riod 1 through 3. In addition, reciprocation rates have a markedly decreasing trend
over time in the costly monitoring condition.
Result 5.6. In both the costless and the costly monitoring condition the majority of
first mover cooperation is reciprocated. However, reciprocation is markedly more
frequent in the initial rounds of the latter compared to the former, and there is a more
pronounced decreasing trend if monitoring is costly.
The latter fact is quite consistent with the average second mover’s belief about
being monitored in the current period. The circles connected with the hatched line
in figure 5.8 depict this belief. Evidently, the average second mover anticipates the
average first mover’s monitoring pattern (as summarized in result 5.5) remarkably
closely.12 While the average second mover’s belief about being monitored is approx-
imately stable close to unity in the costless monitoring condition, it exhibits a clearly
decreasing pattern under costly monitoring. Thus, while the average second mover
believes to be monitored with almost-certainty throughout the whole match in the
costless monitoring condition, (s)he expects to be monitored predominantly at the
beginning of a match, less so towards the end, under costly monitoring.
Result 5.7. The average second mover anticipates the average first mover’s monitor-
ing pattern quite accurately. Specifically, while the average second mover believes to
be monitored with almost-certainty throughout the whole match in the costless mon-
itoring condition, (s)he expects to be monitored predominantly at the beginning of a
match, less so towards the end, under costly monitoring.
Did the average second mover responded consistently to this belief? Conven-
tional economic theory suggests that the temptation to cheat is decreasing in the per-
ceived likelihood of being detected, and vice versa. The belief and behavior patterns
12Recall that we deliberately kept them uninformed about whether they are currently monitored or
not.
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depicted in figure 5.8 are consistent with this intuition: while second movers re-
spond in a standard way to their belief of being constantly monitored in the costless
monitoring condition, reciprocation rates diminish with the belief of being moni-
tored towards the end in the costly monitoring condition. In both conditions, the
average cooperating second mover had a stronger belief of being monitored (.945
in the costless monitoring condition, .652 in the costly monitoring condition) than
the average defecting second mover (.880 in the costless monitoring condition, .471
in the costly monitoring condition), where the difference is significant in the costly
(Mann-Whitney, p = .039) but not in the costless monitoring condition (p = .260).
Rank correlation between beliefs of being monitored and reciprocation is positive
and significant when monitoring is costly (Kendall’s τb = 0.168, p = .040).
While this accounts neatly for the increasing trend of cheating in the costly mon-
itoring condition, a simple response to the belief of being monitored in the current
period cannot, however, account for result 5.6, namely that reciprocation is markedly
more frequent in the initial rounds if monitoring is costly compared to the costless
monitoring condition. Although speculative at this point, a possible explanation of
this fact is that the active and costly nature of monitoring gives rise to a «higher or-
der» of reputation building. In standard repeated games with perfect monitoring (but
incomplete information), strategically acting second movers can build a favorable
reputation in order to induce the first mover to cooperate until close to termination
(Kreps et al., 1982). In our game, second movers can induce the first movers not
only to cooperate, but also to refrain from monitoring. We suspect that the incentive
for the latter («second-order reputation building») is much stronger than the former
(«first-order reputation building»), because under perfect monitoring the maximum
number of periods in which a strategically acting second mover can exploit the first
mover is equal to one (assuming that the first mover will not cooperate again once
cheated), while in our game there is the possibility of cheating over multiple periods
once the first mover trusts blindly. This is a possible explanation why reciprocation
rates are initially so much higher under costly monitoring. Intuitively, (some) second
movers deliberately try to «earn» a reputation in the initial periods in which they are
likely to be monitored, favorable enough to be trusted blindly later on. Strategically
acting subjects may do so in order to exploit their coplayers more easily and perhaps
over multiple periods. This strategic incentive is missing in the costless monitoring
condition, since second movers do not believe in blind trust anyway (and this belief
is justified). Thus, we have the following conjecture
Conjecture 5.1. Some second movers try to strategically exploit the costliness of
monitoring by investing in a sufficiently favorable reputation in the initial periods
in which they are likely to be monitored in order induce blind trust and reap larger
gains from exploitation in later periods.
We leave a direct test of this conjecture for future research, but the facts presented
below already lend some preliminary support.
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5.4.5 How does blind trust emerge? – Strategic reputation building and first
mover responses
Support for this conjecture comes from the fact that the strategy is in some sense
quite successful. To see this consider first mover behavior in more detail. First, note
that (see figure 5.6) the average first mover’s prior about their cooperation being re-
ciprocated is approximately equal at .4 in both conditions. But while this belief does
not change much over time in the costless monitoring condition, there is a marked
increase of confidence in the initial periods of the costly monitoring condition. This
increase may be viewed as justified given full reciprocation. In fact, rank correlation
between first movers’ belief about reciprocation in period t +1 and an indicator vari-
able that is unity if a respective first mover detected her or his coplayer to cooperate
in period t is strongly positive (Kendall’s τb = .555, p = .000),13 that is, the average
first mover became much more confident (pessimistic) in t +1 if (s)he observed her
or his coplayer reciprocating (defecting) in t.
Figure 5.6 also indicates that first movers’ confidence and cooperation go to-
gether. As evident from the left panel, in the costless monitoring condition the pattern
of first mover cooperation rates corresponds quite closely to the average first mover’s
belief about reciprocation, depicted by circles, connected with the hatched line. The
average first mover anticipated the coplayer’s strategic incentive to defect towards the
terminal period, and responds accordingly. Correlation between the first movers’ be-
lief about reciprocation and their own cooperation is strongly positive and significant
(Kendall’s τb = .618, p = .000).
The same is true in the costly monitoring condition (Kendall’s τb = .584, p =
.000).14 Interestingly, however, separating first mover cooperation by cooperation
coupled with monitoring and blind trust, it turns out that only the latter is correlated
with first movers’ beliefs about reciprocation (Kendall’s τb = .410, p = .000), the for-
mer is not (Kendall’s τb = .059, p = .419). The correlation is also positive at the
individual level for all first movers who trusted blindly at least once, whereas most of
the coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero due to the small
number of individual observations.15 To put it differently, the average belief that the
second mover will reciprocate was .874 for blind trustors, .788 for monitors, and .075
for defectors. Thus, a first mover’s confidence in reciprocation appears to be a key
determinant of blind trust.
Result 5.8. While the average first mover’s prior about reciprocation is approxi-
mately equal in both conditions, and does not change much over time in the costless
monitoring condition, there is a marked increase of confidence in the initial periods of
13We also estimated this correlation by means of various regression models that take into account
period-specific effects which yield even stronger correlations. Those results are available upon request.
14Pooled over treatments, Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient between beliefs about reciprocation
and first mover cooperation is τb = .654 with p = .000.
15Of the 12 first movers, four did never trust blindly, while eight did; among the latter, two correla-
tions between beliefs and blind trust is marginally significant, six are not significant.
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the costly monitoring condition, accompanied by a strong increase in blind trust. In
fact, blind trust is positively correlated with first movers’ belief about reciprocation.
This kind of closes the circle and reinforces the interpretation that (i) (some)
second movers try to «earn» being trusted blindly by cooperating in the initial peri-
ods, (ii) first movers become indeed more confident, and (iii) respond with trusting
blindly.
As another piece of evidence in favor of this «second-order reputation build-
ing» interpretation, consider the dynamics of realized payoffs depicted in figure 5.9.
In the costless monitoring condition (depicted in the left-hand column), the fre-
quency of mutual cooperation is moderately positive throughout the initial periods,
but strongly decreasing towards the end, partly through first movers stopping to co-
operate (foreseeing the second movers’ strategic incentive to defect), partly through
second movers stopping reciprocating. This pattern is quite consistent with «conven-
tional first-order» reputation building (Kreps et al., 1982). In consequence, partici-
pants realized on average 55 percent (13.8 tokens) of the surplus from cooperation
throughout the initial ten periods, while efficiency sharply decreased to only about 33
percent (average surplus realized 8.3 tokens) and 17 percent (average surplus realized
4.2 tokens) in the penultimate and ultimate period, respectively.16 The distribution of
payoffs between first and second movers was quite stable with first movers reaping
on average 44 percent of the joint payoff (or realized surplus), minimally 39 percent
(in rounds 1 and 3) and maximally 49 percent (in rounds 6, 7, and 9). Most impor-
tantly, there is no round in which the average first mover made losses by cooperating:
the lowest average payoffs were 15.8 and 15.4 tokens in the penultimate and ulti-
mate periods, respectively, which is still slightly above the outside option payoff of
15 tokens.
The payoff efficiency and distribution dynamics are quite different in the costly
monitoring condition. As evident from the right-hand column of figure 5.9, in the ini-
tial rounds the frequency of mutual cooperation is notably higher in the costly than
in the costless monitoring condition, while dropping to equally low levels towards
the end. However, this is evidently not entirely passed through to efficiency: aver-
age joint payoffs are higher in the costly monitoring condition in every single round,
and drop somewhat less sharply towards the end. The reason is that in the costly
monitoring condition a larger fraction of the diminishing mutual cooperation rates
towards the terminal period is caused by second movers defecting, while in the cost-
less monitoring condition it is predominantly caused by first movers’ choice of the
outside option. Since exchange efficiency is determined entirely by the first movers’
action, less surplus gets lost in the costly monitoring condition. Specifically, par-
ticipants realized on average 75 percent (78 percent, or 19.4 tokens, throughout the
16The surplus was 25 tokens per exchange, the difference between the joint payoff from mutual coop-
eration of 55 tokens and the outside option payoff of 30 tokens. Note that the efficiency of exchange is
determined entirely by the first movers’ action, the second movers’ actions have (statically) only distri-
butional consequences. But of course, reciprocation has indirect (dynamic) consequences for efficiency
through its repercussions on future first mover behavior.
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Figure 5.9: Relative frequency of mutual cooperation and average payoffs over time.
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initial ten periods, 72 percent, or 17.9 tokens, and 50 percent, or 12.5 tokens, in the
penultimate and ultimate period, respectively) of the surplus from cooperation in the
costly monitoring condition, compared to only 50 percent in the costless monitoring
condition.
However, as one might expect the above patterns leave their footprint on the dis-
tribution of payoffs between first and second movers. While the distribution was
quite stable in the costless monitoring condition, it exhibits an interesting pattern in
the costly monitoring condition. In the first eight periods, the average first mover
reaps with 49 percent of the joint payoff (or realized surplus) a somewhat larger
share in the costly than in the costless monitoring condition (44 percent), minimally
45 percent (in round 6) and maximally 53 percent (in round 8). In the remaining four
periods the distribution strongly shifted towards second movers: in those periods, the
average first mover received only 36 percent of the joint payoff (or realized surplus),
minimally 27 percent (in round 11) and maximally 40 percent (in round 10). Inter-
estingly, however, averaged over time those distributional differences between the
conditions virtually cancel out, first movers receiving 45 percent of the joint payoff
(or realized surplus) in the costly monitoring condition, and 44 percent in the costless
monitoring condition. As a result, both first movers (21.9 vs 18.9 tokens) and second
movers (26.9 vs 23.7 tokens) were on average better off in the costly compared to the
costless monitoring condition.
Result 5.9. Average exchange efficiency (including monitoring costs) is higher in in
the costly monitoring condition than in the costless monitoring condition in every
round, and declines less sharply towards the terminal period. The payoff distribution
is much less stable in the costly monitoring condition, exhibiting a strong shift from
first towards second movers towards the end.
This suggest that strategic second movers are at least partially successful in reap-
ing larger shares of payoffs towards the end, but while they invested in a reputation
that merits of being trusted blindly, a much more cooperative trajectory than the one
in the costless monitoring condition is entered.
Note, however, that strategic reputation building works only if there are some
second movers (or first movers believe there are some second movers) in the popu-
lation which are committed to cooperate (Kreps et al., 1982; Kreps & Wilson, 1982;
Milgrom & Roberts, 1982; Wilson, 1985). We know from a large number of ex-
periments that such types exist (see Fehr & Schmidt, 2006, for an overview). This
justifies the first movers’ try to cooperate, perhaps blindly. However, in doing so first
movers who trust blindly nonetheless go for a significant risk of being betrayed (re-
peatedly). It is therefore not surprising that post-experimental surveys also suggest
that it is especially the relatively risk tolerant and less betrayal averse first movers
who trust blindly. Blind trust in our experiment is positively correlated with an exper-
imentally validated survey measure of individual risk preference (Kendall’s τb = .259,
p < .001),17 and it is negatively correlated with a measure of negatively reciprocal in-
17The item contains the question «Are you generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid
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clination (Kendall’s τb = −.223, p = .003), that has been argued to be a good proxy
for betrayal aversion.18 Thus, in addition to beliefs, social and risk preferences also
appear to play a role in accounting for blind trust.19
Result 5.10. Blind trust is negatively correlated with measures of risk aversion and
betrayal aversion.
This suggests also a possible explanation for the existence of blind trust in the first
period of the costly monitoring condition. Those three subjects who trusted blindly
in the first period are on average more confident (elicited belief about reciprocation
0.587 vs. 0.481), more risk tolerant (risk tolerance item score 6.67 vs. 4.84) and
less betrayal averse (negative reciprocity item score 4.67 vs. 7.60) than all other
subjects in the sample;20 for them saving five tokens of information fee may already
be enough compensation for bearing the risk of being exploited.
As a final step, we underpin the above aggregate results by briefly taking a look
a individual dynamics, and show en passant that there is some individual hetero-
geneity hiding behind the averages. Figure 5.10 depicts the individual first mover
dynamics for the costless monitoring condition. The bars indicate whether the player
cooperated in a given period, where a bar is shaded in dark gray if accompanied by
monitoring and light gray if blind, whereas the latter apparently never occurred in
the costless monitoring condition. The markers at the top and the bottom of the bars
represent the actual second mover’s responses, where a marker at the top means co-
operation and a marker at the bottom means defection. Finally, the black lines depict
the first movers’ beliefs about their coplayer’s response.
It is evident that dynamics in individual matches differ. Particularly interesting
are the individual belief patterns. The majority of first movers start with a rather pes-
simistic prior regarding reciprocation (see in particular pairs 1–6, 11, and 12). For
them, it takes to go for some risk in order to learn. Only one first mover refused to do
so (pair 4), and hence forewent all feasible gains from cooperation, the rest tested the
risks?», and respondents answer the question on a 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (very risk
averse) to 10 (very risk seeking). The item is used in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and
has been shown to be good predictor of behavior in experiments with decisions under risk (Dohmen
et al., 2011).
18The items have also been implemented in the SOEP and read «If I suffer a serious wrong, I will
take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost» and «If somebody offends me, I will offend
him/her back», and respondents can answer on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 («does not apply
to me at all») and 7 («applies to me perfectly). I take the sum of both responses a measure of negatively
reciprocal inclination. Fehr (2009a) argues that this measure is a good proxy for betrayal aversion.
19It is also positively correlated with the first generalized trust survey item used in the SOEP («In
general, one can trust people», τb = .301, p < .001), and negatively with the second («Nowadays, you
can’t rely on anybody», τb = −.268, p < .001), and the third («When dealing with strangers, it is better
to be cautious before trusting them», τb = −.342, p = .000). Furthermore, blind trust is negatively
correlated with a trust-vs-monitoring item created by us («Trust is good, control is better», τb = −.326,
p = .000).
20Those differences are of course not significant since there are only three observations in one group,
but the preference-based determinants are close to: a Mann-Whitney test on the difference in betrayal
aversion is marginally significant (p = .066), a test on the difference in risk aversion yields a p = .161.
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Figure 5.10: Individual first mover dynamics in the costless monitoring condition.
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coplayer at least once over the course of interaction. Apparently, those whose coop-
eration is not exploited swiftly become more confident. The pessimistic testers and
initially rather optimistic first movers (see pairs 7–10) who were disappointed became
more, or remained, pessimistic and sometimes punished detected cheats (all cheats
were detected) in non-terminal periods with at least one period of non-cooperation.21
Note that virtually all first movers anticipated the coplayer’s strategic incentive to de-
fect in the final period. In sum, this individual investigation reveals that first mover’s
behavior is quite consistent with their beliefs about reciprocation even at the indi-
vidual level, and that their beliefs are quite responsive to monitored second mover
behavior.
The same general conclusion can be drawn from investigating individual patterns
in the costly monitoring condition. However, there is apparently an important differ-
ence due to frequent blind trust. Clearly, first movers cannot learn anything without
monitoring. Thus, the majority of first movers start the match with monitoring. If
second movers reciprocate one or a few times, then they often start going for the risk
of trusting blindly, at times performing some random audits in turn and responding
with defection if the audit revealed a cheat (see pairs 1, 4–8, 11 and 12 for those
patterns). Thus, at least half of the first movers behaved consistent to the strategy
outlined above, namely shifting from initial testing to blind trust over time as long as
no cheating is detected.
21But note that punishment phases were always limited, that is, all of those who are initially cheated
give their coplayers another chance, typically after one or a few punishment periods. For some this
second chance works out well (see for example pair 12) for others not (see for example pair 3 or 11).
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Figure 5.11: Individual first mover dynamics in the costly monitoring condition.
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But again, there is apparently some individual heterogeneity as well. As in the
costless monitoring condition, there is one first mover (pair 3) who refused to learn
anything. One first mover (pair 12) started very pessimistically, tested her or his
coplayer, became very optimistic over time as the latter turned out to be cooperative,
but nevertheless never trusted blindly (spending 55 tokens on monitoring alone). An-
other first mover (pair 2), starting with a very optimistic prior, trusted blindly for all
twelve periods, despite of foreseeing the second mover’s strategic incentive to cheat
towards the terminal period. Thus, there clearly appears to be some preference-driven
heterogeneity in the propensity to trust blindly. The results further above suggest that
risk preferences and the degree of betrayal aversion are important here.
5.5 Conclusion
Some two decades ago, Hal Varian (1990, p. 153) commented that the literature
«typically assumes that principals are unable to observe the characteris-
tics or the actions of the agents ... However, in reality, it is often not the
case that agents’ characteristics or effort levels are really unobservable;
rather, they simply may be very costly to observe. One may choose to
model high-costs actions as being infeasible actions, but in doing so, one
may miss some interesting phenomena.»
Indeed, the emergence of blind trust that we demonstrate in this chapter may be
viewed as one of those phenomena. We showed this phenomenon in an experiment
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in which subjects play finite horizon modified trust games in which cooperating first
movers do not automatically learn their payoff at the end of a period, but may actively
acquire information about the second mover’s action in that period.
We find the following. First and foremost, the introduction of information costs
resulted in a decrease of monitoring but an emergence of blind trust as a new behavior
type. The latter effect was quantitatively so strong that (i) blind trust turned out
to be the dominant behavior under costly monitoring, and (ii) it overcompensated
the decrease in cooperation with monitoring such that first mover cooperation was
significantly more frequent and payoffs higher under costly monitoring than under
costless monitoring. Furthermore, neither did the average first mover in the costly
monitoring condition worse than in the costless monitoring condition, nor did the
average blind trustor worse than the average monitor or defector. In sum, (i) blind
trust is an empirically relevant phenomenon, and (ii) it is caused by monitoring costs,
and (iii) seems to be an a successful adaption to a setup in which monitoring is costly.
This result is remarkable as it contrasts with the intuition that increasing monitoring
costs hamper cooperation and diminish payoffs.
We find that this static differences between conditions stem from some important
differences in the respective dynamic patterns. As a benchmark it is found that if
monitoring is costless, first movers never cooperate without monitoring, and aver-
age first mover cooperation follows the typical pattern of finite horizon cooperation
games with perfect monitoring. If monitoring is costly, monitoring gets less frequent
and blind trust gets more frequent over time, that is, there is a dynamic shift from
monitoring towards blind trust. In particular, while blind trust is the exception ini-
tially, it strongly increases to become the dominant behavior throughout the first four
periods. The implication is that much of blind trust is a dynamic phenomenon.
In fact, we showed that in the initial rounds of the costly monitoring condition (i)
reciprocation is markedly more frequent and (ii) first movers get much more confi-
dent compared to the costless monitoring condition. Associated with this increase in
confidence is a marked increase in blind trust. In addition to beliefs, social and risk
preferences also appear to play a role in accounting for blind trust, as we find blind
trustors to be less risk and betrayal averse than other players.
While the average second mover anticipates the dynamic monitoring pattern well,
and responds to a lower perceived likelihood of monitoring with more cheating, we
argued that this alone cannot account for the remarkably high reciprocation rates
at the beginning of the costly monitoring condition. Our preferred interpretation
is a «second-order reputation building» hypothesis, according to which some sec-
ond movers try to strategically exploit the costliness of monitoring by investing in a
sufficiently favorable reputation in the initial periods in which they are likely to be
monitored in order induce blind trust and reap larger gains from exploitation in later
periods. We provided further results that support this interpretation. In particular,
in later periods of the costly monitoring condition, there was a shift in the payoff
distribution from first to second movers. However, high investments in reputation
of strategically acting second movers and the existence of intrinsically trustworthy
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responders shifted interactions in the costly monitoring condition on a sufficiently
cooperative trajectory, that on average second and first movers were better off.
Various avenues fur further research suggest themselves. First and foremost, our
suggested interpretation can be subjected to a more direct experimental test. Second,
in addition to the cost of monitoring, one may systematically vary the instrumental
benefits of information acquisition. We do so in in chapter 6 by shortening the length
of interaction horizon. Another interesting question is how humans cope with the
option to monitor at a cost in a indefinite horizon setup, similar to the ones assumed
in the Folk Theorem literature. We leave this for further research.
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Chapter 6
Costly Monitoring, Blind Trust, and the
Length of the Horizon
6.1 Introduction
The realization of mutual gains from cooperation is jeopardized by opportunism in a
variety of economic interactions. It is well known that the «shadow of the future»,
can have, under appropriate conditions, a disciplining function in those situations
(Rubinstein, 1979; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Kreps et al., 1982), and the exper-
imental evidence is clearly supporting (e.g. Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Andreoni &
Miller, 1993; Dal Bó, 2005; Gächter & Falk, 2002; Anderhub et al., 2002; Engle-
Warnick & Slonim, 2004). One key component of those «appropriate conditions»
is the perfectness of monitoring, that is, cheating is immediately and effortless de-
tected. In practice, however, this is routinely not the case. It is therefore an important
question how monitoring imperfections impact on relational enforcement.
There is an increasing number of theoretical (e.g. Fudenberg et al., 1994; Kan-
dori, 2002) and experimental (e.g. Holcomb & Nelson, 1997; Feinberg & Synder,
2002; Sell & Wilson, 1991; Cason & Khan, 1999) studies that introduce «noise» into
the system, that is, monitoring is subject to error. These papers have not only intro-
duced an important practical feature of relational enforcement, but have also deliv-
ered important insights into the role of different information structures in supporting,
or weakening, mutual cooperation in ongoing relationships. However, the entirely
passive characterization of monitoring is somewhat at odds with the more active na-
ture of monitoring in practice: Information on coplayers’ actions is routinely not
only imperfect, but players are frequently in a position to augment available infor-
mation through costly effort. Efforts to overcome imperfect information on coplay-
ers’ actions is well known in a variety of further economically relevant contexts as
well, such as shared resource management (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993;
Seabright, 1993), production teams (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Kandel & Lazear,
1992; Dong & Dow, 1993; Craig & Pencavel, 1995) and alliances (Acheson, 1975,
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1987, 1988; Palmer, 1991), labor relations (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Kanemoto &
MacLeod, 1991; Lazear, 1993), micro-finance (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2005) or
neighborhood watch (Sampson et al., 1997), to name just a few.
In chapter 5 we account for this fact, and thereby extended the experimental lit-
erature in a new direction by allowing important parts of the information structure
of the game to be endogenously determined by the players. Specifically, we reported
upon an experiment in which subjects play finite horizon modified trust games with
the novel feature that a cooperating first mover does not automatically learn her or
his payoff at the end of a period, but may actively acquire information about the sec-
ond mover’s action in that period. We exogenously varied the cost of information
acquisition, and found that the introduction of information costs results in less moni-
toring and an emergence of blind trust as a new behavior type, where (i) blind trust is
the dominant behavior under costly monitoring, (ii) first mover cooperation is more
frequent, and (iii) payoffs are higher if information is costly. Furthermore, neither
did the average first mover in the costly monitoring condition worse than in the cost-
less monitoring condition, nor did the average blind trustor worse than the average
monitor or defector.
In the present chapter, we extend on this paradigm. Standard game theoretic
arguments suggest that (under perfect monitoring) the length of the game horizon
plays a role in the decision to cooperate, and the experimental evidence is consistent
with this. For example, in an experiment using a stage game very similar to ours,
Anderhub et al. (2002) varied (within subjects) the length of matches between two
and ten rounds, and found a tendency for less cooperation in matches with a shorter
horizon compared to matches with a longer horizon. By very similar arguments one
may expect that the length of the horizon also plays a role in the decision to monitor
one’s interaction partner. The intuition is that the shorter the horizon, the smaller
the instrumental benefit from information acquisition. At the very extreme, if an
interaction definitely terminates in the current period, there is no instrumental benefit
at all, because there will be no opportunity to act on the information.
In this vain, we extend on chapter 5, in which the key exercise was an exogenous
variation of the cost of information acquisition, by (i) replicating the key results qual-
itatively for matches with a considerably shorter horizon, and (ii) exogenously vary
the instrumental benefit of information acquisition through a change in the length
of the matches. Specifically, we supplement the data set of chapter 5 by a new ex-
perimental condition in which the experimental game is manipulated along two di-
mensions for a two-by-two factorial between-subjects design. The first factor is the
size of the monitoring fee, which is either zero or five tokens. The second factor is
the matching protocol: in the long horizon condition, subjects are randomly matched
before the first period and then stay together for the entire 12 periods. In the short
horizon condition, subjects are also randomly matched before the first period but are
then re-matched after every two periods, such that the length of a match is 2 periods
in the short horizon condition.
The questions we ask are to what extent our previous results are robust to the
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length of the match horizon, and what are the eventual differences. Specifically, we
(i) investigate the effect of introducing an information fee given that the horizon is
short, and study given that information is (ii) costless or (iii) costly, respectively,
the changes when the horizon is shortened from twelve to just two periods. The
key results are the following: First, the key results of chapter 5 are qualitatively
replicated for matches with a considerably shorter horizon: (i) the introduction of
monitoring costs result in a decrease in the frequency of monitoring and an increase
in the frequency of blind trust. (ii) The latter effect compensated for the former such
that first mover cooperation was no less frequent under costly monitoring than under
costless monitoring. (iii) In addition, neither did the average first mover in the costly
monitoring condition worse than in the costless monitoring condition, nor did the
average blind trustor worse than the average monitor or defector. This reinforces the
findings that blind trust is a robust empirical phenomenon, and that it is caused by the
costliness of monitoring. Still, in short horizon matches blind trust remained clearly
the exception, which is the key difference to the long horizon condition.
Second, the average first mover’s behavior is independent from the length of the
horizon when monitoring is costless, while blind trust and overall first mover cooper-
ation is significantly more frequent in long horizon than short horizon matches when
monitoring was costly. Furthermore, while in long horizon matches first mover co-
operation is significantly more frequent under costly than under costless monitoring,
this difference vanishes in short horizon matches. In other words, while information
costs cause the emergence of blind trust independently from the length of the match,
the latter, as a proxy for the instrumental benefits of monitoring, significantly affects
the frequency of blind trust. In sum, consistent with standard economic reasoning, a
ceteris paribus increase of the cost of information acquisition decreases monitoring
and increases blind trust, while a ceteris paribus increase in the instrumental benefit
of information acquisition increases monitoring and decreases blind trust. In conse-
quence, we found that efficiency (and the average first mover’s share of it) is ceteris
paribus higher in long horizon than in short horizon matches, and ceteris paribus not
lower under costly than under costless monitoring. This is the main result of this
chapter. We underpin this result by an investigation of the behavioral dynamics and
a possible interpretation.
In the remainder we proceed as follows. In section 6.2 we describe the design
of the experiment and report on procedures and implementation. The results are
presented in section 6.3. We summarize and conclude in section 6.4.
6.2 Experiment
6.2.1 Design
We used the conventional (binary) trust game (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Kreps,
1990), as depicted in figure 6.1, as our point of departure. The first mover chooses
between cooperation (option «pink» in the instructions) or an outside option («yel-
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Figure 6.1: Experimental «stage game». The complete game is the twelve-fold sequence
with monitoring decisions in between.
low»). In case the outside option is chosen, both players get 15 tokens and the period
ends. In case the first mover chooses to cooperate, the period continues with the sec-
ond mover’s choice between cooperation (option «brown») or exploitation (option
«blue»). If the second mover cooperates, he gets 25 tokens and his coplayer 30 to-
kens. Otherwise, he exploits the first mover by taking 50 tokens for himself while
his coplayer gets 5 tokens. Every subject plays the game for 12 periods with one
randomly matched coplayer.
The novel feature in our experiment is that a cooperating first mover is not auto-
matically informed about the second mover’s choice. Specifically, without knowing
the second mover’s action, a first mover decides whether he wants to monitor the
second mover’s action or not. In the former case, the first mover was informed about
whether their coplayer responded with «brown» or «blue», respectively, at the end
of the round. In the latter case, (s)he received no information. Second movers were
never informed about whether their coplayer monitored them or not.1
In order to learn more about the belief dynamics, we supplemented the exper-
imental game by (non-incentivized) elicitation of the participants first-order beliefs
about their current coplayer’s behavior in a given period. In each period, before any
decisions were made, first movers were asked to state their belief about whether their
coplayer will respond with «brown» or «blue» to «pink», and second movers were
asked to state their belief whether their coplayer will play «pink» or «yellow». Given
1This is an empirically accurate representation of many, but not all monitoring activities. If the
second mover gets to know whether he or she is monitored, he or she may respond to this information
in the subsequent periods (if any). We study this setup and evaluate a «crowding» hypothesis in a
different paper.
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that «pink» was played, second movers were asked after their decision to state their
belief that their decision will be monitored.
The experimental game was manipulated along two dimensions for a two-by-two
factorial between-subjects design. The first factor was the size of the monitoring fee,
which was either zero or five tokens. The second factor was the matching protocol:
in the long horizon condition, subjects were randomly matched before the first period
and then stayed together for the entire 12 periods. In the short horizon condition,
subjects were also randomly matched before the first period but then were re-matched
after every two periods, that is, before periods 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11. The rematching was
done in a way that each pair of subjects met no more than once. In sum, while the
length of a match was 12 periods in the long horizon condition, it was 2 periods in
the short horizon condition, while still having each subject play 12 periods in total.2
Except for those variations, all treatment conditions were exactly identical.
6.2.2 Subjects and Procedures
Participants were recruited from the general undergraduate student population of
the University of Heidelberg using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner,
2004). In total 96 subjects participated of which 45.8 percent have been female and
85.4 percent German citizen. The mean age was 23.1 years. Subjects were randomly
assigned to treatment conditions, 24 subjects in each cell. No subject participated
more than once or in more than one treatment condition.
All experiments were conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Alfred-
Weber-Institute (AWI-Lab) at the University of Heidelberg in spring 2012. Upon
entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to the computer terminals.
Besides each terminal, an empty sheet of paper and a pen was prepared which partic-
ipants were allowed to use for taking notes during the experiment.3 Booths separated
the participants visually, ensuring that they made their decisions anonymously and
independently. Direct communication among them was strictly forbidden for the du-
ration of the entire session. Furthermore, subjects did not receive any information on
the personal identity of any other participant, neither before nor while nor after the
experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, that is, before any decisions were made,
subjects received detailed written instructions that explained the exact structure of
the game and the procedural rules. All subjects received the same instructions (only
the monitoring fee being replaced across conditions) and this was commonly known.
The experiment was framed in a sterile way using neutral language and avoiding
2We employed this matching procedure to assure that every subject played exactly 12 rounds, in-
dependently from the treatment condition. Note that the match length in the two conditions are the
extreme points of the range of «meaningful» horizons; a length of one round only is outside this range
because in this case it is impossible for a first mover to directly respond to the information acquired at
the end of the round.
3They were instructed to take this sheet with them after the experiment to ensure that nobody, in-
cluding the experimenters, could observe their eventual notes.
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value laden terms in the instructions (see supplementary material). Post-experimental
debriefings attested that no participant had difficulties in comprehending the instruc-
tions.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The exact timing of events was as follows. First, the subjects were randomly matched
into groups of two. Then twelve rounds of the experimental game described above
were played. The binary decisions were made by input boxes to be marked with the
computer mouse, beliefs were indicated by a screen slider with a resolution of 100
points. After the twelve rounds, subjects were asked to answer a short questionnaire
while the experimenter prepared the payoffs. Subjects were then informed about their
payoffs, and then individually called to the experimenter booth, payed out (according
to a random number matched to their decisions; no personal identities were used
throughout the whole experiment) and dismissed.
In every session subjects received a fixed show-up fee of e3, which was not part
of their endowment. The average session had a duration of about 45 minutes and
subjects earned e10.56 (e0.03 per token earned) on average, including the fixed
show-up fee, with a minimum of e5.85 and a maximum of e14.70. Earnings exceed
the local average hourly wage of a typical student job and can hence be considered
meaningful to the participants.
6.3 Results
As a first step we replicate the key results of chapter 5 qualitatively for matches
with a considerably shorter horizon. That is, in section 6.3.1 we focus on the short
horizon condition and study the differences between the costless and the costly mon-
itoring condition. This reinforces the findings that blind trust is a robust empirical
phenomenon, and that it is caused by the costliness of monitoring.
The second and core step of this chapter is a quantitative comparison of the long
and the short horizon conditions. In section 6.3.2 we fix monitoring costs at zero
and compare behavior in the short horizon condition to behavior in the long horizon
condition. In section 6.3.3 we do the same with monitoring costs fixed at five tokens.
In sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5, respectively, we investigate the behavioral dynamics and
a possible interpretation.
6.3.1 Costly monitoring in the short horizon condition
The key effects of introducing a monitoring fee are illustrated in figures 6.4 and 6.5.
The main result of chapter 5, the emergence of blind trust as monitoring becomes
costly, is qualitatively replicated for a considerably shorter horizon of just two peri-
ods. As evident from the bottom panel of figure 6.4, cooperation accompanied by
monitoring decreases by roughly 24 percent (from 34.7 percent to 26.4 percent) as
one moves from the costless to the costly monitoring condition. Following the pre-
vious chapter in basing this and the following statistical tests on a cross-section in
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Figure 6.2: Relative frequency of first mover cooperation by monitoring fee condition aver-
aged over time.
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Figure 6.3: Relative frequency of reciprocation by monitoring fee condition averaged over
time.
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which each observation is an individual average taken over all 12 rounds, this differ-
ence is not statistically significant, however (Mann-Whitney rank sum test, p = .337).
At the same time blind trust is more frequent if monitoring is costly than when it
is costless, a difference that is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney, p = .009) and
quantitatively sufficiently strong such that first mover cooperation rates are not lower
in the costly monitoring condition (Mann-Whitney, p = .954). First movers trusted
blindly in 10.4 percent (15 out of 144) of the cases, resulting in a total cooperation
rate of 36.8 percent (53 out of 144), which is not lower than in the costless monitor-
ing condition (35.4 percent, 51 out of 144). Still, blind trust is clearly the exception,
monitoring being the dominant behavior in both the costless and the costly monitor-
ing condition (this is a key difference to the long horizon condition, as shown below).
Result 6.1. There is less monitoring if it is costly then when it is costless. But there
is a behavior type «blind trust», cooperating without monitoring, that is more fre-
quent when monitoring is costly than when it is costless. Taken together, first mover
cooperation is no less frequent when monitoring is costly than when it is costless.
Likewise, as in chapter 5, the reciprocation rate is higher in the costly monitor-
ing condition, although the difference is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney,
p = .209). As a result, first movers earned on average no less in the costly monitoring
condition (14.9 tokens) than in the costless monitoring condition (14.6 tokens), even
including monitoring costs. The average second mover earned slightly less in the
the costly monitoring condition (23.0 tokens) than in the costless monitoring condi-
tion (24.3 tokens), the difference being not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney,
p = .663), such that both average players were, not notably worse off through the
introduction of monitoring costs.
Of course, more appropriate to judge whether blind trust does or does not pay is
to compare the payoff of blind trustors to the other behavioral alternatives.4 In the
costly monitoring condition, blind trustors clearly did best on average (18.3 tokens)
compared to defectors (15 tokens) and monitors (13.2 tokens). Thus, as in Goeschl
& Jarke (2012) we can conclude that, on average, blind trust was not unprofitable.
Result 6.2. The average first mover in the costly monitoring condition did not do
worse than in the costless monitoring condition. Likewise, the average blind trustor
did not do worse than the average monitor or defector.
Summing up so far, the key qualitative results reported in chapter 5 are upheld
even in matches with a significantly shorter horizon: First, blind trust is an empiri-
cally relevant option even in matches with only a two-period horizon, and monitoring
costs is the cause of its preponderance. Second, blind trust seems to be a success-
ful adaption to a setup in which monitoring is costly, since neither did the average
first mover in the costly monitoring condition worse than in the costless monitoring
4Note that we can do this because second movers were not informed about the monitoring deci-
sion. If they would have been, they might have adjusted their behavior and the comparison becomes
problematic. This methodical point was the second major reason for this design choice.
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Figure 6.4: Relative frequency of first mover cooperation by condition averaged over time.
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condition, nor did the average blind trustor worse than the average monitor or defec-
tor. However, there is also an important quantitative difference: While blind trust is
the dominant behavior under costly information in the long horizon condition, it is
much less frequent in the short horizon condition. In the remainder of this section,
we investigate this difference more thoroughly.
6.3.2 Comparison of short and long horizon condition under costless moni-
toring
We now build on the results of the long horizon condition from chapter 5 and in-
vestigate the effects of shortening the length of the matches. The key results are
illustrated in figures 6.4 and 6.5, which extend figures 6.2 and 6.3, respectively, by
the long horizon condition.
We begin by fixing the information fee at zero. Comparing aggregate first mover
cooperation rates across conditions, as depicted in the lower panel of figure 6.4, co-
operation is less frequent in the short horizon that in the long horizon condition. But
this comparison is not meaningful since there are more terminal periods in the for-
mer than in the latter. Thus, we need to compare non-terminal and terminal periods
in isolation. In doing so, it is evident from the top panel of figure 6.4 that under cost-
less monitoring first mover cooperation rates are approximately equal in the long and
short horizon conditions, respectively. In non-terminal periods, first movers cooper-
ated in 53 percent of the time (70 out of 132) in long horizon matches and in 52.8
percent percent of the time (38 out of 72) in short horizon matches. In non-terminal
periods, first movers cooperated in 16.7 percent of the time (2 out of 12) in long hori-
zon matches and in 18.1 percent percent of the time (13 out of 72) in short horizon
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Figure 6.5: Relative frequency of reciprocation by condition averaged over time.
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matches.
In addition, it is evident that blind trust is not an issue when monitoring is costless,
independently from the length of the horizon. In the long horizon condition, first
mover cooperation was never blind, while there was one instance of blind trust (out
of 69 instances of cooperation) in the short horizon condition, which is in the range
of performance error.5
Result 6.3. If monitoring is costless, the average first mover’s behavior is indepen-
dent from the length of the horizon.
6.3.3 Comparison of short and long horizon condition under costly monitor-
ing
Things are quite different if monitoring is costly. As already shown in detail in chap-
ter 5, blind trust emerges as a new behavior type if monitoring is costly, and in long
horizon matches this increase is strong enough such that (i) blind trust becomes the
dominant behavior and (ii) first mover cooperation is more frequent under costly
monitoring despite cooperation accompanied by monitoring being less frequent. As
evident from figure 6.4, these results are markedly mitigated but not eliminated by
shortening the match horizon to two periods only.
Comparing again non-terminal and terminal periods in isolation, it is evident from
the top panel of figure 6.4 that (with costly information) cooperation together with
monitoring is slightly higher in the short horizon than in the long horizon condition,
5This instance occurred in the first round, and the same subject cooperated another two times in the
second and the fifth round, these times together with monitoring, however.
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both in non-terminal (34.7 vs 30.3 percent) and terminal rounds (18.0 vs zero per-
cent). Continuing with basing our statistical tests on a cross-section of individual av-
erages, only the latter difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney, p = .015).
Blind trust, on the other hand, is clearly more frequent in the long horizon condition,
both in non-terminal (53.0 vs 12.5 percent) and terminal rounds (50.0 vs 8.3 per-
cent), with only the former difference being statistically significant (Mann-Whitney,
p= .002). As a result, under costly monitoring blind trust is an exception in short hori-
zon matches while it is the dominant behavior type in long horizon matches. Thus,
while information costs cause the emergence of blind trust independently from the
length of the match, the latter, as a proxy for the instrumental benefits of monitoring,
significantly affects the frequency of blind trust. In brief: consistent with standard
economic reasoning, a ceteris paribus increase of the cost of information acquisition
decreases monitoring and increases blind trust, while a ceteris paribus increase in the
instrumental benefit of information acquisition increases monitoring and decreases
blind trust. This is the main result of this chapter.
Putting blind trustors and monitors together, figure 6.4 illustrates that first mover
cooperation rates were clearly higher in the long horizon condition, both in non-
terminal (83.3 vs 47.2 percent) and terminal rounds (50.0 vs 26.4 percent), again
with only the former difference being (marginally) statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney, p = .067).
Result 6.4. If monitoring is costly, blind trust and overall first mover cooperation is
significantly more frequent in long horizon than short horizon matches. While in long
horizon matches first mover cooperation is significantly more frequent under costly
than under costless monitoring, this difference vanishes in short horizon matches.
A reason for this result is indicated by an investigation of the behavioral dynam-
ics. In chapter 5 we showed at length that blind trust in long horizon matches is
predominantly a dynamics phenomenon: If monitoring is costly, monitoring gets less
frequent and blind trust gets more frequent towards the terminal round, that is, there
is a shift from monitoring towards blind trust over time. Specifically, in non-terminal
rounds of the long horizon condition with costly monitoring, first movers cooperated
together with monitoring their coplayer in 30.3 percent (40 out of 132) of the time,
while they never monitored their coplayer (0 out of 12) in terminal rounds. In the first
period, the majority of cooperating first movers monitor, blind trustors are a minority.
However, this changes over time, as blind trust increases notably in the initial four
periods and then remaining approximately stable, while the frequency of monitoring
successively decreases over time. Thus, blind trust is clearly the exception initially
and needs some time to develop, about three to four periods.
This suggests why blind trust has a harder time to develop in the short horizon
condition, because there are just two periods, that is, only one period for a first mover
to «test» her or his coplayer. At the same time there are much weaker incentives for
second movers to build a good reputation.
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6.3.4 Strategic reputation building and the dynamics of blind trust in long
matches
To investigate this further, we first review the key dynamics in the long horizon con-
dition (see chapter 5 for a more extensive treatment). We begin by taking a closer
look at the dynamics of second mover behavior. The upper panel of figure 6.5 depicts
aggregate second mover behavior splitted up by terminal and non-terminal periods.
Consistent with «standard» strategic reputation building, cooperation rates in the long
horizon condition are, both under costless and costly monitoring, clearly higher in
non-terminal rounds than in terminal rounds. When information was costless, second
movers reciprocated in 71.4 percent (50 out of 70) of the time in non-terminal rounds,
and in 50.0 percent (1 out of 2) of the time in terminal rounds.
In chapter 5 we conjectured that second movers have a stronger incentive to build
a good reputation if monitoring is costly, because it may induce the first mover not
only to cooperate but perhaps also to abstain from monitoring, that is, to trust blindly.
We called this «second-order reputation building».6 Consistent with this, recipro-
cation rates in non-terminal periods were with 82.7 percent (91 out of 110) indeed
higher under costly monitoring than under costless monitoring (reciprocation rates in
terminal periods were also at 50.0 percent, 3 out of 6). In fact, while reciprocation
rates were similar in both treatment conditions towards the terminal period, over the
initial rounds they are clearly higher in the costly monitoring condition, at remarkable
100 percent in period 1 through 3, than in the costless monitoring condition.
In addition, we showed that the within-treatment dynamics are quite consistent
with the average second mover’s belief of being monitored in the current period,
but also that a simple response to this belief cannot account for the differences be-
tween treatments. In the long horizon condition the average second mover anticipated
the average first mover’s monitoring pattern (as reported above) remarkably closely:
While the average second mover believes to be monitored with almost-certainty
throughout the whole match in the costless monitoring condition, (s)he expects to
be monitored predominantly at the beginning of a match, less so towards the end,
under costly monitoring. In turn, the belief of being monitored and the likelihood of
return cooperation went together (Kendall’s τb = 0.168, p = .040), that is, the average
6In standard repeated games with perfect monitoring (but incomplete information), strategically
acting second movers can build a favorable reputation in order to induce the first mover to cooper-
ate until close to termination (Kreps et al., 1982). In our game, second movers can induce the first
movers not only to cooperate, but also to refrain from monitoring. We suspect that the incentive for
the latter («second-order reputation building») is much stronger than the former («first-order reputation
building»), because under perfect monitoring the maximum number of periods in which a strategically
acting second mover can exploit the first mover is equal to one (assuming that the first mover will not co-
operate again once cheated), while in our game there is the possibility of cheating over multiple periods
once the first mover trusts blindly. Intuitively, this may lead (some) second movers deliberately try to
«earn» a reputation in the initial periods in which they are likely to be monitored, favorable enough to be
trusted blindly later on. Strategically acting subjects may do so in order to exploit their coplayers more
easily and perhaps over multiple periods. This strategic incentive is missing in the costless monitoring
condition, since second movers do not believe in blind trust anyway (and this belief is justified).
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cooperating second mover had a stronger belief of being monitored (.945 in the cost-
less monitoring condition, .652 in the costly monitoring condition) than the average
defecting second mover (.880 in the costless monitoring condition, .471 in the costly
monitoring condition). As a result, reciprocation rates were rather stable in the cost-
less monitoring condition, and markedly decreasing in time in the costly monitoring
condition. However, since the average second mover’s belief of being monitored was
generally stronger in the costless monitoring condition, a simple response to this this
belief cannot account for the treatment differences.
As a possible explanation of those differences, we advanced the «second-order
reputation building» hypothesis. Support for this conjecture comes from the fact that
the strategy is in some sense quite successful. First, rank correlation between first
movers’ belief about reciprocation in period t + 1 and an indicator variable that is
unity if a respective first mover detected her or his coplayer to cooperate in period t
is strongly positive (Kendall’s τb = .555, p = .000), that is, the average first mover be-
came much more confident (pessimistic) in t +1 if (s)he observed her or his coplayer
reciprocating (defecting) in t. As a result, while the average first mover’s prior about
their cooperation being reciprocated is approximately equal at .4 in both conditions,
there is a marked increase of confidence in the initial periods of the costly monitor-
ing condition, which may be viewed as justified given full reciprocation, whereas the
belief does not change much over time in the costless monitoring condition. This is
illustrated by the circles connected with a hatched line in figure 5.6.
Second, correlation between the first movers’ belief about reciprocation and their
own cooperation is strongly positive and significant both in the costless monitor-
ing condition (Kendall’s τb = .618, p = .000) and the costly monitoring condition
(Kendall’s τb = .584, p = .000). Interestingly, however, separating first mover co-
operation by cooperation coupled with monitoring and blind trust if information is
costly, it turns out that only the latter is correlated with first movers’ beliefs about
reciprocation (Kendall’s τb = .410, p = .000), the former is not (Kendall’s τb = .059,
p = .419). Thus, a first mover’s confidence in reciprocation appears to be a key deter-
minant of blind trust. In addition to beliefs, social and risk preferences also appear
to play a role in accounting for blind trust. Post-experimental surveys suggest that
it is especially the relatively risk tolerant and less betrayal averse first movers who
trust blindly. Blind trust in our experiment is positively correlated with an experi-
mentally validated survey measure of individual risk preference (Kendall’s τb = .259,
p < .001),7 and it is negatively correlated with a measure of negatively reciprocal in-
clination (Kendall’s τb = −.223, p = .003), that has been argued to be a good proxy
for betrayal aversion.8
7The item contains the question «Are you generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid
risks?», and respondents answer the question on a 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (very risk
averse) to 10 (very risk seeking). The item is used in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and
has been shown to be good predictor of behavior in experiments with decisions under risk (Dohmen
et al., 2011).
8The items have also been implemented in the SOEP and read «If I suffer a serious wrong, I will
take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost» and «If somebody offends me, I will offend
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Finally, the dynamics of realized payoffs depicted in in figure 5.9 also point to-
ward second-order reputation building. In light of the above results it is no surprise
that interactions were more efficient in the costly monitoring condition than in the
costless monitoring condition. In the latter (depicted in the left-hand column), the
frequency of mutual cooperation is moderately positive throughout the initial periods,
but strongly decreasing towards the end, partly through first movers stopping to co-
operate (foreseeing the second movers’ strategic incentive to defect), partly through
second movers stopping reciprocating. This pattern is quite consistent with «conven-
tional first-order» reputation building (Kreps et al., 1982). In consequence, partici-
pants realized on average 53 percent (13.3 tokens) of the surplus from cooperation
throughout the non-terminal periods, while efficiency sharply decreased to only 17
percent (average surplus realized 4.2 tokens) in the terminal period.9 Under costly
monitoring, the frequency of mutual cooperation is notably higher than in the cost-
less monitoring condition in the initial rounds, while dropping to equally low levels
towards the end. However, this is not entirely passed through to efficiency: average
joint payoffs are higher in the costly monitoring condition in every single round, and
drop somewhat less sharply towards the end. The reason is that in the costly monitor-
ing condition a larger fraction of the diminishing mutual cooperation rates towards
the terminal period is caused by second movers defecting, while in the costless mon-
itoring condition it is predominantly caused by first movers’ choice of the outside
option. Since exchange efficiency is determined entirely by the first movers’ action,
less surplus gets lost in the costly monitoring condition. Specifically, participants re-
alized on average 75 percent (77 percent, or 19.3 tokens, throughout the non-terminal
periods, and 50 percent, or 12.5 tokens, in the terminal period) of the surplus from
cooperation in the costly monitoring condition, compared to only 50 percent in the
costless monitoring condition.
Interesting, however, are the distributional dynamics. In the costless monitoring
condition, the distribution of payoffs between first and second movers was quite sta-
ble with first movers reaping on average 44 percent of the joint payoff (or realized
surplus), minimally 39 percent (in rounds 1 and 3) and maximally 49 percent (in
rounds 6, 7, and 9). Most importantly, there is no round in which the average first
mover made losses by cooperating: the lowest average payoffs were 15.8 and 15.4
tokens in the penultimate and ultimate periods, respectively, which is still slightly
above the outside option payoff of 15 tokens. In contrast, the payoff distribution is
less stable in the costly monitoring condition, exhibiting a shift from first to second
movers over time. In the first eight periods, the average first mover reaps with 49 per-
him/her back», and respondents can answer on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 («does not apply to
me at all») and 7 («applies to me perfectly). I take the sum of both responses as measure of negatively
reciprocal inclination. Fehr (2009a) argues that this measure is a good proxy for betrayal aversion.
9The surplus was 25 tokens per exchange, the difference between the joint payoff from mutual coop-
eration of 55 tokens and the outside option payoff of 30 tokens. Note that the efficiency of exchange is
determined entirely by the first movers’ action, the second movers’ actions have (statically) only distri-
butional consequences. But of course, reciprocation has indirect (dynamic) consequences for efficiency
through its repercussions on future first mover behavior.
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cent of the joint payoff (or realized surplus) a somewhat larger share in the costly than
in the costless monitoring condition (44 percent), minimally 45 percent (in round 6)
and maximally 53 percent (in round 8). In the remaining four periods the distribution
strongly shifted towards second movers: in those periods, the average first mover
received only 36 percent of the joint payoff (or realized surplus), minimally 27 per-
cent (in round 11) and maximally 40 percent (in round 10). Interestingly, however,
averaged over time those distributional differences between the conditions virtually
cancel out, first movers receiving 45 percent of the joint payoff (or realized surplus) in
the costly monitoring condition, and 44 percent in the costless monitoring condition.
As a result, both first movers (21.9 vs 18.9 tokens) and second movers (26.9 vs 23.7
tokens) were on average better off in the costly compared to the costless monitoring
condition. This suggest that strategic second movers are at least partially successful
in reaping larger shares of payoffs towards the end, but while they invested in a rep-
utation that merits of being trusted blindly, a much more cooperative trajectory than
the one in the costless monitoring condition is entered.
6.3.5 Strategic reputation building and the dynamics of blind trust in short
matches
Do we find similar patterns in the short horizon condition, and if so, what are the
differences? Can those differences account for result 6.4?
In fact, as evident from figure 6.5, comparing second mover behavior in terminal
and non-terminal periods we find similar qualitative patterns in the short horizon con-
dition. When information was costless, second movers reciprocated in 36.8 percent
(14 out of 38) of the time in non-terminal rounds, and in 30.7 percent (4 out of 13)
of the time in terminal rounds. Under costly monitoring, reciprocation occurred in
70.6 percent (24 out of 34) of the time in non-terminal rounds, and in 21.0 percent
(4 out of 19) of the time in terminal rounds. Thus, strategic reputation building is an
issue even if the match length is just two periods (the minimum), and, consistent with
the second-order reputation building hypothesis, the incentive to do so appears to be
much stronger in the costly monitoring condition.
However, the incentive for reputation building, both first-order and second-order,
seems to be absolutely weaker in the short horizon condition, as reciprocation rates
are lower under both costless and costly monitoring, respectively.
Result 6.5. Reciprocation is more frequent in non-terminal than in terminal peri-
ods in all treatment conditions. In non-terminal periods, reciprocation is (i) more
frequent under costly than under costless monitoring in both long and short horizon
matches, and (ii) more frequent in long horizon than in short horizon matches under
both costless and costly monitoring.
Again, it can be shown that the within-treatment dynamics are quite consistent
with the average second mover’s belief of being monitored in the current period,
but also that a simple response to this belief cannot account for the differences be-
tween treatments. In the short horizon condition the average second mover antic-
189
Figure 6.6: Aggregate dynamics of first mover cooperation and beliefs about reciprocation
in the short horizon condition. The left column depicts the costless monitoring condition, the
right column the costly monitoring condition.
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ipated the average first mover’s monitoring pattern (as reported above) remarkably
closely: While the average second mover believes to be monitored with almost-
certainty throughout the whole match in the costless monitoring condition (average
belief of 0.940 in initial and 0.946 in terminal periods), (s)he expects to be monitored
predominantly at the beginning of a match (average belief 0.726), less in the terminal
period (average belief 0.567), under costly monitoring. This fits together with the
fact that reciprocation rates were more stable over the two periods of a match in the
costless monitoring condition, while there is a pronounced drop from the first to the
second period in the costly monitoring condition. However, since again the average
second mover’s belief of being monitored is generally stronger in the costless mon-
itoring condition, a simple response to this belief cannot account for the treatment
differences.
What about second-order reputation building here? The dynamics of realized
payoff distribution is again most illuminating. Interesting, however, are the distribu-
tional dynamics. In the costless monitoring condition, first movers reaped on average
a larger share of the joint payoff (or realized surplus) in terminal periods (42.2 per-
cent) than in non-terminal periods (33.8 percent).10 In contrast, this is reversed under
costly monitoring: the average first mover got a larger share of the joint payoff (or re-
alized surplus) in non-terminal periods (42.1 percent) than in terminal periods (36.0
percent).11
How did first movers respond? As evident from figure 6.6, first movers were gen-
erally more confident that their cooperation will be reciprocated in the first than in the
10For comparison, in the long horizon condition first movers got on average 44.4 percent of the joint
payoff (or realized surplus), 44.3 percent in non-terminal periods and 45.1 percent in terminal periods.
11For comparison, in the long horizon condition first movers got on average 44.9 percent of the joint
payoff (or realized surplus), 45.4 percent in non-terminal periods and 38.2 percent in terminal periods.
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second period of a match, that is, they anticipated the strategic incentive to defect at
the end of the match from the very beginning. In addition, confidence and cooperation
go together. Indeed, that the first movers’ belief dynamics are crucial in accounting
for observed behavior is suggested by the fact taht the average first mover’s prior was
approximately equal at 0.4 in all four treatment conditions, whereas the further path
over time differs.
Result 6.6. On average, first movers’ confidence about reciprocation is never in-
creasing in the course of a match in the short horizon condition, and generally lower
than in the long horizon condition.
This suggests a reason for the aggregate differences in the frequencies of coop-
eration and blind trust. First, first movers anticipate the strategic incentive to cheat
in the terminal period quite well in all conditions. Second, the dynamics in the long
horizon condition with costly monitoring suggests that blind trust needs some time
to develop, a «testing phase» in which second movers have a very strong incentive to
behave well. These two facts together suggest that a horizon of two periods is just
too short for the latter dynamic to happen, since the second period is also the terminal
period of a match, such that even if a first mover’s cooperation is reciprocated, any
eventual increase in confidence is countervailed by the anticipated strategic incentive
to defect. In sum, while a long enough testing phase with high cooperation rates fa-
cilitates a shift from monitoring to blind trust over time in long horizon matches, a
testing phase of just one period is apparently to short to enter the same cooperative
trajectory.
It is therefore no surprise that efficiency is generally lower in short than in long
horizon matches. Under costless monitoring, participants realized on average 53 per-
cent (13.2 tokens) of the surplus from cooperation in non-terminal periods, while
efficiency sharply decreased to only 18 percent (average surplus realized 4.5 tokens)
in terminal periods.12 Under costly monitoring, participants realized on average 32
percent (40 percent, or 10.1 tokens, throughout the non-terminal periods, and 23 per-
cent, or 5.7 tokens, in the terminal period) of the surplus from cooperation in the
costly monitoring condition, compared to 35 percent in the costless monitoring con-
dition.13 Interestingly, under costless monitoring the lower average efficiency is just
due to the fact that there are more non-terminal periods in a match: average efficiency
in non-terminal periods is exactly equal (53 percent), and average efficiency in termi-
nal periods is approximately equal (17 and 18 percent, respectively) in long and short
matches. Under costly monitoring, however, efficiency is in all respects higher in
12Mutual cooperation occurred in 19.4 percent of the cases in non-terminal periods and only 5.6
percent in terminal periods. For comparison, in the long horizon condition mutual cooperation occurred
in 37.9 percent of the cases in non-terminal periods and 8.3 percent in terminal periods.
13The frequency of mutual cooperation is notably higher than in the costless monitoring condition
in non-terminal rounds (33.3 percent), while dropping to equally low levels in terminal periods (5.6
percent). For comparison, in the long horizon condition mutual cooperation occurred in 68.9 percent of
the cases in non-terminal periods and 25 percent in terminal periods.
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long horizon (77 percent in non-terminal and 50 percent in terminal rounds) than in
short horizon matches (40 percent in non-terminal and 23 percent in terminal rounds).
Result 6.7. Efficiency is ceteris paribus higher in long horizon than in short horizon
matches, and ceteris paribus not lower under costly than under costless monitoring.
The average first mover’s share of the realized surplus is also ceteris paribus higher
in long horizon than in short horizon matches, and ceteris paribus not lower un-
der costly than under costless monitoring. However, in both long and short horizon
matches, the average first mover’s share is higher in terminal than in non-terminal
periods under costless monitoring, while reverse is true under costly monitoring.
6.4 Conclusion
We reported upon an experiment in which subjects play finite horizon modified trust
games in which cooperating first movers do not automatically learn their payoff at
the end of a period, but may actively acquire information about the second mover’s
action in that period.
As a first step we replicated the key results of chapter 5 qualitatively for matches
with a considerably shorter horizon. In matches with a length of just two periods,
we studied the differences between a costless and a costly monitoring condition, and
found that the introduction of monitoring costs resulted in a decrease in the frequency
of monitoring and an increase in the frequency of blind trust. The latter effect com-
pensated for the former such that first mover cooperation was no less frequent under
costly monitoring than under costless monitoring. In addition, neither did the average
first mover in the costly monitoring condition worse than in the costless monitoring
condition, nor did the average blind trustor worse than the average monitor or defec-
tor. This reinforces the findings that blind trust is a robust empirical phenomenon,
and that it is caused by the costliness of monitoring. Still, in short horizon matches
blind trust remained clearly the exception, which is the key difference to the long
horizon condition, a comparison that was the second and core step of this paper.
In comparing behavior in long and short horizon matches, we found that the av-
erage first mover’s behavior was independent from the length of the horizon when
monitoring was costless, while blind trust and overall first mover cooperation was
significantly more frequent in long horizon than short horizon matches when mon-
itoring was costly. Furthermore, while in long horizon matches first mover cooper-
ation was significantly more frequent under costly than under costless monitoring,
this difference vanished in short horizon matches. In other words, while information
costs cause the emergence of blind trust independently from the length of the match,
the latter, as a proxy for the instrumental benefits of monitoring, significantly affects
the frequency of blind trust. In sum, consistent with standard economic reasoning, a
ceteris paribus increase of the cost of information acquisition decreases monitoring
and increases blind trust, while a ceteris paribus increase in the instrumental benefit
of information acquisition increases monitoring and decreases blind trust. This is the
main result of this paper.
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We underpinned this result by an investigation of the behavioral dynamics and
a possible interpretation. In chapter 5 we showed at length that blind trust in long
horizon matches is predominantly a dynamic phenomenon: If monitoring is costly,
monitoring gets less frequent and blind trust gets more frequent towards the terminal
round, that is, there is a shift from monitoring towards blind trust over time: blind
trust is clearly the exception initially and needs some time to develop, about three to
four periods. This suggests why blind trust has a harder time to develop in the short
horizon condition, because there are just two periods, that is, only one period for a
first mover to «test» her or his coplayer. At the same time there are much weaker
incentives for second movers to build a good reputation.
The latter is underpinned by the finding that reciprocation was more frequent
in non-terminal than in terminal periods in all treatment conditions, while in non-
terminal periods, reciprocation is (i) more frequent under costly than under costless
monitoring in both long and short horizon matches, and (ii) more frequent in long
horizon than in short horizon matches under both costless and costly monitoring. In
addition, in both long and short horizon matches, the average first mover’s share of
the realized surplus is higher in terminal than in non-terminal periods under costless
monitoring, while reverse is true under costly monitoring.
The former is supported by the dynamics of first mover behavior and beliefs.
That first movers’ belief dynamics are crucial in accounting for observed behavior
is suggested by the fact the average first mover’s prior was approximately equal at
0.4 in all four treatment conditions, whereas the further path over time differs: While
the average first mover’s confidence about reciprocation was strongly increasing over
the initial periods, it is never increasing in the course of a match in the short horizon
condition, and generally lower than in the long horizon condition.
This suggests a reason for the aggregate differences in the frequencies of coop-
eration and blind trust. First, first movers anticipate the strategic incentive to cheat
in the terminal period quite well in all conditions. Second, the dynamics in the long
horizon condition with costly monitoring suggests that blind trust needs some time
to develop, a «testing phase» in which second movers have a very strong incentive to
behave well. These two facts together suggest that a horizon of two periods is just
too short for the latter dynamic to happen, since the second period is also the terminal
period of a match, such that even if a first mover’s cooperation is reciprocated, any
eventual increase in confidence is countervailed by the anticipated strategic incentive
to defect. In sum, while a long enough testing phase with high cooperation rates fa-
cilitates a shift from monitoring to blind trust over time in long horizon matches, a
testing phase of just one period is apparently to short to enter the same cooperative
trajectory.
In consequence, we found that efficiency (and the average first mover’s share of
it) is ceteris paribus higher in long horizon than in short horizon matches, and ceteris
paribus not lower under costly than under costless monitoring.
Various avenues fur further research suggest themselves. For example, an in-
teresting question is whether the incentive to monitor is altered by adding a costly
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punishment option to the first mover’s action set. Another interesting question is how
humans cope with the option to monitor at a cost in a indefinite horizon setup, similar
to the ones assumed in the Folk Theorem literature. We leave this for further research.
194
Chapter 7
Communication Technology and Gen-
eralized Trust: Evidence from the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel
7.1 Introduction
The approach to view trust as a historically or culturally determined, short-term in-
variant variable has a large follwing in the social sciences (e.g. Arrow, 1971; Dore,
1987; Putnam, 1993b,a; Fukuyama, 1995), and a bulk of empirical studies has accu-
mulated that uses some measure of trust, cooperativeness, or «social capital», within
a population as an independent variable to predict various economic outcomes (e.g.
La Porta et al., 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001; Guiso et al., 2004,
2008). In economic theory, on the other hand, trust is entirely endogenous, com-
pletely determined by the structure of current interaction (e.g. Kreps et al., 1982;
Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Fudenberg et al., 1994). In particular, the literature on
matching games (e.g. Bendor & Mookherjee, 1990; Kandori, 1992a; Ellison, 1994a),
and the related literature on indirect reciprocity in biology (see Nowak & Sigmund,
2005, for an overview), highlights the critical role of information transmission to
sustain bootstrap notions of trust in a population. The central idea is that individuals
condition their expectations about others’ behavior, and hence their own behavior, on
what they know about their interaction partners’ past, their reputation. However, the
literature is fairy unspecific about the exact mechanisms how such information might
be transmitted; some degree of information dispersal generally enters the model as
an exogenous assumption from the outset. One obvious candidate is communica-
tion technology. Distance communication technology renders it easier to acquire and
spread information about others’ in the relevant community. Can we expect, there-
fore, that people connected to such a communication network find it easier to trust
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others?1
Empirically, very little systematic research exists along these lines. In more
distantly related work, studies on feedback mechanisms embedded in online mar-
ketplaces suggest that they facilitate trust and exchange (e.g. Ba & Pavlou, 2002;
Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002; Resnick et al., 2006). There is also some research
studying some fairly specific contexts, usually relying on quite limited data bases
(e.g. Picot et al., 1996; Fandy, 2000; Ryssel et al., 2004). In a seminal study us-
ing a general data base, Fisman & Khanna (1999) constucted a fourty-country cross-
sectional dataset from survey data taken from the 1990-93 Wold Values Survey (WVS)
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Yearbook 1994 to examine
whether there is a relationship between telephones per capita and responses to the
question «Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?», an item intended to measure the
repondent’s trust in a representative member of the relevant population. In fact, they
find a positive relationship. However, they also point to two key limitations of their
study. First, they admit that their coarse and highly aggregated data does not quite
correspond to the theoretical micro-level approaches that speak to the relationship be-
tween information flows and trust. Second, they recognize the difficulties associated
with the WVS survey item as a measure of trust.
The current study extends on this study, addressing both issues, and contributing
to an assessment of the robustness of the relationship. First, I use a large cross-section
of recent (the 2008 wave) individual level micro-data taken from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) that draws samples which are representative for the popu-
lation in Germany. Second, the SOEP contains an improved, more fine-git, and ex-
perimentally validated measure of generalized trust. Third, I am able to control for a
much larger set of confounding variables, comprising inter alia socio-demographics,
education, social network inclusion, and even individual attitudes such as risk and
time preferences. Fourth, I am able to draw on an experimentally validated measure
of beliefs into others trustworthiness in order to investigate whether the effect of com-
munication technology connectivity on trust is mediated through beliefs, as economic
theory predicts. Finally, as the communication infrastructure underwent significant
change in the last two decades, I extend the set of considered communication tech-
nologies to include cellular phones, internet (both narrow and broad bandwidth), and
television. In sum, while the replication of the basic analysis of Fisman & Khanna
(1999) is a first step of the present study, it significantly extends on it along a number
of dimensions, providing for some original contributions to the literature.
I find the follwing. First, the results show a gap in measured trust between those
repondents who have a landline phone in their household and those who do not,
1This might happen in two respects. First, connected individuals know that they are less easily
exploited because they are more likely to be informed about the identity of cheaters, such that they find
it easier to trust those with whom they interact. Second, connected individuals have means to spread
information about cheaters to others, which may serve as a deterrent to cheat upon them in the first
place, bootstrapping their trust.
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confirming the results of Fisman & Khanna (1999). Second, the existence of this
gap is robust to alternative estimation techniques and the specific construction of the
dependent variable. Third, I find this gap also using the item intended to measure
beliefs in others’ trustworthiness more directly. Furthermore, including the variable
into the original specification as a predictor, the gap vanishs, suggesting that the
effect is indeed mediated by beliefs. Fourth, the gap narrows significantly as vari-
ables that capture the level of education and local network inclusion are controlled
for. Since Fisman & Khanna (1999) did not control for those variables, their results
might be biased upwards. Fifth, there are no signficant effects of celluar phone or
narrow bandwidth interent connectivity, but there is a significantly positive effect of
broad bandwidth internet connectivity, and a significantly negative effect of televi-
sion posession. The order of magnitude of the latter effect is considerable, and may
be an interesting input for further research.
The remaineder of the chapter is organized as follows. I describe the basic statis-
tical model specification and the dataset in section 7.2 . The results are presented in
section 7.3. I conlcude in section 7.4.
7.2 Specification and data
Generalizing on Fisman & Khanna (1999), the baseline specification is a linear model
of the form
y = α +xβ +zγ +ε
where y is a survey measure of trust, x is a vector of dummies indicating the pres-
ence of various information technologies in the respondents’ household, z is vector
of control variables, α represents a constant, and ε the error term. The coefficient
vectors β and γ are to be estimated, whereas the former is the one of focal interest in
the present study.
The dataset is a cross-section constructed from the 2008 wave of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).2 I have complete data vectors on a sample of 17,915
individual respondents. I now describe the variables in more detail.
7.2.1 Dependent variables
The National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey (GSS) item reads
«Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people?», with possible responses «most people can
be trusted» and «can’t be too careful». The same item is implemented in the World
Values Survey (WVS). Since Fisman & Khanna (1999) conducted their study using
this item, it has been subject to criticism. Most importantly, the two response cate-
gories are not mutually exclusive since respondents might consistently agree to both
2One item surveying membership in religious organizations were taken from the 2007 wave, because
it was not included in the 2008 wave.
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answers (Yamagishi et al., 2002). A possible consequence is that the interpretation of
the item can differ widely among different societies (e.g. Miller & Mitamura, 2003).3
To address this problem, the SOEP contains an improved three-item battery (for
a detailed description see Naef & Schupp, 2009b). The first two items just split
the GSS/WVS question up into two parts: «On the whole one can trust people» and
«Nowadays one can’t rely on anyone», with four answer categories, respectively, «to-
tally agree», «agree slightly», «disagree slightly», and «disagree totally». The third
item is included to address a criticism of the GSS/WVS question that answers may
signicantly depend on how people understand «most people», in particular, whether
they include people they know personally or not (Reeskens & Hooghe 2008). The
last item therefore explicitly asks about strangers: «If one is dealing with strangers,
it is better to be careful before one can trust them», whith the same answer categories
as before. I code the responses «totally agree» and «agree slightly» by 2 and 1, and
the responses «disagree slightly» and «disagree totally» by −1 and −2, respectively.
Naef & Schupp (2009b) show that the above item battery has a high degree of
reliability. However, economists are ultimately interested in behavior, so what about
its behavioral relevance?4 By now there are a number of studies that connected be-
havioral experiments with surveys in order to shed light on this issue. In general,
the results are somewhat mixed. Using a sample of students at Harvard University,
Glaeser et al. (2000) found that the GSS/WVS generalized trust item is not signifi-
cantly related to first mover behavior but to second mover behavior in a trust game
experiment. Using a large sample that was representative for the Dutch population,
Bellemare & Kröger (2007) found that the variables predicting the responses the
item and behavior in a trust game experiment were not identical. On the other hand,
Sapienza et al. (2007) found significant correlation between survey responses and
behavior in a trust game experiment with a sample of University of Chicago MBA
students. Using a sizable and heterogenous sample of urban and rural dwellers in
Russia and Belarus, Gächter et al. (2004) found the GSS/WVS generalized trust item
positively correlated with contribution behavior in a public good game experiment,
although not significantly so. In a study with a large sample that was representative
for the Danish population, Thöni et al. (2012) found this correlation to be signficant.
Further research is certainly needed to explain this conflicting evidence. A possi-
ble explanation is that people with different cultural backgrounds have different situ-
ations in mind when confronted with the survey question (which is why I highlighted
the sample populations of the above studies). Support for this conjecture comes from
a study by Holm & Danielson (2005) who found that the survey measure is correlated
with first mover behavior in a trust game experiment with undergraduates in Sweden
but not in Tanzania. Most importantly for the present study, Fehr et al. (2002c) and
3Miller & Mitamura (2003) showed, for example, that Japanese students are more trusting than
Americans measured with the above question from the GSS. Measuring trust and caution separately,
they find that American students are more trusting than Japanese students but at the same time also
more cautious.
4A discussion of this issue is missing in Fisman & Khanna (1999), so the following discussion is an
additional contribution relative to their paper.
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Naef & Schupp (2009b) found trust measured by the three-iteam SOEP battery to be
significantly correlated with first mover behavior but not second mover behavior in a
trust game experiment with a sample that was representative for the German popula-
tion, and Naef & Schupp (2009b) find this to be robust to changes in the experimental
protocol, such as stake sizes. We can therefore have some degree of confidence that
the responses to the survey items have some behavioral relevance.
The main dependent variable that I will use throughout the analysis is a simple
index built from the reponses of the three trust items by just adding them up («simple
trust index» in what follows). Thus, this variable takes values between −6 and 6,
and has a mean of −0.68 and a standard deviation of 2.50. To check whether results
depend on this specific construction, I redo the anlysis with four alternative depen-
dent variables. The second variable is obtained by performing a principal-component
factor analysis with the three trust items as parameters, that indeed yields a unique
factor that loads with 0.80, 0.83, and 0.60 on the three items, respectively, and using
predicted rotated factor loadings as an alternative trust index («factor trust index» in
what follows).5 This variable is automatically normalized to have a mean of approxi-
mately zero (actually 0.004) and a standard deviation of approximately one (actually
1.001), and exhibits a range between −2.15 and 2.59. Finally, I will perform all anal-
yses with each of the three items individually. A further dependent variable that is
more directly targeted at measuring respondent’s belief in others’ trustworthiness will
be introduced in section 7.3.2.
7.2.2 Focal predictors
The focal predictors in the present study are indicators of presence of a number of
information technologies in the respondents’ household. Fisman & Khanna (1999)
used a single variable as a proxy for the average individual’s access to two-way com-
munication technology in a given country, the number of phones per capita. Corre-
spondingly, the main variable in the present study indicates the presence of an or-
dinary landline telephone, which has a relative frequency of 0.937 in our sample. I
have further data on variables that indicate the presence of a celluar phone (0.877), a
narrow bandwidth internet connection (0.344), and a broad bandwidth internet con-
nection (0.557). Furthermore, I consider the one-way communication technology
television (0.974).
7.2.3 Control variables
One key contribution of the present study is the inclusion of a considerable set of
individual-level control variables that allow for extensive checks of robustness. I will
cluster the variables thematically into six batteries and include them in the analysis
one at a time to obtain seven model specifications of increasing richness. The first
battery is a set of federal state indicators to control for regional fixed effects. I will
5The complete results of the factor analysis are available upon request.
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also check for effects of including an additional indicator that controls for former-
GDR history fixed effects (but there will be no changes). I have chosen Saxony-
Anhalt as the reference category, because it exhibits the lowest average trust index.
The second set consists of just one variable, household income. The major reason
is a justified concern that posession of the various information technologies might
merely pick up an income effect. I use the Infratest calculated household net income
per month measured in Euro (mean 2,595.60, standard deviation 1,888.61, strongly
skewed to the right) and take the natural logarithm for the regressions.
The third set consists of naturally exogenous (physical) socio-demographics, specif-
ically height measured in centimeters (mean 171.43, standard deviation 9.41), weight
measured in kilograms (mean 76.71, standard deviation 15.98), age measured in
years (mean 50.04, standard deviation 17.22), and a gender dummy that indicates
female with reference category male (relative frequency 0.522). Gender and age dif-
ferences have been shown to exist in a variety of domains, and matter also for trust
(e.g. Fehr et al., 2002c; Bellemare & Kröger, 2007; Dohmen et al., 2008; Garbarino
& Slonim, 2009). But even physical variables such as height have been shown to
matter for economically relevant behavior, such as risk taking (Dohmen et al., 2011),
or trust and reciprocity (Dohmen et al., 2008).
The fourth set comprises variables on socialization and education. The first
dummy indicates whether the respondent is a german citizen with natural reference
category (relative frequency 0.942). It is intuitive that respondents with a recent
migration background might have more difficulties in trusting others, and there is
supporting evidence (Fehr et al., 2002c). The second dummy indicates whether the
respondent is member of a hierarchically organized religion, with all other or no re-
ligion as reference category (relative frequency 0.316). This variable is also used by
Fisman & Khanna (1999), and is motivated by claims of Putnam (1993a) that the
Catholic Church has discouraged the formation of a «habit of trust» by their strongly
hierarchical organization. La Porta et al. (1997) argued that this extends to any hi-
erarchically religious organization, in particular Catholic and Orthodox Christianity
and Islam. Thus, the above dummy indicates membership in those religions. The re-
maining variables are a set of five dummy variables that indicate the highest attained
educational degree, specifically the completion of a lower secondary level degree (rel-
ative frequency 0.315), an intermediate secondary level degree (0.292), an upper sec-
ondary level degree (0.072), a tertiary level degree (0.218), or other degree (0.046),
with reference category of no degree. There is also previous evidence indicating that
the level of eduction matters for trust. Using pooled time-series and cross-sectional
data from the US General Social Survey (GSS) from 1972 through 1996, and the
DDB-Needham Life Style survey data from 1975 through 1997, Hellwell & Putnam
(2007) find a significantly positive relationship between survey measured trust and
education. In their large-scale experiment Bellemare & Kröger (2007) find similar
evidence.
The fifth set consists of variables that describes the respondents’ social network.
The first two dummies indicate whether the respondent is in an active marriage (rela-
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tive frequency 0.612), or in a permanent relationship (0.172), with being single as ref-
erence category. Another variable contains the number of self-reported close friends
(mean 4.20, standard deviation 3.66). A dummy variable that indicates whether the
respondent is gainfully employed is intended to capture integration in a social net-
works at the workplace. Finally, a set of four dummy variables indicates whether the
respondent is integrated in spare time networks. Specifically, they indicate whether
the respondent is active in local politics (relative frequency 0.108), attends church
(0.475), volunteers (0.289), or is active in sports (0.664). In principle, all variables
come with an intuitively natural (positive) prediction on trust. However, more impor-
tantly for the present purposes the variables may drive both trust and communication
technology connectivity, since the marginal benefit of those technologies increase
with network inclusion, such that their omission may result in a bias.
Finally, a set of trust-related personal preferences or attributes is included. First,
it is well known from economic theory that impatience, discounting of the future, is a
critical derteminant of the willingness to cooperate (e.g. Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986;
Fudenberg et al., 1994). Thus, I include a self-reported measure of patience (mean
6.08, standard deviation 2.28), measured on a Likert scale from zero to 10 with in-
creasing values representing increasing patience. By the above argument patience
comes with a positive prediction. Second, I also include a self-reported measure of
impulsiveness (mean 5.09, standard deviation 2.19), measured on the same scale with
increasing values representing increasing impulsiveness. There are reasons while it
might matter but no unambigous prediction: on the one hand, impulsive people may
commit more «errors» which may disrupt trust relations more often, on the other hand
it may also serve as a commitment device to act trustworthy against the own imme-
diate self-interest more often (Frank, 1988), which may have repercussions (through
others’ reciprocity) on trust. Third, we also know from economic theory that risk
aversion (tolerance) tends to inhibit (encourage) trust (see Fehr, 2009a, for a dis-
cussion of the evidence), since it involves a risk of betrayal. I therefore include a
self-reported measures of risk preference (mean 4.44, standard deviation 2.30), also
measured on a Likert scale from zero to 10 with increasing values representing in-
creasing risk tolerance. The behavioral relevance of this item has been experimentally
validated (Dohmen et al., 2011). By the above reasons, this variable also comes with
a positive prediction.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Trust and landline connectivity
Confirming the results of Fisman & Khanna (1999), we find a clear positive relation-
ship between landline connectivity and survey measured trust. A raw comparison
between those respondents with a landline phone and those without shows that the
former exhibit a higher (simple) trust index than the latter: those with a phone score−0.640, those without a phone score −1.248, a difference that is significant using
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Table 7.1: Results of linear model estimations with the simple trust index as dependent
variable and landline connectivity as focal predictor.
OLS estimates
Trust index Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Landline 0.608 0.558 0.426 0.454 0.267 0.177 0.197
(0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079)
.000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .026 .013
State FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Income no no yes yes yes yes yes
Phys. demog. no no no yes yes yes yes
Soc. & educ. no no no no yes yes yes
Soc. netw. no no no no no yes yes
Preferences no no no no no no yes
Constant -1.248 -1.711 -2.383 -7.085 -5.324 -5.362 -6.269
(0.078) (0.115) (0.131) (0.540) (0.532) (0.523) (0.525)
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Obs 17,915 17,915 17,915 17,915 17,915 17,915 17,915
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R2 0.004 0.015 0.022 0.031 0.075 0.103 0.114
Robust Standard errors in parantheses, p-values in italics.
a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (p = .000).6 This difference is also captured by the
coefficient of linear model 1 in table 7.1. Since this difference may be driven by
regional-historic specifics that are correlated with both the dispersal of phones and
trust, I include state dummies to control for those fixed effects. The most salient of
such effects are differences between western and eastern states, the latter having a
clearly different history during the existence of the former German Democratic Re-
public. As evident from model 2 in table 7.1, this reduces the difference only slightly.
A second concern may be that the posession of a phone merely picks up an in-
come effect, so in model 3 I control for the logarithm of the net household income.
This variable has an independent positive and highly significant effect on the trust
index (see table 7.5 in the appendix). Furthermore, as evident from table 7.1 control-
ling for income further narrows the trust gap between phone owners and non-owners
to about 0.426.
As a next step, model 4 includes the set of natually exogenous (physical) demo-
graphics, such as height, weight, gender, and age. All variables have an independent
and statistically significant but modest effect on the trust index (see table 7.5 in the
appendix). The difference between phone owners and non-owners remains approxi-
mately constant (it even increases slightly to 0.454).
In model 5, I include indicators of German citizenship, membership in hierarchi-
6Using the factor trust index, the former group scores 0.019 and latter −0.229. For the individual
items, the differences are 0.256 vs. −0.008 for the first, 0.256 vs. −0.025 for the second, and −1.152
vs. −1.215 for the third. The markedly lower scores and the smaller difference suggest already that
the third item measures something slightly different than the other two items. I will come back to this
below.
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cal religions, and education. Citizenship has a statistically significant and quantita-
tively noteworthy independented effect in the predicted direction (see table 7.5 in the
appendix). In contrast to the predictions of Putnam (1993a) and La Porta et al. (1997),
and the results of Fisman & Khanna (1999), I do not find a statistically significant ef-
fect of membership in a hierarchically organized religion in the dataset. Supporting
the predictions (and earlier evidence) on the effect of education levels, respondents
with an upper secondary level or tertiary level degree exhibit a markedly higher (sim-
ple) trust index than respondents without a degree. Those effects are the strongest
among all variables included (table 7.5). Controlling for this cluster of variables nar-
rowes the gap between phone owners and non-owners considerably, with a difference
of 0.267 remaining. The vast majority of this narrowing stems from the inclusion of
the education variables, suggesting that phone ownership picks up education effects
to some extent.
I further extend the model by the set of variables that are aimed at capturing
the respondents’ social network. I do not find any independent effects of whether the
respondent is in a permanent relationship (including marriage) or gainfully employed.
However, the number of friends and whether the respondents participates in local
social activities, such as politics, church, sports, or volunteering are all significant
and positive predictors of measured trust (see table 7.5). As predicted, controlling
for this cluster of variables narrowes the gap between phone owners and non-owners
considerably further, with a difference of 0.177 remaining.
As a final step, I include the set of variables on trust-related personal preferences
or attributes. As evident from table 7.5 in the appendix, patience and risk tolerance
have the predicted independent effects on trust, which is interesting on its own. Im-
pulsiveness also has a positive and significant coefficient, albeit somewhat weaker
than the other two variables. Controlling for this cluster of variables widenes the gap
between phone owners and non-owners somewhat, with a new difference of 0.197.
Thus, the other control variables seem to absorb some effects of those individual
characteristics if it is not controlled for them.
In sum, the (measured) trust gap between phone owners and non-owners clearly
remains statistically significant at the five-percent level throughout all specifications,
but diminishes somewhat through the intoduction of variables indicating a respon-
dent’s level of education and local social network. Fisman & Khanna (1999) did not
control for neither, such that their results may be upwards biased.
In table 7.2 the results of some checks of robustness are shown. In the first row, I
reestimate the models using Tobit and Ordered Probit methods. Evidently, the results
are very robust to these variations. In the second row I use the factor trust index as
an alternative dependent variable. By recalling that this index has a different range,
it is evident that the results are robust to this alternative specification as well. In
third, four, and fifth row, respectively, I reestimate the models with each of the three
survey items separately, respectively (recall that each of them varies between −2 and
2). Apparently, the results become somewhat stronger with the first two items, in
particular the second, while the third item seems to measure something else, which
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Table 7.2: Robustness checks: Landline coefficients using different dependent variables and
estimation methods.
OLS Tobit Ordered Probit
Dependent variable Model 1 Model 7 Model 1 Model 7 Model 1 Model 7
Simple Index 0.608 0.197 0.635 0.208 0.243 0.081
(0.080) (0.080) (0.083) (0.082) (0.033) (0.034)
.000 .013 .000 .011 .000 .018
Factor Index 0.248 0.082 0.259 0.087 0.248 0.085
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
.000 .010 .000 .009 .000 .013
Item 1 0.264 0.089 0.291 0.097 0.246 0.083
(0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.037) (0.039)
.000 .016 .000 .019 .000 .034
Item 2 0.281 0.119 0.342 0.142 0.248 0.107
(0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.003) (0.035) (0.036)
.000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .003
Item 3 0.064 -0.012 0.124 -0.027 0.081 -0.017
(0.030) (0.031) (0.054) (0.055) (0.035) (0.037)
.033 .697 .021 .629 .020 .639
Tabulated are the regression coefficients of the landline connectivity indicator. Robust Standard errors in parantheses,
p-values in italics.
is perhaps not that surprising because it asks specifically about «strangers» while the
others refer to people «as a whole».
The fact that the results are strongest using the second item («Nowadays one can’t
rely on anyone») alone is interesting, because one might argue that this item refers
more to the respondents’ belief about others’ trustworthiness, while the other two
refer more to the respondents’ behavioral tendencies what one normally does. If this
is correct, then this would be nicely consistent with standard economic theory which
predicts that effects of information on behavior are completely mediated by beliefs.
I now prusue this idea further.
7.3.2 Expectations
According to standard economic theory combined with recent experimental evidence,
trust is driven by both beliefs about others’ trustworthiness and preferences. Impor-
tantly, not only preferences towards risk or ambiguity but social preferences as well
(Cox, 2004; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008; Ashraf et al., 2006;
Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010; Fehr, 2009a). The GSS/WVS contains an addional
item that appears to be more directly asking about the beliefs in others’ trustwor-
thiness. It reads «Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if
they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?» with possible responses «would take
advantage» and «would try to be fair». Gächter et al. (2004) found it significantly
correlated with contribution behavior in the public good game experiment mentioned
above, that is, if people believe that most others are fair, then they also contributed
more to the experiment.
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Thöni et al. (2012) conducted a large-scale public good experiment with a sample
that was representative for the Danish population in which they connected contribu-
tion behavior in the experiment to survey measures. Consistent with previous stud-
ies, they find that the GSS/WVS generalized trust item has significant explanatory
power for contribution behavior in the experiment. However, they go a step further
in providing evidence that the GSS/WVS generalized trust item seems to measure
preferences but not beliefs (i.e. responses to the question explain how much people
contribute given their beliefs about others’ contributions, but not how optimistic they
are about other peoples’ tendency to cooperate), whereas the expexted fairness item
seems to measure beliefs but not preferences. They speculate that this is consistent
with the way the questions are stated: the trust item evokes thoughts about what the
respondent generally does («you can’t be too careful») while the fairness item evokes
thoughts about how other people generally behave («would they try to be fair?»).
Since, as argued above, any effect of information on behavior should be (theoret-
ically) mediated by beliefs, the above results should be qualitatively no different if
the dependent variable is replaced by the expected fairness item. The SOEP contains
the item unaltered, so I am able to investigate this hypothesis. I code the affirmative
response as one, respectively, and estimate the same model specifications as in the
previous section. Since the response variable is binary (a relative frequency of 0.541
responded «would try to be fair»), I use logistic regression instead.7
The results are shown in table 7.3. Evidently, the results are remarkably similar
to the previous ones. Furthermore, including the expected fairness item into the re-
gressions reported above should absorb any direct effect of phone connectivity on the
trust index. This turns out to be the case. Including the expected fairness item into
the OLS estimation of model 7 with the simple trust index as dependent variable, the
coefficient of the phone indicator becomes smaller and insignificant (0.107, p= .134),
whereas the coefficent of the expected fairness item is huge and significant (2.225,
p = .000). Sobel-Goodman mediation tests turn out to be significant at the 0.1 percent
level. This reinforces the hypothesis that the expected fairness item measures beliefs
about others’ trustworthiness. Those results also render it more difficult, albeit not
impossible, to argue that the phone indicator coefficient reflects reverse causality.
7.3.3 Further communication technologies
As final step, I expand model 7 to include the additional communication technology
indicators, cellular phone, narrow bandwidth internet, broad bandwidth internet, and
television. The results of this expandent model (model 8) using again three different
estimation techniques are summarized in table 7.4. The coefficient of the landline
phone indicator decreases a little, but remains significant at the five percent level.
7I also performed Probit regressions that yield approximately the same results, so I omit them here.
They are, of course, available upon request. Note that 250 observations of respondents that did not
answer the fairness item got lost in the regressions. However, restricting the previous analysis on this
slightly smaller sample did not have any significant effect. Results on this checks are available upon
request as well.
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Table 7.3: Results of logistic regressions with the expected fairness item as dependent vari-
able and landline connectivity as focal predictor.
Logit estimates
Trust index Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Landline 0.399 0.367 0.306 0.226 0.164 0.137 0.148
(0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
.000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .039 .027
State FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Income no no yes yes yes yes yes
Phys. demog. no no no yes yes yes yes
Soc. & educ. no no no no yes yes yes
Soc. netw. no no no no no yes yes
Preferences no no no no no no yes
Constant -0.211 -0.552 -0.881 -4.135 -3.253 -3.360 -3.959
(0.061) (0.094) (0.108) (0.461) (0.464) (0.467) (0.472)
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Obs 17,665 17,665 17,665 17,665 17,665 17,665 17,665
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.017 0.030 0.044 0.048
Robust Standard errors in parantheses, p-values in italics.
Table 7.4: Results of linear model estimations with the trust index as dependent variable and
additional connectivity as focal predictors.
Model 8
Trust index OLS Tobit Ordered Probit
Landline 0.171 0.180 0.069
(0.082) (0.085) (0.035)
.037 .034 .051
Cellular 0.020 0.024 0.007
(0.063) (0.065) (0.027)
.751 .714 .808
Internet narrow -0.011 -0.007 -0.001
(0.038) (0.059) (0.017)
.780 .885 .930
Internet broad 0.187 0.193 0.084
(0.042) (0.043) (0.018)
.000 .000 .000
Television -0.382 -0.383 -0.173
(0.121) (0.126) (0.054)
.002 .002 .001
Controls yes yes yes
Constant -5.948 -6.161
(0.536) (0.550)
.000 .000
Obs 17,915 17,915 17,915
Prob > F .000 .000
Adj. R2 0.115
Prob > χ2 .000
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.028
Robust Standard errors in parantheses, p-values in italics.
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Owning a cellular phone on top has no additional independent effect. A narrow band-
width internet connection (relative no internet connection) also has no significant ef-
fect. The coefficient of the broad bandwidth internet connectivity indicator, however,
is positive, highly significant, and slightly larger than that for landline connectivity.
This is interesting and is consistent with the fact that the internet has become a major
communication medium, both two-way and public address.
Remarkable, however, is the quantitatively and statistically significant coefficient
of the television indicator, which is strongly negative. Investigating the robustness
and universality of this effect and possible explanations is perhaps an interesting av-
enue for further research. A speculative hypothesis would be that people without a
TV set are less exposed to reports about opportunistic behavior, but base their beliefs
more on their personal environment which can be expected to be more balanced with
respect to instances of trustworthy and opportunistic behavior.
7.4 Conclusion
I have replicated the results of Fisman & Khanna (1999) (i) using a large cross-section
of recent individual level micro-data taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP), (ii) an improved, more fine-git, and experimentally validated measure of
generalized trust, and (iii) using alternative estimation methods. I extended on the
study by (i) controlling for a much larger set of confounding variables, (ii) drawing
on an experimentally validated measure of beliefs into others trustworthiness in order
to investigate whether the effect of communication technology on measured trust is
mediated through measured beliefs, as predicted by economic theory, and (iii) ex-
tending the set of considered communication technologies to include cellular phones,
internet (both narrow and broad bandwidth), and television.
I found that the follwing. First, the results show a gap in measured trust between
those repondents who have a landline phone in their household and those who do
not, confirming the results of Fisman & Khanna (1999). Second, the existence of
this gap is robust to alternative estimation techniques and the specific construction
of the dependent variable. Third, I find that this gap also using the item intended
to measure beliefs in others’ trustworthiness more directly. Furthermore, including
the variable into the original specification as a predictor, the gap vanishs, suggesting
that the effect is indeed mediated by beliefs. Fourth, the gap narrows significantly as
variables that capture the level of education and local network inclusion are controlled
for. Since Fisman & Khanna (1999) did not control for those variables, their results
might be biased upwards. Fifth, there are no signficant effects of celluar phone or
narrow bandwidth internet connectivity, but there is a significantly positive effect of
broad bandwidth internet connectivity, and a significantly negative effect of television
ownership. The order of magnitude of the latter effect is considerable, and may be an
interesting input for further research.
There are, however, still important caveats remaining. First, I followed Fisman &
Khanna (1999) in just assuming a causal direction. Economic theory provides good
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reasons for this assumption, but empirically I cannot rule out reverse causality with
the data at hand. Such a reversed relationship would boil down to the assumption
with which I introduced this chapter, namely that trust is indeed (to some extent)
exogenous. If one wants to believe this story (definite evidence is still lacking, see
Fehr, 2009a) one could easily construct cases in which individuals’ trust drives their
technology adoption. The results around the expected fairness item are, of course,
not easy to reconcile with this story. However, I cannot exclude such a possibility
beyond doubt, such that any causal interpretation of the present results is to be made
with due care.
Second, despite that I have included a large set of control variables, there may still
be an omission bias such that the magnitude of the relationships is to be taken with
care as well. In extreme, there is still the possibility that there is no relationship at all.
Addressing these shortcomings, possibly complemented by experimental research,
would be an interesting avenue for further research.8
Appendix
8The items on trust and on the household’s technology equipment are included only on a irregular
basis for time to time. The 2008 wave is currently the only one in which both item batteries were
included at the same time. If this happens again in the future, it would also be interesting to construct a
panel dataset in order to get even more robust estimates and study individual level dynamics.
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Table 7.5: Additional results of linear model estimations with the simple trust index as de-
pendent variable.
Model 7 Model 8
Trust index OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Income (log) 0.057 0.059 0.056 0.058
.000 .000 .000 .000
Female 0.192 0.205 0.197 0.209
.000 .000 .000 .000
Age 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007
.001 .001 .000 .000
Height 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015
.000 .000 .000 .000
Weight -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
.000 .000 .000 .000
German citizen 0.382 0.405 0.371 0.393
.000 .000 .000 .000
Hier. religion -0.025 -0.028 -0.020 -0.022
.564 .530 .653 .617
Lower second. deg. -0.249 -0.252 -0.240 -0.243
.005 .006 .006 .008
Int. second. deg. 0.018 0.022 0.008 0.012
.841 .808 .923 .894
Upper second. deg. 0.822 0.837 0.795 0.810
.000 .000 .000 .000
Tertiary deg. 0.907 0.919 0.869 0.879
.000 .000 .000 .000
Other deg. -0.100 -0.107 -0.097 -0.103
.398 .385 .415 .403
Married -0.052 -0.047 -0.081 0.079
.273 .328 .093 .113
Steady partner 0.043 0.055 0.028 0.039
.471 .367 .643 .525
Close friends 0.068 0.070 0.068 0.070
.000 .000 .000 .000
Employed -0.010 -0.006 -0.022 -0.019
.819 .901 .611 .679
Local politics 0.175 0.178 0.173 0.176
.003 .003 .004 .004
Volunteering 0.223 0.227 0.220 0.224
.000 .000 .000 .000
Church 0.368 0.382 0.369 0.382
.000 .000 .000 .000
Sports 0.246 0.261 0.232 0.247
.000 .000 .000 .000
Patience 0.086 0.089 0.086 0.089
.000 .000 .000 .000
Impulsiveness 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
.001 .002 .002 .002
Risk tolerance 0.065 0.067 0.064 0.066
.000 .000 .001 .000
Constant -6.269 -6.481 -5.948 -6.161
.000 .000 .000 .000
Obs 17,915 17,915 17,915 17,915
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .000
Adj. R2 0.114 0.115
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.026
In order to fit the table on a single page, the robust standard errors are not but only p-values are reported (in italics).
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Final Remarks
With the studies in chapters 3 through 7 I have made steps toward extending the litera-
ture on cooperation in considering information structures as endogenous. I motivated
this line of research by conjecturing that doing so might have a number of interesting
implications, in particular that (i) individuals might adopt strategies that produce en-
tirely different cooperative and sanctioning behaviors if we allow players to acquire
more accurate information (at a cost), and (ii) that individuals also have the option
to forgo the opportunity, to stay delibertely «blind». I found confirming evidence
in chapters 3 through 6. Understanding more about the motivational fine-structure
of the «blind punisher» and the «blind trustor» might be an interesting avenue for
further research. Considering indefinite horizon settings would also be interesting
to draw more explicit connections to the theoretical (folk theorem) literature. An-
other interesting route would be to extend the setting to study not only monitoring
but also information transmission or pooling in a matching game, like those consid-
ered in sections 1.4 and 2.5. These steps would also underpin the results obtained in
chapter 7 experimentally. In sum, there are vast opportunities to further extend the
experimental (and theoretical) literature in ways to the study transparency as an en-
dogenous («equilibrium») phenomenon, which is shaped by the players’ information
acquisition and transmission behavior.
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